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This thesis examines the continued applicability of the
bastion concept as a basic assumption of the Maritime
Strategy with respect to the new Soviet military doctrine.
The methodology employed involves an examination of Soviet
literature, naval hardware, and exercise/operating patterns
to determine if there has been a shift in the Soviet
emphasis upon protecting the SSBN force. The results show
that even though the Soviets have made certain changes in
the political aspects of their military doctrine, they will
most likely continue to emphasize the protection of the SSBN
as the primary mission of the Soviet Navy in the event of a
war. In fact, as the numbers of strategic nuclear warheads
are reduced by future arms control proposals, such as START,
the Soviets will probably consider the protection of the
SSBN force to be more important than in the past.
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Geopolitically, the Soviet Union first and foremost is a
landpower, and her political leaders and military estab-
lishment inevitably have the strategic culture of a
landpower. The United States is a seapower, leads a
maritime alliance that dwarfs in its total defense mobili-
zation potential the assets of the Soviet imperium, and
requires a national/maritime coalition strategy that both
plays to Western strengths and copes adecjuately with
Western vulnerabilities. .. .A continental landpower cannot
be defeated at sea, but a maritime alliance most certainly
can be.-^
A. STATEMENT OF THE THESIS
This research will review the intellectual development
and present applicability of the Maritime Strategy;
specifically, the relevance of the bastion concept as a
primary assumption and critical linkage between the Maritime
Strategy and the new Soviet military doctrine. A careful
review of the Soviet literature, hardware, and operations
will be conducted to determine the primary movitvations for
the apparent changes in Soviet military doctrine to see if a
change in the naval aspect of Soviet military strategy can
be determined, and, if it is discovered that changes do in
fact exist, what the implications might be for the present
Maritime Strategy.
^Colin S. Gray, "Keeping the Soviets Landlocked:
Geostrategy for a Maritime America," The National Interest .
No. 4, Summer 1986, p. 24.
B. AN ERA OF CHANGE
The U.S. Maritime Strategy was first formally introduced
as a coherent plan by the Secretary of the Navy John Lehman
in March, 1984. Secretary Lehman described the strategy as
the maritime component of the National Military Strategy
represented by National Security Decision Directive-32
(NSDD-32) . The introduction of the strategy instigated a
tremendous debate among such top defense intellectuals as
Robert Komer and Colin Gray. The topics of this debate have
covered the entire spectrum from the financial risks of the
strategy to its strategic soundness. However, the basic
principles which were argued so vigorously by both the
proponents and critics of the Maritime Strategy were by no
means unique and, in fact, have their modern intellectual
roots firmly embedded in the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries.
When Mikhail Gorbachev became the General Secretary of
the Communist Party of the Soviet Union another twist was
added to the debate. Gorbachev wasted no time in making it
very clear that the policies of the Party were taking, by
most Soviet standards, a radically different course from
those of his predecessors. The sincerity and actual degree
of the changes being introduced by Gorbachev are still under
debate, and will continue to be for the indefinite future,
but one thing is perfectly clear: the rhetoric of the
General Secretary and other senior Party officials has
definitely altered, and seems to suggest, at the very least,
an attempt by Gorbachev and his ideological colleagues to
introduce some manifest and sweeping changes in the policies
of the Soviet Union.
Some of Gorbachev's new policies, as represented by the
"party's monopoly on interpretation. . .of today's two talis-
manic words" perestroika (restructuring) and glasnost
(openness) , appear to be largely social and economic in
content. 2 However, it has become increasingly clear that
the General Secretary also means for his new policies to
have military implications. Richard Haver, the Deputy
Director of Naval Intelligence, has noted.
Creating a vital Soviet civilian economy may come
partially at the expense of the military. Thus, to help
implement perestroika, the Soviet Union has developed a
"defensive doctrine," and Secretary Gorbachev suggests




The complete implications of Gorbachev's policies on
Soviet military strategy remain to be seen. However, it is
not simply idle conjecture to suggest that some changes in
Soviet military strategy will be necessary and that,
furthermore, are currently being manifested. The current
(1988) downtrend in the Soviet Navy's operational tempo as
well as the Soviet willingness to make drastic cuts in their
^George Will, "Gorbachev's Motives," The Monterey
Herald, 15 May 1988, p. B-2
.
-^Richard Haver, "The Soviets Perspective," Naval
Institute Proceedings . May 1988, p. 234.
nuclear and conventional arsenals may both be indications of
such a change.
Even if such fundamental strategic decisions are
currently being made by the Soviet leadership it could be
several years before substantial evidence is available. The
military historian and strategist Trevor Dupuy has suggested
that
There have been three basic preconditions historically for
assimilation of new... ideas:
1. An imaginative, knowledgeable leadership on military
affairs, supported by extensive knowledge of, and
competence in, the nature and background of the
existing military system.
2. Effective coordination of the nation's economic,
technological-scientific, and military resources.
3. Opportunity for battlefield experimentation as a
basis for education and analysis."*
It is at best extremely difficult to determine if the
present Gorbachev leadership possesses all three of these
ingredients. There is no doubt that the Soviets have an
extremely high knowledge of military affairs and spend a
great deal of time in the pursuit of "scientific" military
strategy. It is also apparent that Gorbachev, as well as
his predecessors, have shown immense concern about the
effective coordination of the Soviet Union's economic and
scientific resources for military purposes. Nevertheless,
even with these two pieces of the puzzle apparently in
"^Trevor Dupuy, The Evolution of Weapons and Warfare .
Indianapolis: Bob Merrill Co. Inc., 1980, p. 305.
place, there are still far more questions than answers. For
example, many Sovietologists have serious doubts whether
Gorbachev will manage to survive the decade of the 1980s as
the political and ideological leader of the Soviet communist
party, or if the powerful Soviet military will be willing to
accept the cuts in spending that Gorbachev's policies seem
to portend.
If all of the conditions cited by Dupuy are present,
there is still a considerable delay: "When these conditions
have been present, there has usually been a time lag of
approximately 2 years, or one generation, between the
initial experimental adoption of a new (idea)... and its
full assimilation."^ Thus, although the Soviets are now
spending a good deal of time discussing such ideas as
"reasonable sufficiency" or "non-offensive defense," Dupuy 's
argument would suggest that the fundamental changes in
Soviet military strategy being adopted by Gorbachev will not
be fully implemented, and therefore fully evident to the
West, until shortly after the turn of the century. This is
assuming that Gorbachev is able to convince the opponents of
his new ideas of their importance to the Soviet military, an
important assumption at this point. Obviously, this by no
means precludes the necessity of carefully studying the
Soviet military in order to gain a glimpse, no matter how
slight, of what these changes might mean. If Gorbachev is
^Dupuy, The Evolution of Weapons and Warfare , p. 305.
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successful then it may be too late for the West to react 2
years down the line when the changes become more evident.
It is important that we begin to study the possible
significance of these changes now, so that there are no
surprises later.
C. STRATEGIC NECESSITIES
Before a specific discussion of the Maritime Strategy
can be reviewed, the general nature of military strategy and
what makes a strategy a success or failure must be
evaluated. Strategies in general help determine how to
implement the proper amount and type of resources, at the
proper moment, against the appropriate enemy. In order to
meet these demands and still be successful and acceptable, a
strategy must satisfy three criteria: affordability,
flexibility, and applicability.
The issue of affordability is probably the most basic
litmus test which can be applied to any potential strategy.
Obviously, in the American political system any strategy
which is exorbitantly expensive stands no chance of passing
through the top military leadership which must sell the
strategy to the Congress.
The Maritime Strategy proposed a 600 ship Navy with 15
aircraft carriers and 100 nuclear attack submarines. The
affordability of such a Navy became one of the central
arguments of the Maritime Strategy. Opponents insisted that
this would pull vital resources away from both the Army and
the Air Force, especially in the critical NATO central
front. Lehman and his backers countered by pointing out
that the United States is an island continent with over 40
treaty relationships around the world. Since the Soviets
have developed an offensively oriented blue water navy the
top U.S. Navy planners believe that 600 ships is the
absolute minimum necessary to meet these demanding
obligations.
^
Flexibility refers to the ability of a strategy to deal
with a myriad of possible crises. Although such a criterion
may seem to be rather self evident, the experiences of the
French Army at the beginning of World War II provide an
excellent example of what can happen if a strategy suffers
from tunnel vision.
The architects of the Maritime Strategy attempted to
make flexibility one of the cornerstones of the entire
strategy. The strategy was specifically designed to deter
"a continuum of violence that threatens our vital interests,
running all the way from the terrorism we have seen so
tragically in recent days at one end of the spectrum of
violence, all the way to thermonuclear war."^
Any realistic strategy must be built around a basic set
of assumptions about the strategy of potential enemies.
^The 600 Ship Naw and the Maritime Strateqv . U.S.
Government Printing Office, 1986, p. 110.
"^
The 600 Ship Navy and the Maritime Strategy , p. 16.
These assumptions must be an accurate reflection of how the
opponent's strategy is perceived. If these assumptions
prove to be wrong, or if the enemy changes his strategy,
then the present strategy becomes not only irrelevant but
possibly dangerous.
It is ironic that the most critical of the three
criteria applied to military strategy, applicability, is the
least criticized aspect of the Maritime Strategy. This is
perhaps due to the basic nature of determining an opponent's
military strategy, especially when the primary opponent is a
part of a very closed and obsessively secretive society such
as the Soviet Union. In the simplest terms, this means that
a certain amount of guess-work must take place in order to
place the pieces of the puzzle together into a coherent
whole. This is not to imply that the development of the
Maritime Strategy was based upon a group of random estimates
of the Soviet's intentions in case of a future war, but it
does indicate that, considering the Soviet talent for
strategic deception and the obtuse manner in which they
explain themselves, strategic planning against the Soviets
must be very carefully thought out and, more importantly,
constantly examined and reexamined.
D. U.S. MARITIME STRATEGY
Despite an increase in global commitments, the United
States Navy underwent a drastic reduction in its force
structure in the decade after the Vietnam war. In terms of
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actual numbers the U.S. Navy went from 960 ships in 1967 to
479 ships in 1980. There is no doubt that the drastic
reduction was due to block obsolescence in the wake of the
withdrawal of the United States from the war in Vietnam as
well as the public distrust of the military that followed.
Deserved or not, the 1970s proved to be a very difficult
period not only for the U.S. Navy, but for the entire U.S.
military in general.
By the end of the 1970s the fact that the U.S. Navy had
shrunk to nearly half of its original size meant that
national policies had to focus more and more on a defensive
sea control strategy for the Navy, which emphasized
protecting the sea lines of communication (SLOC) from enemy
vessels. Many of the top ranking officers in the Navy
realized that such a defensive strategy would be a distinct
disadvantage in the case of a prolonged conventional war.
In reaction to the shrinking force levels a Naval force
planning study called Sea Plan 2000 was produced in March
1978. As the chairman of the group that produced the study
explained, "The current trend is to strengthen our convoy
escort forces at the expense of our amphibious forces,
battle groups, and attack submarines. What I am proposing
is that this set of priorities be altered...."^ In order to
emphasize the need for a more aggressive strategy. Sea Plan
^F.J. West, "A Fleet for the Year 2000: Future Force
Structure," Naval Institute Proceedings . June 1980, p. 76.
2000 recommended a forward deterrence posture aided by 600
ships and 15 carriers, all of which would later be important
aspects of the Maritime Strategy.
One of the more vocal and important proponents of a
different naval strategy was the Chief of Naval Operations
Admiral Thomas B. Hayward. In May 1979 Admiral Hayward
stated, "Projecting power against the sources of Soviet
naval strength may well be the most rapid and efficient way
to gain control of the seas (as contrasted with the
simplistic concept held by many that Sea Control simply
means escorting convoys to Europe and little else)."^
The increase in military spending called for by the
Reagan administration meant that the supporters of a
different naval strategy could make themselves heard. As a
result the newly appointed Secretary of the Navy, John
Lehman, could call for the building of "a balanced mix of
approximately thirty ships per year to achieve a truly
capable fleet of about 600 ships and 15 battle groups" less
than three months after taking office. ^^
The Maritime Strategy, as can be expected, has not been
without its opponents and criticisms. The primary
objections to the strategy can be broken down into two
fundamental categories: conventional and nuclear.
^Thomas B. Haward, "The Future of Soviet Sea Power,"
Naval Institute Proceedings . May 1979, p. 68.
'^John Lehman, Testimony before the Senate Armed
Services Committee, FY1982, part 4, p. 2267.
Conventional critics normally object to the Maritime Srategy
as a war fighting strategy in a conventional war; nuclear
opponents criticize it because they fear it will inevitably
escalate to a nuclear war.
The conventional opponents of the strategy, led by
strategic analysts and policy makers such as Robert Komer,
have essentially objected to the strategy because "sweeping
up the Soviet Navy would hardly suffice to prevent a great
Eurasian heartland power like the USSR from dominating our
chief allies. "^^ This school of thought, sometimes called
the Continental Strategy, believes that a future war will
ultimately be determined on the ground (most Continentalists
emphasize the NATO front in Central Europe) , and therefore,
the principal use of a Navy is to protect the SLOCs to
ensure that critical supplies can reach the front.
The existence of the Continental Strategy only
emphasizes that the basic conventional arguments for and
against the Maritime Strategy are not new. The main
argument of the Continental Strategy is essentially a
recurrence of the ideas first outlined by the eminent
geostrategist Halford Mackinder at the beginning of the
twentieth century. In opposition to Mackinder's
intellectual offspring, the maritime strategists are
l^Robert Komer, "Maritime Strategy vs. Coalition
Defense," Foreign Affairs . Summer 1982, pp. 1133-34.
repeating many of the ideas proposed by the American naval
strategist Alfred Mahan.
The nuclear opponents of the Maritime Strategy have a
basic, simple, and recurring theme: the Maritime Strategy
"contains the seeds of extremely rapid (nuclear)
escalation. "^2 These nuclear escalationists, led by Desmond
Ball and Barry Posen, all give a variety of reasons why the
implementation of the Maritime Strategy could lead to
nuclear war. The reasons are not as important here as the
implications: the U.S. Navy should rely on a more defensive
SLOC control strategy (amazingly similar to the very
strategic concepts the Maritime Strategy was employed to
avoid) in order to eliminate, as much as possible, the
possibility that a future war could escalate to nuclear
annihilation.
E. PRESENTATION OF THE PROBLEM
1. Inherent Problems of Strategic Planning
As previously discussed, the design of a strategy,
military or otherwise, requires basic assumptions about the
potential enemy's perceived strategy or reaction to your
strategy. It is important to realize that such assumptions
must, by their very nature, be based to some extent upon the
inferences of what the enemy will do. The reason is rather
simple, but often forgotten: unless the enemy allows access
12 Desmond Ball, "Nuclear War at Sea," International
Security . Winter 1985-86, p. 23.
to his war plans then the assumptions must be based upon the
small amount of empirical evidence that can be gathered.
The problem is further complicated by the fact that we can
never be certain that the enemy is not deliberately trying
to deceive us. Furthermore, even if the basic assumptions
do appear to be based on solid empirical evidence which is
not the product of a strategic deception, it is always
possible that the enemy will not act in war as he had
planned during peace.
Despite these many problems it is the job of the
strategic planner to use his surgeon's scalpel to make
precise cuts between the reality of the enemy's plan and the
wishful thinking which can all too often cloud our
objectivity. The primary and commonly accepted manner for
doing this, at least in the military arena, is to look at
three traditional areas: what the enemy says, how the enemy
practices what he says in exercises, and finally, how the
enemy actually operates.
By using this methodology some assumptions about the
enemy's military strategy can be pulled together. Some of
these assumptions will be primary assumptions which are
explicitly discussed in the context of the Maritime
Strategy; others will be secondary assumptions and, in fact,
are never specifically discussed or referred to when the
Maritime Strategy is described.
2. Primary Assumption of the Maritime Strategy
The Maritime Strategy is a force planning strategy
that was designed to counter a continuum of possible global
contingencies with emphasis on a global conventional war.
Since the strategy tends to emphasize the non-nuclear aspect
of a future war, it required some basic assumptions of how
the Soviets would fight a future conventional war.
The Soviets outlook on the nature of a future war
has changed significantly over the previous 3 years. On 14
January 1960 Soviet General Secretary Nikita Khrushchev
announced a new military doctrine for the Soviet Union. The
new doctrine proclaimed that a future war would begin with
"rocket strikes deep in the interior" of the warring
nations. ^^ The implications were clear, the Soviets felt
that a future war with the West "will inevitably take the
form of a nuclear rocket war."^^
By 1967, after the ouster of Khrushchev, the Soviets
underwent yet another change in military doctrine. The new
doctrine stressed that although the nuclear rocket is still
the primary weapon of war, it is possible that a future war
would be preceded by a conventional conflict, thus making
the development of conventional weapons more important than
they were under the previous doctrine. Many Western
13Harriet Scott and William Scott, The Armed Forces of
the USSR . Boulder: Westview Press, 1984, p. 42.
l^Scott, The Armed Forces of the USSR , p. 44.
theorists of the Soviet military attributed this shift in
doctrine to NATO's formal adoption of the flexible response
concept proposed in the United States a few years earlier. ^^
As a result of this doctrinal change, the Soviets
developed a system that would enable a strategic strike to
take place upon the United States from a submarine platform
which was deployed in the comparative safety of home
waters. ^^ The resulting system was the Delta class
submarine with the 4200 nm SS-N-8 missile. The Delta class
SSBN would thus be able to remain deployed in protected
"bastions" or "sanctuaries" which would be closely guarded
by the conventional Soviet fleet.
The idea that the Soviets would deploy their Delta
class submarines in protected bastions became known as the
"bastion concept." It was first developed by Western
analysts of Soviet naval affairs in the early 1970s and
accepted by the U.S. naval community by 1978.-^^ The bastion
concept has become one of the most important and central
assumptions of the Maritime Strategy.
^^Scott, The Armed Forces of the USSR , pp. 54-55. See
also Michael MccGwire, Military Objectives in Soviet Foreicrn
Policy . Brookings Institution, 1987, pp. 29-30. MccGwire
refers specifically to the 1960 Central Committee Plenum.
^^Michael MccGwire, Soviet Naval Policy; Objectives
and Constraints . M. MccGwire, K. Booth, J. McDonnel, eds.,
Praeger Publishers, 1975, p. 516.
^^Jan Breemer, "The Soviet Navy's SSBN Bastions:
Evidence, Inference, and Alternative Scenarios," Journal of
the Royal United Services Institute . March 1985, gives an
excellent outline of the bastion concept and its evolution.
3 . Purpose of this Research
In order to place the Maritime Strategy in the
proper context it is necessary to trace its intellectual
development from its Mahanian/Mackinderist roots to the
present day. Once this has been accomplished then it will
be shown that the maritimist arguments for and continental-
ist arguments against the Maritime Strategy are based
largely on present assumptions about the Soviet Navy which
were mostly developed in the early to mid 1970s.
The Maritime Strategy is obviously concerned
primarily with the Soviet Navy and its role within Soviet
military strategy. It is critical to show what the Navy's
role in Soviet military strategy has been, and what it is
today. If it becomes evident that there is an actual
change, or the indications of a trend, then not only will
the neo-Mahanians and neo-Mackinderists have to completely
reevaluate their arguments, but the U.S. Navy will be forced
to undertake a drastic reassessment of the Maritime Strategy
itself. A strategy that is based upon erroneous assumptions
is more dangerous than no strategy at all.
It is extremely crucial that the pertinence of the
assumptions about the Soviet naval aspect of military
strategy be reassessed to see if they closely reflect the
political-military reality as the Soviets see it. If it is
apparent that the Soviets are steadily moving away from a
bastion concept and, for example, have every intention of
causing severe damage to NATOs SLOCS, then the present
arguments for and against the Maritime Strategy, indeed the
very Strategy itself, become increasingly irrelevant as the
Soviets begin to develop the means to implement the new
strategy.
F. METHODOLOGY
The primary purpose of this research is to determine if
the bastion concept remains a valid assumption for the
Maritime Strategy with respect to the new Soviet military
doctrine. The bastion concept is really a very broad
assumption that encompasses several other implicit
assumptions, furthermore, it is not a concept that the
Soviets explicitly address—bastions and sanctuaries refer
to the Western interpretations. Therefore, the bastion
concept will be broken down into six more basic assumptions
which will be individually reviewed.
After discussing the development of the Maritime
Strategy and the bastion concept, the role and missions of
the Soviet Navy before Gorbachev will be reviewed with
respect to the six basic assumptions. This will be
accomplished primarily by evaluating the Soviet Navy through
the eyes of the man who commanded it for nearly 3 years:
Admiral Gorshkov.
Finally, there will be a thorough review of the changes
that have occurred in the Soviet military since Gorbachev
became General Secretary. The debate within the Soviet
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Union about implementing perestroika and its role in the
military is clearly still continuing. At this point, it
appears that the issues of the debate are primarily divided
between the military and the academicians. Since it is not
at all clear who has the advantage at this time, both sides
of the debate will be presented where applicable. Due to
the wide variety of Soviet analysts involved in the debate,
this is not meant to be a strictly formal content analysis.
Instead, a review of the more recent Soviet literature since
1985 will be conducted in an attempt to pull together some
of the more commonly recurring themes. By using this
method, a more sound understanding of the primary concerns
among the Soviet military and civilians can be obtained.
A review of the more recent Soviet literature on their
new military doctrine is insufficient to uphold or reject
the continuing validity of the six assumptions. Therefore,
the literature review is followed by a critique of the
Soviet arms control proposals as well as the trends in
Soviet naval hardware development, operations and exercises.
Drawing upon this body of evidence, the support, or lack of
support, for the six basic assumptions will be shown and
compared with the evidence of the pre-Gorbachev period.
Using this method, any current or future trends in the
Soviet military will hopefully become evident, and can
certain inferences about the present and near future
applicability of the bastion concept be drawn.
II. DEVELOPMENT OF A STRATEGY
Democracy refuses to think strategically unless and until
it is compelled to do so for purposes of defense.^
A. MODERN INTELLECTUAL ROOTS
The Maritime Strategy is not a strategy that is based
upon fundamentally new or unique concepts. Like all
strategies, the Maritime Strategy was evolved over a period
of several years and is based upon the combined combat
experience and strategic thought of many different people.
It is also a strategy that has been based upon many
important assumptions of how the Soviets will operate their
Navy in a future war. However, before discussing the more
important of these assumptions the development and current
oppostion to the Maritime Strategy will be reviewed. This
must be done in order to place the Maritime Strategy in its
proper context as a valid warfighting strategy.
Many of the current arguments concerning the Maritime
Strategy can be traced back nearly 100 years. At the turn
of the century two strategists, one American and the other
British, were printing some of the very ideas which would
become the centerpiece of the current argument. Therefore,
a discussion of the development of the modern strategy, and
-'Halford J. Mackinder, Democratic Ideals and Reality ,
New York: Henry Holt and Co., 1942, p. 23.
the principal arguments opposing it, must begin with a
review of the original ideas of Alfred T. Mahan and Halford
Mackinder.
1. Mahan and the Maritime Strategy
Alfred Thayer Mahan was a relatively undistinguished
naval officer until he was invited by the first president of
the newly created Naval War College in Newport, Rhode
Island, Commodore Stephen B. Luce, to "...raise maritime war
to the level of a science. ... "^ By the time of his death in
1914, Mahan had published 20 books and 137 articles and was
considered in many countries to be one of the preeminent
naval historians and strategists in the world. It is a
testament to the ideas of Mahan, which were not all entirely
original but were rather timely, that they continue to
influence the strategies and force structures of navies all
over the world to this very day. In fact, many of his more
important ideas were to be incorporated into the very
Maritime Strategy which guides the U.S. Navy to this day.
Mahan 's purpose in studying naval warfare was to
discover the few "principles of land warfare applicable by
analogy to war at sea."-^ His most important works were
lengthy studies of the British Navy and its effects upon
^Philip Crowl, "Alford Thayer Mahan: The Naval
Historian," Makers of Modern Strategy . Peter Paret ed.
,
Princeton University Press, 1986, p. 449.
^Crowl, "Alford Thayer Mahan: The Naval Historian," p.
450.
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European events between 1660 and 1812. His basic message
was rather simple: the sheer maritime predominance and sea
control strategy employed by Britain during this period of
history had a significant effect upon the outcomes of the
many wars fought between England and France.
Mahan focused upon the economic effects of the
British naval blockade of France during their decades of
war. According to Mahan, the superior size and quality of
the British fleet proved to be too much for the weaker
French Navy and allowed the blockade to succeed, thus
leading to the economic strangulation of France. However,
Mahan did not feel that the main function of a Navy was to
simply protect its commerce through a convoying system. A
navy must prevent its own economic lifelines from being cut
by aggressively attacking the enemy's, and this was best
accomplished by first destroying the enemy fleet. "The one
particular result which is the object of all naval action,
is the destruction of the enemy's organized force, and the
establishment of one's own control of the water. "^
Mahan ' s proposed methods for destroying the enemy
fleet was a decidedly aggressive and offensive naval
strategy. Furthermore, Mahan 's strategy called for a
forward defense of the critical maritime regions. "The true
stations for the British fleets... was before the hostile
"^Alfred T. Mahan, Sea Power in Its Relation to the War
of 1812 . 2 vols., p. 51, as cited in Crowl , "Alfred Thayer
Mahan: The Naval Historian," p. 458.
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ports and as close to them as might be."^ Once the fleet is
stationed as far forward as possible, the enemy fleet must
be engaged and destroyed, then control of the sea has been
established and the slow economic strangulation of the enemy
may commence.
As in all military campaigns, the front of operations of a
powerful fleet should be pushed as far towards the enemy
as is consistent with the mutual support of the various
detachments, and with secure communications with their
base. By so doing, not only are the great national
interests placed more remote from the alarms of war, but
the use of the region behind the front of operations, in
this case the sea, is secured to the power that can afford
to maintain its fighting line close to the enemy's
position.
^
Mahan was also aware of the deterrence value of a
modern and well trained navy. Although Mahan is generally
remembered for his emphasis on forcing an opposing fleet
engagement, his belief in the benefit of a modern navy as a
deterrent is not necessarily an inconsistency in his naval
philosophy; Mahan knew that a war was better avoided if
possible but "unless the position won is strategically
decisive. . .the battle might as well, or better, never been
fought."^ Furthermore, Mahan 's view on deterrence was that
it "implies not merely what shall be done to repel attack.
^Alfred T. Mahan, The Influence of Sea Power Upon the
Freeh Revolution an Empire . 2 vols.. Little Brown and Co.,
1898, p. 84.
^Mahan, The Influence of Sea Power Upon the Freeh
Revolution an Empire , p. 340.
^Mahan, Alfred T.
,
Naval Administration and Warfare .
Little Brown and Co., 1918, p. 136.
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but what is necessary to do in order that attack not be
attempted , or, if undertaken, may be resisted elsewhere than
at the national frontier, be that land or sea."^
In summary, to simplify and condense the thrust of
his major ideas. Admiral Mahan's naval strategy called for
the use of the fleet as far forward away from home shores as
possible. The fleet should be positioned to hopefully
dissuade the enemy from ever engaging in a battle but, if
that battle is pursued (for example, if war is declared)
,
then the primary function of the fleet is to protect its own
sea lines of communications by destroying the enemy's fleet
and, therefore, establishing complete maritime superiority
over the sea. Once this superiority is established then the
navy can begin to aggressively attack the enemy's commerce
and blockade his ports. By accomplishing these tasks the
navy could hopefully then "drive the enemy into the
battlefield of the Continental System, where his final ruin
is certain."^
Many of Mahan's ideas had an important influence on
the Maritime Strategy. For example, in the summer of 1981,
Secretary of the Navy John Lehman was just beginning to
express the ideas that would later comprise the Maritime
Strategy. The legacy of Admiral Mahan's ideas were
^Mahan, Naval Administration and Warfare , p. 172 (my
emphasis)
.
^Mahan, Naval Administration and Warfare , pp. 400-401.
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acknowledged form the very beginning. Lehman noted that
Mahan's concept of "command of the seas" was an extremely
important concept "which is so relevant today. "^^ The
development of the Maritime Strategy will be more fully
discussed later in this chapter. However, in order to
understand the influence of Mahan's ideas upon that strategy
it is necessary to briefly summarize Lehman's view of the
Maritime Strategy.
Lehman proclaimed that the primary function of that
strategy is to deter war. If this objective proved to be a
failure, then the purpose of the strategy was to then engage
the enemy in his own backyard. The destruction of the enemy
fleet in these forward areas would serve two basic func-
tions: it would keep the enemy busy and therefore protect
NATO's SLOCS; and it would hopefully lead to war termination
on grounds acceptable to the NATO alliance. In case of a
war with the Soviets, the U.S. Navy would
...stress forward deployments, including operations
capable of war-fighting and winning in areas denoted as
"high risk." Such an approach should force the Soviets,
historically dominated by continental horizons, to
concentrate more resources on homeland defense—and
possibly less on interdiction of U.S. sealanes.^^
Lehman ' s statements concerning the Maritime Strategy
could almost have been written by Mahan himself. The
parallels between the two are unmistakable. Mahan's
^^John F. Lehman, "Rebirth of a Naval Strategy,"
Strategic Review . Summer 1981, p. 11.
^^Lehman, "Rebirth of a Naval Strategy," p. 13.
principles of an aggressive forward strategy based as far
from home waters as possible, in order to destroy the enemy
fleet and protect vital supply lines are clearly evident in
the Maritime Strategy. Thus, it is fair to say that
although not all of Mahan's ideas are still relevant in
today's modern high technology world of supercomputers and
guided missiles, his concept of sea control is still alive
and well in the U.S. Maritime Strategy.
2 . Mackinder and the Continental Strategy
Hal ford Mackinder was a professor of geography at
the University of London and Oxford. He was never as
prolific as Mahan, but did manage to exert a tremendous
influence on strategic thinking and, in fact, is considered
to be the preeminent theoretician of geopolitics. Despite
Mahan's tremendous popularity among the British, Mackinder
managed to gather a significant following who felt that his
ideas and influence were "at least equal to Mahan's on those
who have power to shape the destiny of the world. "-^^
Mackinder 's ideas concerning the Heartland within
the World Island were originally published in 1904.
However, after World War I, when the allies were considering
the formation of the League of Nations, Mackinder was
compelled to publish his most important work. Democratic
Ideals and Reality . Mackinder 's primary concern was that
l^Mackinder, Democratic Ideals and Reality , p. xxi of
introduction.
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the League of Nations would be dominated by well intentioned
but idealistic principles that would render it ineffective
in a rapidly changing world. He understood very well that
rule by democracy meant "rule by consent of the average
citizen" who had very little strategic vision beyond his own
present and local concerns. Mackinder fervently believed
that "we must base our proposed League on realities, if we
would have it last. .. .Democracy must reckon with Reality. "^^
It is not accurate to depict Mackinder 's ideas in
complete opposition to the ideas of Mahan. Mackinder
understood the advantage of seapower, which is hardly
surprising for a British strategist at the turn of the
century. However, Mackinder feared that the immense success
enjoyed by the British empire due to its maritime predomi-
nance would lead to a dangerous over-confidence among future
strategic planners. Mahan 's belief that a predominant
seapower could dominate a war was precisely the attitude
that Mackinder most feared. In what must have been a subtle
warning to Admiral Mahan and his followers Mackinder wrote:
So impressive have been the results of British sea-power
that there has perhaps been a tendency to neglect the
warnings of history and to regard sea-power in general as
inevitably having, because of the unity of the ocean, the
last word in the rivalry with land-power.^"*
^•^Mackinder, Democratic Ideals and Realitv . p. 208.
^"^Mackinder, Democratic Ideals and Realitv
. p. 59.
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Mackinder believed, like Mahan, that his ideas
formed a strategic concept whose time had come. Prior to
the nineteenth century there was simply insufficient
manpower in the world island to make world domination a
possibility. The era when a powerful maritime nation could
dominate the world was coming to an end. The great
landpowers of the world were going to have ever increasing
strategical opportunities against the traditional seapowers.
The principal landpower of concern, according to
Mackinder, was any landpower who could dominate the
Heartland within what he called the World Island. The World
Island was comprised of the continents of Europe, Africa,
and Asia and, not only did it contain the majority of the
earth's land surface, at the time it contained seven-eighths
of the world population. The Heartland was a specific
region within the World Island which included the "Baltic
Sea, the navigable Middle and Lower Danube, the Black Sea,
Asia Minor, Armenia, Persia, Tibet, and Mongolia. "^^ Both
Germany and Russia were contained within the Heartland and
were the two principal powers vying for control.
Mackinder felt that any country that could manage to
gain control of the world island would have three signifi-
cant advantages over the traditional seapowers. The first
advantage was the tremendous gains made in land mobility
over the previous 50 years which immediately took away from
^^Mackinder, Democratic Ideals and Reality , p. 110.
27
seapower one of its historically most unique and significant
advantages. Mackinder believed that it was no longer a
given that seapower had an inherent advantage in mobility
over landpower. "Today armies have at their disposal not
only the Transcontinental Railway, but also the motor-
car. ... In short, a great military power in possession of
the Heartland. . .could take easy possession of the crossways
of the world "^^
The second significant advantage of a Heartland
power would be the access to a tremendous base upon which to
build seapower. Seapower is dependent upon the productivity
of the bases upon which it rests and, according to
Mackinder, the vast majority of the Heartland was still an
economically underdeveloped region with great potential. If
the economic potential of the Heartland was ever properly
developed then "East Europe and the Heartland would make a
mighty sea-base."
The third advantage of the Heartland power is the
most important advantage because it is often mentioned in
conjunction with arguments against the Maritime Strategy.
Any country in control of the Heartland would have the
geographic advantage of being in a region which is
"inaccessible" to sea power. This advantage was considered
to be so important by Mackinder that he often used this
explanation to define the Heartland. "The Heartland is the
16Mackinder, Democratic Ideals and Realitv . p. 111.
region [to] which, under modern conditions, sea-power can be
refused access. "^'^ In sum, Mackinder believed that any
country which had control of the Heartland and had the
proper combinations of land mobility and economic
productivity, while being protected from the reach of
seapower, could rule the world.
What if the Great Continent, the whole World-Island or a
large part of it, were at some future time to become a
single and united base of sea-power? Would not the other
insular bases be outbuilt as regards ships and outnumbered
as regards seaman? Their fleets would no doubt fight with
all the heroism ^begotten of their histories, but the end
would be fated. ^"18
Mackinder realized that the two powers vying for
control of the Heartland were Germany and Russia. But in
1919 Germany had just lost World War I and had signed the
Treaty of Versailles. Russia had also been defeated in the
war, had undergone a revolution, and was still in the midst
of a civil war. However, Mackinder knew that Russia would
continue to be a menace due to her large population and
influence in Eastern Europe. "Nature there offers all the
prerequisites of ultimate dominance in the world... and the
Russian peoples are Growing Concerns. . .with a powerful
historical momentum. "-^^
Mackinder 's solution to the inevitable power
struggle that would occur between Russia and Germany for
^"^Mackinder, Democratic Ideals and Reality , p. 110.
^^Mackinder, Democratic Ideals and Reality , p. 70.
l^Mackinder, Democratic Ideals and Reality , p. 170.
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control of the Heartland was a group of independent
countries placed between the two powers. Obviously, this
group of countries would have to be the Eastern European
countries but this was especially important because:
Who rules Eastern Europe commands the Heartland;
Who rules the Heartland commands the World Island;
Who rules the World Island commands the World. ^^
Mackinder's Heartland thesis is perhaps more
relevant in this day of mass transportation and global
communications. However, many of the opponents of the
Maritime Strategy tend to point to Mackinder's ideas as
irrefutable proof of the futility of a maritime strategy
against a heartland power like the Soviet Union. Such a
point may be valid but it seems to miss an important point
that the proponents of the Maritime Strategy often make:
the U.S. Navy is not attempting to win the war through the
Maritime Strategy, it is trying to prevent NATO from losing
it.
B. DEVELOPMENT OF SOVIET MILITARY DOCTRINE
The bastion concept is essentially the assumption that
the Soviet Navy will maintain the majority of its SSBN force
deployed safely within waters contiguous to the Soviet Union
(the obvious exceptions would be the Yankee SSBNs that are
deployed in the West Atlantic and the Golf Class SSBs that
^^Mackinder, Democratic Ideals and Realitv . p. 150.
are in the Baltic) . In order to fully understand how this
concept came to be viewed by the U.S. intelligence community
it is necessary to give a brief description of how Soviet
military doctrine has evolved over the last 3 years.
1. Development of Soviet Militarv Doctrine
The Soviet use of the word military doctrine, like
most words the Soviets use to explain a concept, is very
specific in meaning. Doctrine refers to the official
communist party line and, once it has been decided, there is
very little or no room to argue about doctrine once it is
promulgated. On 14 January 1960, Nikita Khrushchev
announced that the Soviet Union "has powerful rocketry. The
present level of military technique being what it is, the
Air Force and the Navy have lost their former importance....
Our armed forces have to a considerable degree been switched
to rocket and nuclear weapons. "^l Although Khrushchev
provided ' no explanations about why the Soviet Union had
switched to a nuclear dominated military this question was
quickly answered by his minister of defense. Marshal R. Ya.
Malinovskiy
:
One of the important positions of this doctrine is that a
world war, if it nevertheless is unleashed by the
imperialist aggressors, will inevitably take the form of
nuclear rocket war, that is, such a war where the main
means of striking will be the nuclear weapon and the basic
^^Harriet Scott and William Scott, eds.. The Soviet Art
of War . Boulder: Westview Press, 1982, p. 163.
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means of delivering it to the target will be the
rocket 22
Soviet military thought was almost exclusively
dominated by this nuclear doctrine for the next eight years.
Almost all Soviet pronouncements concerning the nature of a
future war were verbatim repetitions of Malinovskiy. Even
Marshal V. D. Sokolovskiy ' s book Military Strategy , still
one of the more authoritative works on military doctrine
openly published by the Soviets, proved to be a careful
observance of the official Soviet policy. In fact, the
majority of Sokolovskiy ' s book dealt with nuclear war as a
modern phenomenon which Soviet military strategy was
adopting to its advantage.
In the period from 1966 to 1968 there was
substantial evidence that a change in Soviet military
doctrine had occurred. The change was not a radical change,
but considering the glacial pace at which the Soviets seem
to change their official doctrine it was a significant
change. The official doctrine now claimed that a future war
with the West would still be nuclear but acknowledged that
it could be preceded by a phase in which conventional
weapons would be used. This change had important
implications. The Soviets now explained that more attention
would once again have to be given to conventional weapons
systems; the Strategic Rocket Forces may still be the most
'^Scott, The Soviet Act of War , p. 158.
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important branch of the Soviet military but the Navy and Air
Forces were no longer unimportant. In 1970 the Soviet
Minister of Defense, Marshal A. A. Grechko announced that in
a future war "classic types of armaments will also find use.
In certain circumstances, the possibility is admitted of
conducting combat actions with conventional weapons. "23
Although not all Western analysts of Soviet affairs
agree upon the exact timing of this subtle shift in Soviet
military doctrine, there is a consensus on the reasons the
Soviets why picked this rough period of time to change their
policies. 2^* In 1967 NATO formally adopted the nuclear
concept of "flexible response." The flexible response
policy replaced the earlier massive retaliation concept
which was perceived as allowing for no alternative but the
massive onslaught of nuclear weapons in case of a war with
the Soviet Union. Flexible response, as the name implies,
called for a continuum of responses in proportion to the
severity of the aggression.
2. Implications of Doctrinal Shift
The change in military doctrine from a world in
which the next war would be a short, decisive, destructive.
23scott, The Soviet Act of War , p. 208.
^^Michael MccGwire, in his book Militarv Objectives in
Soviet Foreign Policy , insists that the change that took
place in December of 1966 before NATO formally adopted
"Flexible Response." Most other analysts, such as the
Scotts, feel the change was probable in early 1968, after
NATO's decision.
and final nuclear clash between the Soviet Union and the
West, to a world in which the next war may have a prolonged
conventional phase, had profound implications for the Soviet
force structure. Prior to the 1966-1968 doctrinal shift
Soviet forces were largely built for one-time use. The
Soviet naval attitude, as cynical as it may seem, was that
there was no need to produce weapons systems which could
remain at sea for prolonged periods of time with their
magazines brimming with weapons because, once the war did
start, all of these systems would be quickly annihilated.
However, now that a future war would be preceded by a
conventional phase, and who knew for certain just how long
this could last, it was now important to build weapons
systems with the ability to remain on line for longer
periods of time—and survive. Furthermore, and more
importantly, this required a nuclear weapons delivery system
that was highly survivable. The Soviets were well aware of
the attractiveness of their strategic delivery systems as
targets in the conventional phase of a war, and knew that
their sea-based systems, necessarily operating close to U.S.
shores, such as the Golf SSB and the Yankee SSBN, were
vulnerable to Western ASW forces.
In 1971 the Soviets produced the Delta class SSBN
with the SS-N-8 missile. What was significant about this
weapons system was not the submarine, but the nuclear
missile it carried. The SS-N-8 had a range capability in
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excess of 4000 nm. This meant that the Delta, unlike the
Yankee or the Golf, could deploy in home waters such as the
Barents sea and still reach targets in North America. Since
the Delta was not a significantly quieter submarine than its
predecessors, and it is probably fair to assume that the
Soviets knew this, then the Soviets could work their way
around this problem by deploying the Delta close to home
waters where the conventional Soviet Navy could protect it.
In October 197 3 Soviet naval analyst Michael
MccGwire first proposed such a theory. MccGwire argued that
the Soviets realized that their sea based strategic systems
had "a poor record of evading U.S. detection systems." This
problem, combined with the inherent vulnerability of a
static land-based system, made the construction of a better
system a vital strategic necessity. "It was therefore
decided to develop an SLBM system with sufficient range to
be able to strike at North America from the comparative
safety of home fleet waters. This system (the 4200 nm SS-N-
8) would be fitted in the D-class [submarine] .... "^^
MccGwire 's colleague, Bradford Dismukes, expanded
upon MccGwire 's idea and added that the range of the SS-N-8
also allows the Delta to be concentrated into an area so
that other land and naval forces can protect them (such an
operation is often called pro-SSBN) . Dismukes concludes
^^MccGwire, Soviet Naval Policv; Objectives and
Constraints , p. 516.
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that, "At this time it would appear useful for analysts to
add the pro-SSBN mission to the list of possible wartime
tasks of the Soviet Navy. "26
3 . Withholding and Bastions
Many analysts felt, and continue to feel, that the
Soviets developed the Delta because its inherent
survivability would allow it to be used as an "insurance
force." By protecting the SSBN force in its home waters the
Soviets could ensure that they could maintain a positive
correlation of nuclear forces. The Soviets have placed
great emphasis on maintaining a favorable correlation of
forces which are defined "in general... as a way of
determining which side will have the upper hand, broadly
speaking, in the action being studied. "27 Therefore,
according to many analysts, the Soviets would "withhold" the
Deltas in the event of a nuclear exchange as leverage for
bargaining a favorable war termination.
It is important to understand that there is a
distinct difference between the concepts of "withholding"
and "bastions." Withholding is usually given as the reason
for placing the Soviet SSBN force within the bastions.
^^Bradford Dismukes, "The Soviet Navy General Purpose
Forces: Roles and Missions in Wartime," Soviet Naval
Policy: Objectives and Constraints , p. 583.
^^Ali Jalali, Goulham Wardak, and John Sloan, Discus-
sions with Voroshilov and Frunze Academv Students: Correla-
tion of Forces and Means . Science Applications International
Corporation, 1986, p. 2.
although the two terms often seem to be freely interchanged.
In 1974, at the third annual seminar of Soviet naval
development held at Dalhousie University, James McConnell
first linked the withholding strategy to the bastions.
After reading Admiral of the Fleet Sergei Gorshkov's
articles that had been published in the Soviet naval journal
Morskoi Sbornik . McConnell concluded that:
Gorshkov appears to be rationalizing a political decision
to withhold a substantial portion of Soviet SLBMs from the
strikes of the initial period in order to carry out
"deterrence" in war, conduct intrawar bargaining, and
influence the peace talks at the end of the war.^"28
4. U.S. Navy and the Bastion Concept
The U.S. Navy was much slower than the civilian
community to adopt the bastion theory. At the hearings for
the Department of Defense Appropriations for FY 1978 it was
admitted that the Soviets were "aware of the potential
threats to their SLBM force and are attempting to increase
its survivability. "2^ The annual Department of Defense
report went one step further and claimed that: "Such
deployments, relatively close to home ports, allow more time
28 J. McConnell, "The Gorshkov Articles, the New
Gorshkov Book, and their Relation to Policy," Soviet Naval
Influence: Domestic and Foreign Dimensions . M. MccGwire and
J. McDonnell, eds., Praeger Publishers, 1977, p. 377.
2^DoD Appropriations for FY 1978 . U.S. Government
Printing Office, p. 62.
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on station. . .and provide a degree of sanctuary from anti-
submarine warfare. .. forces. "^°
At the Senate hearings for Department of Defense
appropriations held in March 1982 the Director of Naval
Intelligence, Rear Admiral Shapiro, first indicated that the
U.S. intelligence community had adopted this interpretation
of the bastion concept, at least in the Navy. It was to be
a concept that would have profound implications for the
fledgling Maritime Strategy.
It is interesting to note that the U.S. Navy began
to first discuss the bastion concept at about the same time
that it began to first discuss, at least publicly, the
concepts which would later become the Maritime Strategy. In
this respect, 1978 would appear to be a watershed year for
the U.S. Navy. At a time of low budgets and public outcries
for a defensive sea control/convoy protection policy, the
leaders of the Navy realized that it was beginning to look
more and more as if the Soviets were not going to come out
and fight. In 198 5, after the Maritime Strategy had been
announced, Rear Admiral Shapiro's successor. Rear Admiral
Butts, finally gave the U.S. Navy's full understanding of
how the Soviets were going to fight the next war:
The Soviets believe a war with the West would be decisive,
global in scope, and probably escalate to nuclear
conflict. Therefore, while naval forces are structured to
fight in any environment, initial wartime operations would
^^Breemer, "The Soviet Navy's SSBN Bastions: Evidence,
Inference, and Alternative Scenarios," p. 22.
be conducted with a view towards escalation. Hence . the
Soviet Navy is assigned two overarching, complementary
missions to perform initially. The primary task is to
deploy and protect the SSBN force. They believe that
SLBMs. for the first time, give navies the capability to
directly affect the course and even the outcome of a war.
Because of the importance they ascribe to the SSBN force,
the Soviets plan to support and protect it through an
echeloned defense in depth . .. .To accomplish these tasks,
the Soviets would attempt to control all or large portions
of the Norwegian and Greenland Seas and the waters to the
north as well as the Seas of Japan and Okhotsk and the
area off the Kamchatka Peninsula.^
C. SEA PLAN 2000
Throughout the 1970s, while the bastion concept was
being integrated into the strategic assessment of Soviet
military strategy, the U.S. Navy was undergoing drastic
reductions in its force levels. By 1980 the Navy had only
479 ships compared with 960 ships in 1967 at the height of
the Vietnam war. Meanwhile, there was a growing concern of
the Soviet Navy and its ever increasing capabilities. Many
analysts argued that U.S. naval superiority over the Soviet
Navy in case of a future war could no longer be taken for
granted.
The results of a shrinking navy with expanding global
commitments facing a growing opponent were almost predicta-
ble. Many defense planners outside of the U.S. Navy were
calling for a very anti-Mahanian naval strategy that would
emphasize defensive sea control. Many of these planners and
decision makers felt that the primary purpose for the Navy
3 ^DoD Appropriations for FY 1986 , U.S. Government
Printing Office, pp. 4367-68.
in case of a future war with the Soviet Union would be to
maintain the critical SLOCs leading to Europe. These
strategists maintained a global view of the world that was
primarily Eurocentric and was driven by the belief that if
the central front in Europe was lost, then all was lost.
There was even a call for a "swing strategy" in which naval
forces in the Pacific would be pulled over to the Atlantic
theater of operations to assist in the protection of the
Atlantic SLOCs.
No self-respecting navy with strategic foresight wants
to be used as a convoy escort service and little else; and
the United States Navy was no exception. The naval
leadership realized that the basic argument essentially was
centered around the traditional capabilities-versus-
commitments problem, and most people were pointing their
fingers at the U.S. Navy's shrinking capabilities. The most
obvious solution would be to point out the fact that the
Navy had global commitments that were expanding everyday,
and would probably continue to expand over the next quarter
century.
In March 1978 an increasingly restless naval leadership
responded with a naval force planning study called Sea Plan
2000 . The study emphasized the advantages that can be
offered by strong naval forces. Navies can contribute to
deterrence by maintaining global stability, primarily
through their deployment in forward areas and by defense of
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the SLOCs.3 2 Even more importantly, from a political point
of view, a strong navy provides the national policymakers
and leadership with the flexibility required to respond to
the many possible contingencies that can occur in different
locations over the world.
The U.S. Navy, according to the study, was already being
utilized to its maximum limits. In view of the growing
Soviet threat it may not be long before the Navy would find
itself forced into a situation where naval forces would have
to be withdrawn from one critical region to respond to a
crisis in another—leaving the vacated region for the
Soviets. "The overall size of our naval fleet is
threatening to decline below the threshold of critical mass
necessary for the containment of serious crises and the
retention of flexible options for the deterrence of major
war." As a result U.S. "naval forward deployments are
stretched taut. Should the U.S. draw down its forward
deployments, this action could leave the USSR as the
dominant naval power in the vacated region. "-^-^
Sea Plan 2000 used the bastion concept as one of its
central assumptions. The study explained that the Soviets
would never release their submarines for SLOC interdiction
^^Summarv of Sea Plan 2000 Naval Force Planning Study .
U.S. Government Printing Office, March 1978.
^^ Summarv of Sea Plan 2000 Naval Force Planning Study ,
p. 3.
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as long as they perceived that there was a threat to their
homeland (and, as Sovietologists have noted, the Soviets
always perceive a threat to their homeland) . Therefore, the
study considered forward deployments in the Soviet's home
waters as the best means of defending against the Soviet
threat because it kept the Soviets on the defensive.
According to the director of the study, F.J. West Jr.,
Sea Plan 2000 placed "special" emphasis on the continuing
development of offensive oriented naval ships such as the
attack submarine and carrier battle groups. Although the
actual study was classified, the unclassified summary of the
study indicated that three different growth options were
reviewed. These options, shown in Table 1 along with the
growth levels later recommended by John Lehman in order to
execute the Maritime Strategy, show that the study
recommended a maximum growth level of four percent real
growth through the year 2000. However, in a later paper.
West wrote that the study recommended a 600 ship Navy with
15 carrier battle groups, interestingly the exact number
recommended by Lehman in 1981.-^^
Sea Plan 2000 strongly recommended a growth rate of at
least four percent if the Navy was to meet all of its global
commitments through the year 2 000. The study, by itself,
did not have an immediate impact upon the force planning
^"^F.J. West provided these figures in his article,
"Maritime Strategy and NATO Deterrence," Naval War Colleae
Review . September-October 1985, p. 5.
TABLE 1













SSBN 25 25 25 40
CV 10 12 14 15
SSN 80 94 98 100
Aegis Ship 10 24 28
Surf Comb 210 252 272
Amphib 52 66 78 75
Other 52 64 70
Total 439 535 585 600
Sources: U.S. Navy, S
Study, (Unci
19 7 8; and Te
House Armed
and the Mari
ea Plan 2000: Naval Force Planninq
assif ied Executive Summary) , 28 March
stimony of John Lehman before the
Services Committee, The 600 Ship Navy
time Strateav. U.S. Government
Printing Office, 1986.
Note: A further breakdown of the 600 ship Navy is shown in
Table 3.
levels within the Department of Defense. It is clear,
however, that the study did provide some of the root
concepts that would later be used in the justification of
the Maritime Strategy and, more importantly, it provided the
much needed momentum for the U.S. Navy to sell its new
strategy to the Reagan administration.
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D. REAGAN ADMINISTRATION
1. Early Development of the Maritime Strategy
As previously discussed, the Maritime Strategy is a
strategy with roots traceable to the late 197 0s. Admiral
Thomas B. Hayward, the Chief of Naval Operations, continued
to be one of the more outspoken advocates of the new
strategy, but he was not alone. A host of other top naval
leaders and military strategists, such as F.J. West and
Thomas Moorer, were also advocating a more offensively
oriented naval strategy.
In the process of promoting a more offensively
oriented strategy, several principles began to emerge.
These principles were never presented as a coherent whole
but had to be selected from the various arguments for a new
strategy. However, as will be shown, these principles were
to form the core ideas of what would later be known as the
Maritime Strategy. One important principle, sometimes
referred to as "counterforce coercion," would later be added
to the list. ^5 However, although some of the principles
have apparently fallen into temporary disfavor at various
times, all of them remain very pertinent in any current
argument concerning the Maritime Strategy as it stands
today. These principles are reviewed below.
^^The term "coercive counterforce" is borrowed from
John Mearshimer's article, "A Strategic Misstep: The
Maritime Strategy and Deterrence in Europe," International
Security . Fall 1986.
a. Future War
A future war, if it is against the Soviets, will
certainly be a world wide affair and not just isolated to
Europe. This argument was aimed primarily at the previously
discussed Eurocentric view of the world that argued the war
in Europe was critical, if Europe was lost then all was
lost. The new naval strategy realized the increasing
importance of the Pacific rim countries and the shifting
trade balance to this region. As John Lehman would later
argue: "Clearly, our increasing commercial interests and
historic security ties in the Pacific impact on our naval
planning for the area."^^
b. Conventional War
Since the next war will not necessarily start
with nucler weapons, then the U.S. Navy must be able to
fight a prolonged conventional war. This principle was in
response to the shift in the U.S. doctrine away from mutual
assured destruction in the late 1960s and the Soviet shift
in emphasis from a future war that would definitely be
nuclear to the idea that a future war could be preceded by a
lengthy conventional period.
This idea was not a radical shift from the then
existing strategy. On the contrary, the U.S. military had
long accepted the possibly conventional nature of a future
3^John Lehman, "The 600 Ship Navy," Naval Institute
Proceedings , pp. 2-17. Supplement to January 1986 issue of
Naval Institute Proceedings .
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war before the late 1970s. However, it was being stressed
again because the supporters of the new naval strategy felt
it was not emphasized enough. A basic tenet of conventional
versus nuclear war is that conventional wars require a much
larger force structure. The naval leadership did not feel
that the force structure of the U.S. Navy in the late 1970s
indicated a proper appreciation of this tenet or, even
worse, indicated that the United States was not willing to
support a force structure that reflected a more conventional
war fighting doctrine and, therefore, was ignoring one of
the basic realities of modern military strategy,
c. Deterrence/War Termination
The primary function of the U.S. Navy must be
the deterrence of war with the Soviets. If the deterrence
posture proves to be a failure then the primary objective of
the navy is to ensure war termination on grounds favorable
to the U.S. The idea of using the Navy to deter a war with
the Soviets was not a new one, in fact the very existence of
the SSBNs and their role proves this point more than
adequately. However, the idea that the Navy could have a
role in precipitating war termination on terms that were to
the advantage of the United States was not a part of the
commonly accepted wisdom
—
particularly for a conventional
war in Europe. This principle was meant to counter those
strategists, especially the Continental ists, who continued
to argue that the Navy could have very little, if any.
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effect upon the course of a war in Europe by making
"peripheral attacks" upon the Soviet land mass,
d. SLOC Protection
In a major war with the Soviets it will be
critical to ensure that the SLOCs to Europe remain open and
well protected. This principle was a reflection of the
continuing concern for the dependence of the U.S. on
maritime supply routes as well as the fact that the U.S.
merchant marine was continuing to shrink. In the mid-1950s
U.S. flag ships comprised 21 percent of the total tonnage
and 31 percent of the total value of all maritime imports
and exports. By 1984 these totals were less than five
percent each.-^^ Furthermore, studies indicated that since
the Korean War there has been an increasing percentage of
total cargo transported to theaters of war by seaborne
traffic. The trend has towards fewer ships which carrying
larger loads of cargo. (See Table 2)
By 1984 there were only 548 U.S. -flag ships of
which 244 were general purpose dry cargo freighters. Most
projections indicated that this number would be insufficient
for a resupply to NATO in the event of a war with the
Soviets. According to one report:
^'^Harlan Ullman, Crisis or Opportunity? U.S. Maritime
Industries and National Security . Georgetown University
Press, 1984, p. 11.
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TABLE 2
MARITIME SUPPORT OF PAST AND FUTURE WARS






Source: Harlan Ullman, Crisis or Opportunity? U.S. Maritime
Industries and National Security . Center for
Strategic and International Studies: Georgetown
University, Washington D.C., p. 14.
NATO would require between one and two dozen convoys at
sea at any one time, each composed of 50 to 70 merchant
ships. In total, the alliance would need between 3,000
and 6,000 merchant ships. . .Moreover, no tested NATO-wide
plan exists for securing all necessary ships in times of
crisis. There is no system for locating each ship on
short notice and no procedure exists for mobilizing it as
part of a resupply effort.''"38
There was no disagreement between the proponents
of a more aggressive naval strategy and the supporters of a
continental strategy about the critical importance of
protecting the SLOCs. Their differences stemmed from the
respective arguments about the best method to deal with this
glaring weakness in our military strategy.
e. Forward Offensive/Horizontal Escalation
The primary difference between the strategy of
the late 197 0s, and the strategy being proposed by the Navy,
•^^Ullman, Crisis or Opportunity? U.S. Maritime
Industries and National Security , p. 15.
concentrated on the best method to protect the SLOCs.
Instead of simply escorting the convoys to Europe or Asia,
the new naval strategy called for a strategy which would
exploit the geographic disadvantage of the Soviet Union.
All four Soviet fleets, with the exception of a part of the
Pacific fleet, must pass through natural choke points to
gain access to the open ocean. Therefore, the best method
of protecting the SLOCs must be to send U.S. naval forces
directly into the Soviet home waters and fight them before
they can pass through the choke points. This was in
opposition to the view that the U.S. Navy should fight the
Soviet Navy at the choke points. The difference between the
two is not trivial. The U.S. Navy felt very strongly that
fighting the Soviets at the choke points was an inherently
defensive strategy that automatically put the defender at a
disadvantage.
The new naval strategy did not stop at the
concept of employing the Navy in an offensive manner. It
was also determined that naval pressure must be placed upon
the Soviet Union at the time and place of Western choosing.
For example, if the Soviets were to launch an attack on
Central Europe, the Navy could counter by making attacks in
the Pacific theater to relieve some of the pressure on the
Central Front. This concept, commonly referred to as
"horizontal escalation," would presumably prevent the
Soviets from diverting some of their Pacific assets to the
49
European front by essentially creating a two front war. "It
is reasonable to argue that only by putting substantial
pressure on the Soviet Union in the Pacific theater could
the initial NATO conventional force deficiencies in central
Europe be compensated for until the force could be
reinforced and resupplied. "-^^
f. Required Force Structure
The force structure necessary to execute these
principles must place a great emphasis on the nuclear attack
submarine and the carrier battle group. Although not all of
the more vocal supporters of the new naval strategy were in
agreement on the exact numbers necessary for such a task,
the numbers were all very close. It was virtually unanimous
that "the twelve carrier battle groups represent the
absolute minimum in capability to discharge our
missions...." Many specifically recommended 600 ships and
15 carrier battle groups. The suggestions for using a large
amount of small carriers (Admiral Stansfield Turner
recommended 24 or more) with less sophisticated aircraft was
not gaining much support within the U.S. Navy.^^ Many
feared that the smaller carriers being proposed by Turner
would reduce the offensive fire power capabilities of the
^^Alvin Cottrell and Thomas Moorer, "Sea Power and NATO
Strategy," NATO; The Next Thirty Years . Kenneth Myers ed.
,
Boulder: Westview Press, 1980, p. 224.
4 0,
'Thomas B. Hayward, "The Future of U.S. Sea Power,"
U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings . May 1979, p. 68.
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U.S. Navy and would make any arguments for forward
operations academic. The implication was that the only
carrier capable of operating in forward areas was the modern
large-deck aircraft carrier.'*^
2 . Lehman Presents a Goal
In March 1981, barely two months after assuming
office as Secretary of the Navy, John Lehman unveiled his
goal to Congress of attaining a 600 ship navy with 15 battle
groups. It was not until the summer of the same year that
Lehman began to specifically mention the need to develop a
new doctrine "to permit the implementation of an effective
strategy. "^^
At this early point Lehman did not specifically
mention a Maritime Strategy. However, he did make it clear
that he had an important principle in mind for the new
strategy: an offensively-oriented Navy whose main function
would be to protect the SLOCs through forward deployments.
Lehman felt that "such an approach (forward deployments)
should force the Soviets, historically dominated by
continental horizons, to concentrate more resources on
homeland defense—and possibly less on interdiction of U.S.
sealanes. "^-^
"^^Stansfield Turner, "Thinking About the Future of the
Navy," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings . May 1979, p. 68.
"^^ DoD Appropriations for FY 1982 . U.S. Government
Printing Office, p. 2267.
"^^Lehman, "Rebirth of a Naval Strategy," p. 13.
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Throughout the first two years of the Reagan
administration the Navy continued to push for the 600 ship
navy but did not discuss a coherent strategy to make proper
use of this force structure. Most requests for funding were
based upon the increasing global commitments of the U.S.
Navy as evidenced by the more than 40 treaties honored by
the United States all over the world. Discussions of a
naval strategy to help honor these commitments, or even to
fight a global war, were vague and incomplete.
3 . A Strategy Unveiled
a. A Sneak Preview
In February 198 3 the Deputy Director of the
Strategic Plans Division in the Office of the Chief of Naval
Operations, Commodore Dudley Carlson, made the first
official presentation of the U.S. Maritime Strategy. In his
brief discussion of the strategy, Carlson essentially
reiterated many of the core principles had emerged from the
1970s.
Carlson explained that the primary purpose of
the strategy was to ensure global forward deterrence and, if
that failed, to ensure war termination on terms favorable to
the United States. This goal would be accomplished by the
use of amphibious forces to "carry the fight to the enemy,
at a place and time of our choosing." The means of
accomplishing favorable war termination are rather vaguely
outlined but essentially centered around the offensive
pressure being brought against the Soviets, thus proving to
them that there is nothing to gain, and by implication
everything to lose, by continuing the war.
Finally, in this first presentation, the Navy
made it clear that the only means of executing such a
strategy was by having the force structure which is
compatible with the goals of the Maritime Strategy. This
clearly meant a force of 600 ships: "...our strategy review
clearly indicates the need to attain the minimum force
level... of a 600 ship Navy with 15 deployable CVBGs...and
four Battleship SAGs as force multipliers...."'*^
b. First Formal Presentation
It is now obvious that the Navy had been working
at a rapid pace under Lehman to develop a coherent strategy
that would justify the repeated calls for a 600 ship navy.
The Navy had the core principles of the strategy since the
previous decade, and had often discussed these principles in
open literature, but had not been able to present it in a
coherent rational manner to what must have been an
increasingly dubious Congress and public. Finally that
moment had arrived.
On 14 March 1984, Secretary Lehman gave the
first full presentation of the Maritime Strategy. The
presentation, before the Senate Armed Services Committee,
'^'^D. Carlson, House Armed Services Committee, FY 1984,
Part 6, p. 51.
reaffirmed many of the very same principles that have
previously been outlined. Lehman emphasized that the
Maritime Strategy was a part of the national military
strategy as set forth in National Security Decision
Directive-32 signed by President Reagan on 20 May 1982.
The presentation of the Maritime Strategy by
Lehman did not contain any new principles which had not
already been discussed in great detail by previous naval
leaders. The Soviets were still the primary threat; the
next war would most likely be global; protection of the
SLOCs was still critical; and the best strategy for the U.S.
Navy in the next war was still a forward offensive which
would pin the Soviet forces down in their home waters.
However, when pressed on the issue Lehman vehemently denied
that the Maritime Strategy called for U.S. carrier battle
groups to make attacks on Soviet naval ports. "I have never
said we were going to steam carriers up there to lob A-6's
into the Kremlin's men's rooms. ""^^
It is important to note that the critical
linkage between the Bastion concept and the Maritime
Strategy was established from the very beginning. Admiral
Watkins, then Chief of Naval Operations, made it very clear
that it was of vital importance to keep the Soviets within
their bastions. "We have to know how effective the SSN
45DoD Appropriations for FY 1985 . U.S. Government
Printing Office, p. 3871.
surge would be against the Soviet bastion force around the
SSBNs. It is very critical to force them back up there.
That is going to be watched very critically. "^^
c. Continued Refinement: 1984-1986
In the two years following the public
announcement of the Maritime Strategy, the Navy continued to
emphasize the basic core principles. The critical
importance of maintaining the protection of the SLOCs was
especially highlighted. Lehman stated that over 90 percent
of the equipment and supplies necessary to sustain a
defensive effort in Europe would have to be sealifted.
There absolutely could not be success in the European
theater if there was not success in the Atlantic, and
success in the Atlantic could only be guaranteed by forward
deployments . "^^
The forward deployments were justified in terms
of destroying the Soviet Navy. There was no discussion of
counterforce coercion (destroying the Soviet SSBNs in order
to alter the nuclear correlation of forces) . The fact that
SSBNs would be most likely destroyed was not discounted, but
it would be as a result of the forward deployments and not
because the SSBNs were being specifically targeted.
Furthermore, favorable war termination was expected to occur
because the Soviets would finally understand the futility of
^^DoD Appropriations for FY 1985 . p. 3878.
^"^The 600 Ship Navv and the Maritime Strategy , p. 107.
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continuing the war without their navy and with the U.S. Navy
sitting right on their front doorstep.
It is also of some importance to note that
during this period the concept of horizontal escalation was
seldom mentioned. In fact, Lehman specifically mentioned
the need for the Navy to conduct sequential operations since
they could not be everywhere at once.'*^ This apparent shift
in policy was probably because many critics felt the
Maritime Strategy tended to deemphasize the NATO alliance
and was leaning very strongly towards unilateralism.^^
During this period John Lehman also refined his
arguments in support of the 600 ship Navy. Lehman stated
that there were three primary considerations in picking 600
ships for the Maritime Strategy (as opposed to 500 or 700, a
question Lehman was repeatedly asked) . The first considera-
tion was the geography of the United States—an island
continent dependent upon the sea lanes for her survival.
Second was the more than 4 treaty relationships the United
States had around the globe (this fact was often repeated)
;
finally there was the fact that the Soviets had developed an
offensively oriented blue water navy that was "patently
Mahanian in design." These considerations, especially the
^^This was first pointed out by John Mearshimer in his
excellent article, "A Strategic Misstep: The Maritime
Strategy and Deterrence in Europe" (fn. 35) . Also see
Senate Armed Services Committee, FY 1985, Part 8, p. 3854.
^^Mearhsimer , "A Strategic Misstep: The Maritime
Strategy and Deterrence in Europe," p. 22.
last one, were bound to get the attention of the students of
the Maritime school of offensive sea power. (Table 3 shows
the actual breakdown of the 600 ship Navy)
.
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In January 198 6, the United States Naval
Institute Proceedings published a supplement that dealt
exclusively with the Maritime Strategy. The purpose of the
supplement was to provide "the most definitive and
authoritative statements of the Maritime Strategy that are
available in unclassified form." The document was billed as
the equivalent of a British "White Paper," and was meant to
clear the air of any misconceptions concerning the official
Maritime Strategy. The articles were not only a turning
point in that they finally provided a coherent public
presentation of the Maritime Strategy, but it was a
strategic watershed as well since, for the first time,
counterforce coercion was elevated as the raison d'etre of
the strategy.
In the opening article, by CNO Admiral Watkins,
it was made very clear that SLOC interdiction is considered
by the U.S. Navy to be a secondary mission of the Soviet
Navy. The primary concern of the Soviet Navy, even during a
conventional war, would be the maintenance of a nuclear
correlation of forces that continued to favor the Soviets.
In order to maintain this advantage the Soviets would have
to protect their SSBN force. Therefore, "a critical Soviet
Navy role in a future conflict would be to protect the
Soviet homeland and their ballistic missile submarines.
which provide the Soviets with their ultimate strategic
reserve. "^^
In order to take advantage of the Soviet
reliance upon the nuclear correlation of forces, the U.S.
Navy will "continue to destroy ... ballistic missile
submarines, thus reducing the attractiveness of nuclear
escalation by changing the nuclear balance in our favor. "^^
Not only does the destruction of Soviet SSBNs dampen the
possibility of nuclear escalation, it also adds to the
possibility of war termination on favorable terms, a primary
objective.
Perhaps the greatest contribution of this
article, with respect to this research, is that it shows
that the bastion concept has been firmly established within
the U.S. intelligence community. SLOC interdiction was not
a primary function of the Soviet Navy and, in fact, they
would "retreat into defensive bastions to protect their
ballistic missile submarines. "^2 There could no longer be
any doubt that the bastion concept had become the
centerpiece assumption of the Maritime Strategy. The
purpose here is to review the validity of that assumption.
^Ojames Watkins, "The Maritime Strategy," The Maritime
Strategy. U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings , supplement to
January 1986 issue, p. 7.
Slwatkins, "The Maritime Strategy," p. 13.
^^watkins, "The Maritime Strategy," p. 9.
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E. OPPOSITION TO THE MARITIME STRATEGY
It is no great surprise that the Maritime Strategy has
generated a fairly significant amount of controversy among
the small community of military analysts. It had been many
years since the U.S. Navy had stepped forward with a
concrete plan that openly revealed its intentions for
fighting the next war. At last, all of the "armchair
strategists" (as Lehman is fond of calling the civilian
analysts) had empirical evidence that they could point to
when criticizing Navy policies, and no longer had to rely on
rumors and innuendo that was gathered second-hand from
questionable sources.
Numerous articles have been published that openly
criticize the Maritime Strategy. The reasons for these
criticisms, referred to briefly in Chapter I, are varied but
there are essentially two major arguments. The first
argument is that the Maritime Strategy is inherently
escalatory and carries with it the seeds for a nuclear war.
The second argument, already referred to many times, is that
the Maritime Strategy is a waste of precious defense
spending because it squanders resources on a Navy that will
not be able to fatally damage a continental power like the
Soviet Union.
1. Nuclear Opposition
Although many analysts have argued that the Maritime
Strategy can lead to nuclear war, they have not all agreed
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upon the mechanisms within the strategy that make it
inherently escalatory. However, the most credible protest
focuses on the counterforce coercion concept, which, as
previously discussed, became one of the principal objectives
of the Maritime Strategy in 1986. The critics of
counterforce coercion point out that one of the primary
assumptions is that the Soviets place great emphasis on
their nuclear forces (this is an important point since
Admiral Watkins explicitly mentions it in the 1986
Proceedings supplement) . If the Soviets really do place
that much emphasis on the nuclear correlation of forces, the
critics explain, then they might be strongly tempted to use
their strategic nuclear weapons through a counterforce
strike rather than lose them in long term attrition warfare.
In other words, the policy of counterforce coercion would
cause precisely the opposite of the desired response and,
instead of forcing the Soviets to sue for peace, would
compel the Soviets to utilize the very weapon that the
strategy was trying to neutralize in the first place.
There are only two possible solutions to this
dilemma. The U.S. Navy must either learn to distinguish
between Soviet SSBNs and attack submarines or it must
abandon the strategy of forward deployment in Soviet SSBN-
infested waters altogether. The first solution is untenable
because the Navy has made it clear that it is virtually
impossible to "make a distinction in a combat environment
—
even prehostilities—with certainty to distinguish between
SSBNs and attack submarines." Furthermore, this problem "is
going to worsen in the future. "^^ The second solution is
unacceptable to the Navy because it undermines the entire
concept of the Maritime Strategy. Thus the argument remains
at an impasse.
It is perhaps one of the greatest ironies of the
Maritime Strategy that so much attention has been focused on
the question of nuclear escalation in light of the policy of
the ground forces in Europe. As early as 1983 General
Bernard Rogers, at the time the Supreme Allied Commander in
Europe, said "we can only sustain ourselves conventionally
for a relatively short time. I will then be forced to ask
for the authorization. . .to use nuclear weapons. "^^
There is no historical precedent to determine if a
nuclear war that started at sea would escalate to land, or
vice versa. However, it is significant to note that at
least one analyst who exhaustively researched Soviet
literature concluded that there was "no literature evidence
to support the view that release authority for tactical
nuclear weapons is a navy matter nor tha± a nuclear war at
^^L. Bagget, DoD Appropriations for FY 1986 . U.S.
Government Printing Office, p. 4399.
^"^ Bernard Rogers, as cited in "Thinking About the
Future of the Navy," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings .
August 1980, p. 34.
sea (alone) would be initiated by the Soviets.
..
(however)
once nuclear weapons are used ashore, they will be used at
sea as well."^^ The question must be asked: if the Supreme
Allied Commander in Europe fully expects to be pushed to his
limits within the first few weeks of a war in central
Europe; and if he fully expects to request authorization for
the release of nuclear weapons (and it must be assumed thatr
•no commander would ask for such authorization unless he
truly felt it was a last resort) ; and, furthermore, if the
Soviets have indicated that a nuclear war that started on
land would inevitably spread to the sea; then why is so much
attention being focused on the escalatory nature of the
Maritime Strategy when it is the declatory policy of NATO
forces in Europe to use nuclear weapons, if necessary, to
slow the Soviet advance ?
2 . Conventional Opposition
There have been numerous arguments, on a
conventional level, objecting to the war fighting strategy
encompassed within the Maritime Strategy. Some of these
arguments have been:
1. No naval commander would ever send a carrier battle
group to attack the Soviet mainland without having
complete control of the sea and air.
2. The concept of horizontal escalation is costly and,
in the long term, will do no real damage to the
Soviets. More than likely they will ignore it and
55james Tritten, Soviet Naval Forces and Nuclear
Warfare . Boulder: Westview Press, 1986, p. 34.
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continue to commit most of their resources to the
central front in Europe.
3 . The force structure necessary to carry out the
Maritime Strategy is simply too expensive and ignores
other interests which are more important (such as
reinforcing the ground forces in central Europe)
.
The main conventional criticism of the Maritime
Strategy, however, has focused on the classic thesis first
promulgated by Hal ford Mackinder. - Many critics (Ro4>ei^>:?;j^
Komer is the most vocal) suggest that the Maritime Strategy -
was a wonderful strategy when the United States was facing
another primarily maritime power such as Japan during World
War II. However, the Soviet Union is not a traditional
maritime power because it has not been necessary for the
protection and expansion of the Soviet Union. The Soviets
are in control of the "heartland" and are thus largely self
sufficient. In fact, while many of the Maritime strategists
sound remarkably similar to Mahan, reading some of the
objections by the continental strategists, one would think
he was reading straight from the passages of Mackinder:
The industrialization and democratization that has
occurred over the past century and a half, especially the
development of mass armies and of railroads to move them
rapidly, has led to a significant shift in the relation-
ship between land power and sea power in favor of the
former. Insular powers like the United States can do
little with independent naval forces to hurt a land power
like the Soviet Union. ^^
Due to the shift in advantage from the maritime
powers to the continental powers, a "peripheral" strategy
^^Mearshimer , "A Strategic Misstep: The Maritime
Strategy and Deterrence in Europe," pp. 33-34.
such as the Maritime Strategy could never prevent the
Soviets from dominating the Eurasian landmass. Furthermore,
if a strategy cannot prevent the Soviets from controlling
Eurasia, especially Europe, then it should be reconsidered
because, by implication, the protection of Europe should be
the primary consideration in any U.S. military strategy.
Most defenders of the Maritime Strategy, notably
John Lehman, have countered the Continental strategists by
pointing out that the issue is not a fundamental question
between a Maritime strategy and a Continental (or Coalition)
strategy. Quite simply, if the United States cannot control
the seas then vital supplies will not be able to reach
Europe and any arguments for or against the type of strategy
to be employed are swiftly overcome by events. According to
Lehman, "No defense of NATO can be carried out without
achieveing control of the maritime theaters of NATO.
Maritime superiority is a prerequisite of any strategy for
the defense of Europe. "^^
F. APPLICABILITY OF THE CURRENT ARGUMENT
Very few of the principal arguments against the Maritime
Strategy have ever concentrated on the primary assumptions
the strategy has made about the naval aspects of Soviet
military strategy, especially the bastion concept. This is
most likely due to the fact that the bastion concept has
^"7 Lehman, "The 600 Ship Navy," p. 107.
become firmly entrenched as a part of the commonly accepted
wisdom.
However, recent events in the Soviet Union have
necessitated a thorough review of essentially all of the
basic assumptions the U.S. intelligence community has been
making about the Soviet Navy. It is entirely possible that
absolutely nothing has really changed, that the Soviets are
only intersted in making us believe that changes are
occuring (a possibility that is by no means inconsistent
with past Soviet behavior) . However, this possibility does
not preclude the necessity of a reassessment of our basic
assumptions.
The bastion concept must always be viewed in the context
of its relationship with the Maritime Strategy. The two
ideas, a forward offense to defeat the bastioned Soviet
naval forces, are inseparable—one cannot be fully
understood without accepting the other. If, for example, it
becomes apparent that the Soviets are abandoning their
bastion concepts then the Maritime Strategy becomes a non-
strategy because it is based on irrelevant assumptions. As
one U.S. naval officer described it,
In a broader vein, the strategy seeks to counter a
specific Soviet strategy and a specific Soviet navy role
within that strategy and thus might prove inappropriate to
counter a different Soviet approach. If, for example, the
Soviets were to deploy their entire submarine force to the
open ocean before the outbreak of war, a very different
U.S. approach to ASW might be required. ..
.
While the
strateov thus seeks to limit Soviet options, no one can be
certain that Soviet wartime strategy. . .will be what their
prewar doctrine suggests . ^^
Strategies are interactive and dynamic organisms, as one
strategy grows and changes the other strategy must react in
order to survive. Up to this point the organic development
of the Maritime Strategy has been reviewed, what remains is
a check to see if there has been a concomitant change in the
naval aspects of Soviet military strategy.
^^Linton F. Brooks, "Naval Power and National Security;
The Case for the Maritime Strategy," Internat ional Security.
Fall 1988, p. 75.
III. FUNDAMENTAL ASSUMPTIONS
This linking of Soviet naval operations to the active
defense of SSBNs is a key assumption in the U.S. Maritime
Strategy, particularly as it has been articulated since
1981.1
A. THE BREAKDOWN OF A CONCEPT
The development of any strategy which hopes to exploit a
potential enemy's weaknesses requires fundamental
assumptions about the enemy. These assumptions must include
details of what the enemy feels to be important, how the
enemy would position his forces in case of a future war,
which forces the enemy considers to be more important, which
forces the enemy is willing to risk, and what the enemy
would hope to gain from a future war, should it occur.
These are only a few of the many questions that must be
answered before a responsible strategy can be developed. A
realistic list would continue indefinitely in length and
detail.
One of the primary assumptions of the Maritime Strategy
is the bastion concept. As previously discussed, the
bastion concept assumes that the primary mission of the
Soviet Navy in case of a future war is the protection of the
SSBN force; therefore, the SSBNs will deploy in well
protected bastions or sanctuaries which will be guarded by
^Stefanick, "America's Maritime Strategy: The Arms
Control Implications," p. 17.
the conventional Soviet Navy. It is the purpose of this
research to review the fundamental applicability of the
bastion concept as a basic strategic assumption. However,
before the applicability of the bastion concept can be
properly scrutinized it must be further reduced into even
more basic assumptions.
An assumption as broad and encompassing as the bastion
concept will contain other implicit and explicit assumptions
bounded within it. The methodology employed in this
research, as discussed in Chapter I, consists of breaking
the bastion concept down into these smaller assumptions that
can be more easily verified, or not verified as the case may
be.
Even a concept as seemingly basic as the bastion theory
can be further broken down into an endless number of
assumptions, some meaningful and others rather trivial. The
method employed here was to break the bastion concept down
into the most important assumptions that could be indepen-
dently verified. A careful review of the open literature on
the Maritime Strategy has indicated that there are six such
assumptions. These assumptions are: (1) The Soviets intend
to withhold their SSBN forces as a strategic reserve; (2)
The Soviets believe the ballistic missile submarine can
conduct strategic missions and, therefore, influence the
course and the outcome of a war; (3) The Soviets do not view
the interdiction of NATO's sea lines of communications as a
primary mission for their conventional navy—at least at the
outset of a conventional war; (4) The Soviets will utilize
the majority of their conventional navy to protect their
SSBN force in home waters even if the U.S. Navy does not
conduct a forward offensive; (5) The Soviets believe that
the next war with the West will not necessarily be a nuclear
war and, therefore, the critical part of the war will he^tii&^H..
land war in Central Europe; and (6) The Soviets do not
intend to escalate the war to a nuclear war if some (or
perhaps all) of their SSBN force is destroyed, but instead
will be more likely to sue for peace once they lose their
positive correlation of nuclear forces.
B. BASIC ASSUMPTIONS CONTAINED WITHIN THE BASTION CONCEPT
1. The Role of the SSBN in the Soviet Navy as an
Withholding/Deterrent System
The Soviet Union, like the United States, has based
its strategic nuclear forces on three primary platforms,
often referred to as the strategic triad. The three
platforms are the land based ICBMs, long range bombers, and,
of course, the sea based SLBMs. The Soviet emphasis on the
correlation of forces, nuclear and conventional, has even
led to the creation of an independent service for the ICBMs
called the Strategic Rocket Forces.
The inherent survivability of the SSBN made it an
ideal platform on which to base strategic weapons. Its
ability to survive longer than either the land-based or air-
based systems naturally meant that the SSBN would become
even more important to the Soviet war fighting strategy. It
was this assumption that the Soviets naturally place a
tremendous emphasis on the nuclear correlation of forces,
and would therefore give the SSBN a very high priority, that
led to the withholding strategy as a justification of the
,
bastion concept. Withholding envisions the use of the SSBN
force as a strategic reserve to be used for bargaining
leverage during a war, or possibly for ensuring war
termination on terms that were favorable to the Soviets
(assuming the war was not going well for them) . From this
perspective, the function of the SSBN is to act as a
deterrent against further vertical escalation, its primary
advantage is derived through its simple presence and not
through its actual use. Such a function has become
traditional for strategic (and in some cases tactical)
nuclear forces.
It is very clear from reviewing policy statements
made by senior U.S. Navy officials that the concept of
withholding the SSBNs as a strategic reserve is widely
accepted. For example, former Chief of Naval Operations
Admiral James Watkins stated that the Soviets "place a high
priority on... the nuclear correlation of forces" and that "a
critical Soviet Navy role in a future conflict would be to
protect the Soviet homeland and their ballistic missile
submarines, which provide the Soviets with their ultimate
strategic reserve ••2
The ability of the SSBN force to survive a nuclear
or conventional exchange, along with the Soviet emphasis on
the nuclear correlation of forces, has therefore made the
notion that the Soviets intend to withhold their SSBN forces .
as a strategic reserve one of the cornerstone assumptions ^-o4uei*^^
the bastion concept. Statements such as the one made by
Admiral Watkins above, as well as many other official
statements made in congressional testimony, have made it
clear that the withholding/strategic reserve theory has been
widely accepted in the U.S. intelligence community.
2 . The Role of the SSBN in the Soviet Navy as a War
Fighting System
The first assumption focused on the role of the SSBN
as a deterrent; however, the Soviets also view the ballistic
missile submarine as an extremely capable weapons system if
it must actually be used in war. Before describing this
function it is first necessary to review a few basic
concepts concerning Soviet military strategy.
In their attempts to utilize the scientific method
to study war, the Soviets have attached very specific
meanings to certain words and phrases. To a Westerner not
accustomed to such preciseness of meaning in the use of
language, this can become very confusing and, under certain
^Watkins, "The Maritime Strategy," p. 7.
circumstances, can lead to more harm than good. If the
Soviet literature is translated without an understanding of
the literal meaning of certain words, then the original
intent of the sentence, paragraph, or even article can be
entirely lost.
The Soviets assert definite distinctions between the
words war and armed struggle. War involves the struggle-,
against an adversary on several levels: economic,
political, diplomatic, ideological, as well as military.
Armed struggle refers to the actual use of the armed forces
in combat. Thus, armed struggle can be thought of as a sub-
category of war, and war can exist without the firing of a
shot.^ Therefore, the Soviets, unlike the West, consider
themselves to be in a constant state of war with the
imperialist forces of capitalism which will only be resolved
through the historically inevitable victory of the progres-
sive forces of socialism. Furthermore, such a victory does
not necessarily have to be the result of a catastrophic
clash of the armed forces between the opposing ideologies,
the Soviets believe there may be a less violent way to
achieve this victory—in other words, war is no longer
"fatally inevitable. ""^
^Tritten, Soviet Naval Forces and Nuclear Warfare , p.
26.
^William T. Lee and Richard F. Staar, Soviet Militarv
Policy Since World War II . Hoover Institution Press, 1986,
p. 27.
In the Soviet methodology of war, armed struggle
serves a specific purpose that is used to attain a specific
goal, namely to "resolve strategic missions and attain
strategic goals. "^ Strategic missions are those missions
which are used to achieve strategic goals, and strategic
goals, by definition, affect the course and outcome of a
war.^ The distinction made here is important, Stratesgic;
goals affect the war and not just the armed struggle, again
indicating that armed struggle is only one part of the broad
Soviet definition of war. As Figure 1 indicates, there is a
certain mathematical preciseness in the linear logic of this
particular aspect of the Soviet approach to military
strategy
.
armed struggle >> resolves strategic missions >>
to attain strategic goals >> which influence the
course and outcome of a war
Figure 1. Soviet Strategic Hierarchy
There is also a distinction between influencing the
course of a war and its outcome. As the names imply,
influencing the course of a war is a step beneath
influencing its outcome, it is not as dramatic or complete
^Tritten, Soviet Naval Forces and Nuclear Warfare , p.
26.
^Tritten, Soviet Naval Forces and Nuclear Warfare , p.
32.
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in its overall effect. Sometimes the Soviets will write
about events (or systems) that can influence only the course
of the war and at other times the course and the outcome.
It is important to make this distinction because if a branch
of the service, or a specific weapons system, is capable of
conducting strategic missions then this means it must be
able to influence the course and the outcome of a i^ar.
Three naval means of influencing the outcome of a war have
been identified: (1) crushing an opponents military-
economic potential; (2) participating in fleet versus shore
operations; or (3) destroying major groupings of the enemy.
In addition, there are two naval means of influencing the
course of a war: (1) fleet operations against the enemy's
nuclear potential at sea; and (2) using strategic missile
submarines in operations against the shore.
^
The second assumption implied by the acceptance of
the bastion concept is that the Soviets believe the
ballistic missile submarine can conduct strategic missions
and, therefore, influence the course and the outcome of a
war. This implies that the Soviets see a two-fold advantage
in protecting their SSBN force in case of a war. First, as
shown by the first assumption, because they want to maintain
a positive correlation of nuclear forces. Second, because
^Tritten, Soviet Naval Force and Nuclear Warfare , p.
31. Tritten identified these after exhaustive research of
the writings and speeches of Admiral Gorshkov and other top
ranking Soviet officials.
they believe that if the SSBN must be used it can effect the
course and the outcome of the war. These two goals are
mutually exclusive because one refers to the advantage of
the SSBN by its very existence and the other by its use.
Like the first assumption, the U.S. Navy's
acceptance of the validity of the second assumption has been
made quite clear. Admiral Butts , the former Chief of Naval
Intelligence, has stated that, for the Soviets, "the primary
task is to deploy and protect the SSBN force. They believe
that SLBMs. for the first time, give navies the capability
to directly affect the course and even the outcome of a
war. "^
3 . Interdiction of the Sea Lines of Communications
The third assumption, unlike the previous two, has
consistently been the most controversial. From the very
beginning the presentation of the Maritime Strategy seemed
to contain a contradiction. As early as 1981 Secretary
Lehman was complaining that "it is unlikely that U.S.
shipping
—
going it alone—is currently capable of supporting
U.S. requirements in peacetime, much less in war. Our
maritime situation is nothing less than a calamity." And
yet, according to Lehman, a strategy which stressed forward
deployment of naval forces would force the Soviets "to
^R. Butts, House Armed Services Committee, FY 198 6,
Part 8, p. 4367.
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concentrate more resources on homeland defense—and possibly
less on interdiction of U.S. sealanes."^
This concern about the importance of the SLOCs to
any NATO strategy was later reiterated by Admiral Watkins in
his publication of the Maritime Strategy. Watkins insisted
that the increased emphasis that had been placed on military
seal ift by the Reagan administration -had assured that tha .
U.S. could supply a sufficient amount of military sealift to
Eurpope but "we will neither be able to tolerate attrition
typical of World War II nor provide adequate dedicated
sealift to transport the strategic raw materials we will
require. "-^^ Nevertheless, Watkins, like Lehman five years
before, declared that the Soviets looked upon the
interdiction of NATOs SLOCs as a secondary mission.
It is important to note that this apparent
contradiction is resolved when placed in the proper context.
Lehman and Watkins, and presumably the rest of the strategic
planners responsible for the Maritime Strategy, felt that
the increased importance of NATO's SLOCs meant that the best
means of protecting them was to emphasize forward
deployments instead of waiting for the Soviets to deploy
their forces into the Atlantic. The best solution for the
protection of the SLOCs, it was decided, was to "operate our
forces so as to keep the Soviets engaged in defending rather
^Lehman, "Rebirth of a Naval Strategy," pp. 13-14.
l^Watkins, "The Maritime Strategy," p. 11.
than attacking. We want them to react to us—not the other
way around . "^^
This solution, however, did little to alleviate the
burning question that was on the mind of those who
remembered the Allied experience of World War II in the
battle of the Atlantic: would the strategy be adequate to
prevent the attrition typical of the U-boat campaign at ijthieuvfl
height of World War II? In a six month period in 1942, 14
German U-boats managed to sink 4 50 allied ships. Admittedly
this was right after the entry of the United States into the
war and the convoying and air patrol systems at this point
were at best feeble. Such obvious statistics led many
analysts to believe that this point could hardly go
unnoticed by the Soviets. Therefore, the most reasonable
strategy for the Soviets to employ would be unconditional
submarine warfare on NATO's supply lines from the United
States to the Central Front in Europe.
The maritime strategists, as they have carefully
noted, did not ignore the lessons of World War II, but
simply felt that the Soviets would not place the
interdiction of NATOs SLOCs on a higher priority than the
protection of their own SSBN force. In other words, for the
Soviets, maintaining a positive correlation of nuclear
forces was more important than severing NATOs supply lines.
Thus the third assumption inherent in the bastion concept is
^^Bagget, House Armed Services Committe, p. 4387.
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that the Soviets do not view the interdiction of NATO's sea
lines of communications as a primary mission for their
conventional navy—at least at the outset of a conventional
war.
4. Primary Mission of the Soviet Conventional Navy
If, according to the third assumption, the Soviets
do not view SLOC interdiction as a primary mission for rtheir
conventional navy, then what precisely is its primary
mission? The bastion concept has two essential elements.
First, the Soviet Navy will maintain their SSBNs in the
relative safety of home waters in order to maintain a
positive correlation of nuclear forces. Second, and more
importantly from a conventional war fighting aspect, the
Soviets will use the majority of their conventional navy to
protect the SSBNs in these bastions. Such an assumption
provides an important insight into the importance the
Soviets attach to their SSBN force since it implies that the
main purpose for building the remainder of their
considerable navy, which includes attack submarines,
destroyers, cruisers, and even air craft carriers, is to
protect this SSBN force.
This assumption, that the Soviet conventional navy
will be used primarily to protect their SSBN force, is most
critical with respect to the relevance of the Maritime
Strategy. The Maritime Strategy stresses forward
deployments because that is where the Soviet naval forces
are expected to be found. If it did not stress forward
deployment then any war fighting scenario would only
envision an uneasy stand off between the opposing forces
with no combat—an unacceptable strategy from the U.S.
perspective. Thus, there are two subtle themes involved
with the missions of the Soviet conventional navy in case of
a future war. One of these themes suggests that the «U;S.
Navy will "force Soviet submarines to retreat into defensive
bastions to protect their ballistic missile submarines. "^^
The other says that "the Soviet Navy's role in overall
Soviet strategy suggests that initially the bulk of Soviet
naval forces will deploy in areas near the Soviet Union,
with only a small fraction deployed forward. "^^
These two themes appear to be contradictory. Will
the Soviets deploy their conventional navy in home waters
because that is what they originally intended or because the
forward deployment strategy of the U.S. Navy has forced them
up there? The open literature does not provide an adequate
answer to this question. However, it is clear that the U.S.
Navy has assumed that the Soviets intend to utilize the
majority of their naval forces near their home waters to
protect their SSBN force—whether provoked or not. What is
not clear is exactly how many of their conventional forces
they will keep in their territorial waters if they are not
^^Watkins, "The Maritime Strategy," p. 9.
^^Watkins, "The Maritime Strategy," p. 7.
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directly threatened. Therefore, the apparent discrepancy is
cleared if it is assumed that the Maritime Strategy is
attempting to play it conservatively by forcing the Soviets
to keep as much of their forces in their home waters as
possible by the forward deployment of U.S. naval forces.
Thus, the fourth assumption inherent in the bastion concept
is that the Soviets will utilize -the majority of -their
conventional navy to protect their SSBN force in home waters
even if the U.S. Navy does not conduct a forward offensive.
5. Land War/Conventional War in Europe
A fact which is very seldom mentioned in official
Soviet literature is that the role played by its Navy in the
"Great Patriotic War" and World War II (there is a distinc-
tion between the two for the Soviets) was relatively minor.
The Soviet Union, and Russia before her, has traditionally
been a landpower and there is little dispute in the Soviet
Union (or in the West) that the Soviet Army had the major
part to play in the defeat of Germany. The Soviet Navy did
have the largest submarine force in the world at the start
of the war, but other pressing economic situations, and the
untimely Nazi invasion, prevented her from building a large
surface fleet. Fortunately for the Soviets, the war would
essentially be a land war to be determined on the European
land mass. The major naval battles of the war would be
fought by her allies, the British and the Americans.
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When Admiral Gorshkov assumed control of the Soviet
Navy in 1956 the Soviet Army still completely dominated the
top positions of leadership in the Soviet military
bureaucracy. The ideas being promulgated by the military
establishment and being accepted as doctrine were largely
army-dominated ideas. The main use of the navy was in
coastal defense and to support the army. Gorshkov- did
.^
manage to bring about a very gradual change in the Army-
dominated military establishment and, by the beginning of
the 1980s, the Soviet Navy had at least secured itself a
reasonably firm position in Soviet military strategy (an in
depth review of this change is beyond the scope of this
research). ^^ However, even today, the top positions in the
Soviet military establishment are manned by Army officers,
and the Navy still appears to be fifth in the pecking order
behind the Strategic Rocket forces, the Ground forces, the
Air Defense forces, and the Air Force.
Any gains which Admiral Gorshkov was able to make
for the Soviet Navy were due to the role of the SSBN. At
last, Gorshkov had a weapon that could theoretically
influence the course and outcome of a war. However, as
previously discussed, the change in Soviet doctrine that
occurred in the late 1960s to early 1970s stated that a
future war would no longer necessarily be a nuclear war but
l^For a good explanation see Tritten, Soviet Naval
Force and Nuclear Warfare , pp. 69-91.
could be preceded by an extended conventional conflict.
Furthermore, not only would the next war be initially
conventional but the most critical TVD (teatr voennykh
deystviy or theater of military operations) would be the
Western TVD in Europe. The Soviets would prefer to fight a
future war in a blitzkrieg style with the quickest possible
victory, hopefully contained to only one theater. By 'this
strategy, the Soviets hope to be able to win the war "at the
lowest possible level of intensity" while maintaining firm
control of escalation. -^^
The Soviet military strategy thus provides an ideal
justification of the protection of the Soviet SSBN force
within bastions. If the Soviets intend for the next war to
be a quick conventional war (it is a simple truth of
military strategies that no one plans for a long war, they
simply happen) , then it makes sense for them to keep their
SSBN force well protected. It is quite likely that,
according to the Soviet timetable, the Soviets do not even
envision the need for the Navy to play a large role in the
war. If they can overrun all of Europe in a matter of weeks
then there is very little that either navy can really do.
This assumption about Soviet military strategy, like
all of the previous assumptions, has been openly accepted by
the U.S. Navy. Admiral Watkins has stated that the Soviets
l^Philip Petersen and John Hines, "The Conventional
Offensive in Soviet Theater Strategy," Orbis . Fall 1983, p.
695.
"would not use nuclear weapons lightly, preferring to
achieve their goals with conventional means. "^^ But even in
a conventional war the Soviets will pay close attention to
the correlation of nuclear forces; thus, even though the war
may not involve the use of nuclear weapons it is still a
nuclear war because of the high priority placed on the
nuclear correlation of forces. In any case, according-;W?^|r^
Admiral Watkins, "the probable centerpiece of Soviet
strategy in global war would be a combined-arms assault
against Europe, where they would seek a quick and decisive
victory. "^^ Therefore, the fifth assumption inherent in the
bastion concept is that the Soviets believe that the next
war with the West will not necessarily be a nuclear war and,
therefore, the critical part of the war will be the land war
in Central Europe.
6. Nuclear Escalation/War Termination
It is perhaps one of the greatest ironies of the
study of war that the ultimate weapon of destruction yet
invented by man, the nuclear weapon, has forced a change in
the objectives of war from victory to termination. The
American tradition of war has dictated that an enemy is to
be completely defeated, occupied, and forced to negotiate on
the terms of the occupying powers. The classic example of
this attitude was World War II in which both Germany and
l^atkins, "The Maritime Strategy," p. 73.
^"^Watkins, "The Maritime Strategy," p. 7.
84
Japan were warned in advance that the only possible
conclusion to the war was their unconditional surrender.
Although it may be argued that the only effect of this
policy was to unneccesarily prolong the war, the important
point to be made here is that with the advent of the nuclear
weapon, particularly with its introduction to the United
States and the Soviet Union, the policy of unconditional
f
surrender between two powers that both had nuclear weapons
was seen as extremely dangerous and, therefore, increasingly
unrealistic.
The Maritime Strategy assumes that a future war with
the Soviet Union cannot be won under the contingencies of
unconditional surrender without a considerable risk of
vertical escalation and massive destruction. In fact, at
the very least, the most that can be hoped for in a future
war with the Soviet Union is that it can be terminated with
a minimal amount of damage to the United States and her
allies. In this respect, the Maritime Strategy has
attempted to be more realistic in its approach to the
ultimate objective of a future war with the Soviet Union
—
but this has not always been the case.
The war termination aspect of the Maritime Strategy
demonstrates that the strategy encompasses two different
strategic levels: war deterrence and, failing that, war
fighting. The strategy, as both a deterrent strategy and a
war fighting strategy, proclaims that if deterrence should
fail then the goal of the strategy is to terminate the war
on grounds favorable to the United States. However, the
main problem associated with this concept is that although a
considerable amount of time and thought has been spent on
understanding deterrence, there is still a lack of
sufficient in depth analysis on war termination in the
nuclear age.
The concept of deterrence in the nuclear age has
been responsible for a plethora of books and articles. In
the United States during the 1950s and early 1960s, the
concept of deterrence was contained within the principle of
"mutual assured destruction." Unfortunately, mutual assured
destruction was not a war termination strategy at all but
simply a deterrent posture based on the fatalistic
assumption that a future nuclear war will not be won by
either side but will instead result in the wholesale
destrucion of the civilized world. This idea that a nuclear
war cannot be won has managed to maintain some degree of
popularity among strategic analysts, and has perhaps
restricted a more complete analysis of fighting a nuclear
war as a viable option. ^^
Perhaps the most important barrier to the complete
analysis of nuclear war and war termination is the lack of
^^For an excellent explanation of cultural
peculiarities and their effect upon nuclear strategy see
Colin Gray, Nuclear Strategy and National Style . Lanham
Maryland: Hamilton Brothers, 1986. Especially see Chapter 2.
empirical data to back up any proposed hypotheses. The only
nuclear war ever fought must be considered an exception to
the rule, if indeed any rules can be established on this
subject, because the United States had the nuclear weapon
and the Japanese did not. Furthermore, in a future conflict
there would probably be condiderable hesitancy to use a
nuclear weapon, even on a tactical scale and in the face '.of- v*
overwhelming enemy superiority and almost certain defeat.
The major deterrent to the use of any nuclear weapon in a
future war is that an extremely subtle but very important
psychological barrier must be crossed before a nuclear
weapon can be employed. Once that barrier is crossed and
the weapon is actually used, no matter how unimportant the
target or how limited the damage, an important precedent
will have been set and it becomes impossible to predict how
much further the conflict will escalate. The decision to
use the nuclear weapon for the first time will be the
hardest; as with most difficult decisions, it will become
easier after that. The lack of sufficient analysis on war
termination in the nuclear age is therefore more of an
uneasy acknowledgement by most analysts that the initial
decision to actually use the nuclear weapon in a war may
open an entire Pandora's box of problems that simply cannot
be forseen or controlled—and are therefore best avoided
completely.
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When the Soviets gained strategic parity in the
early 1970s it became obvious that Mutual Assured Detruction
was not a viable strategy, and other options had to be
considered. Thus, in the 1970s analysts began to introduce
the concepts of limited strategic or limited nuclear
options. Limited nuclear options, which entail the limited
use of nuclear weapons for purely limited objectives, waff-i^.
considered to be the traditional linkage to a war termina-
tion strategy. ^^ However, the Maritime Strategy introduced
a new linkage that specifically avoided the use of nuclear
weapons by using U.S. naval forces to destroy Soviet
strategic systems (the SSBN) . Hopefully, this policy of
counterforce coercion would achieve the same goals as the
limited nuclear options without crossing the psychological
barrier which naturally prohibits the use of nuclear weapons
for fear of a rapid escalation with no control.
The Soviets are faced with several options if faced
with a counterforce coercion strategy from NATO: (1) they
can escalate vertically by using their strategic nuclear
systems before the U.S. and NATO naval forces have a chance
to destroy them (one of the primary arguments of the nuclear
escalationists discussed in Chapter II) ; (2) they can simply
^^James E. Dornam, Mark Earle, Stephen R. Gibert,
Charles H. Morit, Arthur A. Zuehlke, War Termination
Concepts and Political. Economic, and Military Targeting ,
paper prepared by the SRI International Strategic Studies
Center for the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency,
March 1978, p. 15.
ignore the loss of their SSBN force and continue fighting
without escalating to a nuclear exchange; (3) they can
conduct a caiid pro quo campaign by destroying a U.S. or NATO
strategic system on a one for one basis; or (4) they can
decide it is pointless to continue the war if they no longer
enjoy a superiority in the nuclear correlation of forces and
therefore terminate the war as quickly as possible.
The Maritime Strategy explicitly accepts the fourth
option as the most likely response. Escalation is dismissed
outright because it "serves no useful purpose for the
Soviets since their reserve forces would be degraded and the
United States' retaliatory posture would be enhanced. "^O
Instead, since the Soviets "place great weight on the
nuclear correlation of forces, even during the time before
nuclear weapons have been used" it is more likely that a
strategy which focuses on shifting this nuclear correlation
through the destruction of Soviet ballistic missile
submarines would be more likely to "terminate the war on
terms acceptable to us and to our allies. "^1 The Maritime
Strategy acknowledges that escalation could occur but
"aggressive use of maritime power can make escalation a less
attractive option to the Soviets with the passing of every
day. II 2 2
20watkins, "The Maritime Strategy," p. 14.
21watkins, "The Maritime Strategy," p. 14.
22watkins, "The Maritime Strategy," p. 14.
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There is an apparent contradiction involved with
this particular aspect of the Maritime Strategy. The
strategy assumes that the Soviets believe the SSBN can
affect the course and outcome of a war, a statement not used
lightly by the Soviets, and yet the strategy expects the
Soviets to allow the destruction of their SSBNs without
escalation and, in fact, to terminate the war if a
sufficient amount are destroyed. However, it must be
understood that the very existence of a bastion concept
indicates that the Soviets fully expect the SSBN to be a
potential target in case of a future war. Furthermore, the
Soviets would dearly love to be able to destroy U.S. SSBNs
and have stated so on many occasions. It is reasonable to
assume that the Soviets would like to avoid escalation of
any conflict with the United States to the use of nuclear
weapons. Unfortunately, these are questions that can never
be answered adequately until an actual war occurs and real
decisions have to be made. In either case, the sixth
assumption inherent within the bastion concept is that the
Soviets do not intend to escalate the war to a nuclear war
if some (or perhaps all) of their SSBN force is destroyed,
but instead will be more likely to sue for peace once they
lose their positive correlation of nuclear forces.
C. SUMMATION
The purpose of this research is to determine if the
bastion concept still provides a critical linkage between
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the Maritime Strategy and the naval aspects of the new
Soviet military doctrine. Since the bastion concept is a
rather expansive theory, it is easier to develop this
linkage if it is broken down into a set of more fundamental
assumptions inherent within the ideas encompassed by the
bastion concept. This was accomplished by conducting a
thematic content analysis of official publications and-^pen
testimony given by senior naval officers and the Secretary
of the Navy.
The six fundamental assumptions of the bastion concept
are:
1. The Soviets intend to withhold their SSBN forces as a
strategic reserve in case of a future war with the
West.
2. The Soviets believe the ballistic missile submarine
can conduct strategic missions and, therefore,
influence the course and outcome or a war.
3. The Soviets do not view the interdiction of NATO's sea
lines of communications as a primary mission for their
conventional navy—at least at the outset of a
conventional war.
4. The Soviets will utilize the majority of their
conventional navy to protect their SSBN force in home
waters even if the U.S. Navy does not conduct a
forward offensive.
5. The Soviets believe that the next war with the West
will not necessarily be a nuclear war and, therefore,
the critical part of the war will be the land war in
Central Europe.
6. The Soviets do not intend to escalate the war to a
nuclear war if some (or perhaps all) of their SSBN
force is destroyed, but instead will be more likely to
sue for peace once they lose their positive
correlation of nuclear forces.
The bastion concept by no means requires the support of
all of these assumptions. For example, if the assumption
about nuclear escalation and war termination (the sixth
assumption) appears to be completely invalid, this does not
mean that the bastion concept is also defective. It may
mean that the Soviets are using the bastion for other
reasons that are not so apparent. ^ in*vany-case> . the, first,^^/
place to look must be in the major writings of the man who
commanded the Soviet Navy for almost 30 years, Sergei
Gorshkov.
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IV. EVIDENCE OF BASTIONS
It is particularly important that submarines have become
the main arm of the forces of modern navies. The new
strategic orientation of the navies toward warfare against
the shore has also played a great role. All of this has
to a great degree increased the need for the all-around
support c
missions.
A. A PROPER PERSPECTIVE
The purpose of this research is not to conduct an
exhaustive review of all aspects of the Soviet Navy for the
previous 3 years in order to trace the development of the
bastion concept. The development of the bastion concept was
given in Chapter II. The very fact that most strategic
analysts and intelligence experts in the United States
military have adopted the bastion concept, and the fact that
it has become a centerpiece assumption of the U.S. Naval
Maritime Strategy is sufficient proof of its acceptance.
The process of reviewing and supporting the existence (or
non-existence) of the bastion concept at this point would be
a redundant academic exercise. The bastion concept has
become an accepted fact, albeit a still debated fact, in
U.S. naval perspectives of its opponent's strategy.
It is now important to look closely at the changes that
have occurred in the Soviet Union since Mikhail Gorbachev
^S.G. Gorshkov, Sea Power of the State . 2nd ed.
,
Moscow: Military Publishing House, 1979, p. 340.
came to power in March 1985. Specifically, it is important
to review the changes that have taken place in the military
to determine if the central assumption of the Maritime
Strategy, the bastion concept, is still the critical linkage
between the present Maritime Strategy and the "new" Soviet
military doctrine.
However, before an examination of the new Soviet
military doctrine is commenced it is first necessary to
review the strategy of the Soviet Navy as seen through the
eyes of Sergei Gorshkov, the man who led the Soviet Navy for
almost 3 years and is largely responsible for its present
shape. Gorshkov 's effect upon the Soviet Navy and his
influence on Soviet military strategy in the previous two
decades, at least for a Naval officer in an Army-dominated
hierarchy, cannot be over-emphasized. In order to
understand the significance of the new ideas being
promulgated about the Soviet military it is necessary to
have at least an elementary understanding of Gorshkov 's
ideas as they applied to Soviet military strategy, and the
part the Soviet Navy would play in that strategy in case of
a future war with the West. Only then can Gorbachev's
influence upon the Soviet military be placed in the proper
perspective.
An exhaustive review of the writings and speeches given
by Admiral Gorshkov and his replacement as head of the
Soviet Navy, V.N. Chernavin, has been conducted by other
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analysts. 2 This precludes the necessity of traveling over
ground that has already been thoroughly researched. The
point here is to condense some of Gorshkov's more important
ideas as presented in his two major works, Red Star Rising
at Sea and The Sea Power of the State , and to see to what
extent Gorshkov's ideas support or refute the six basic
assumptions of the bastion concept outlined in Chapter III.
B. GORSHKOV'S VIEW OF NAVAL STRATEGY
For better or for worse, Sergei G. Gorshkov is one of
the most prominent naval figures of the twentieth century.
The very fact that he was able to survive as head of the
Soviet Navy from June 1956 until his retirement in December
1985 is in itself a remarkable testimony to his endurance
and political savvy. Had he not published a single word
Gorshkov would still have to be admired for this feat alone.
However, though not considered an extremely prolific writer
on naval affairs, Gorshkov did publish several works in the
1970s which dealt extensively and in some detail with the
relationship between sea power and a state which desired to
attain status as a truly global power, such as the Soviet
Union.
^See Tritten, Soviet Naval Forces and Nuclear Warfare ,
and David A. Hildebrandt, The Soviet Trend Toward Conven-
tional Warfare and the Soviet Navv; Still No Anti-Sloe? .
Master's Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey,
California, June 1988.
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The first of these important works, Red Star Rising at
Sea , was a series of articles which appeared in the Soviet
naval journal Morskoi Sbornik in 1972 and 1973. ^ The
second, and much more important work. Sea Power of the
State , was first published in 197 6 with a second edition
appearing in 1979. This book, unlike Red Star Rising at
Sea, was a much more detailed book which went beyond --an
historical analysis of the Russian and Soviet Navy. In Sea
Power of the State Gorshkov provided an interesting insight
into the present (and to some extent future) significance of
a navy and its importance to a nation that wishes to attain
superpower status. It is difficult to say to what extent
Gorshkov was arguing for his major points or simply
repeating fully approved doctrine, this argument continues
to this day. However, it is important to realize that the
CPSU did allow these works to be published, and we can
assume that everything the Soviets write, say, or do has
been carefully thought out in advance with the realization
that the West will be paying close attention.
1. Fleet vs. Fleet and Fleet vs. Shore
Before reviewing evidence of Admiral Gorshkov •
s
support for the six basic assumptions, it is first necessary
to review his approach to modern naval operations. Gorshkov
•^Red Star Rising at Sea is the name given to the
collected articles by the Naval Institute Press which
published all of the articles in a book under this name in
1974. The articles in Morskoi Sbornik appeared under the
title of "Navies in War and Peace" in 1972 and 1973.
breaks naval operations down into two distinct categories:
fleet-against-fleet and fleet-against-shore. Fleet-against-
fleet, as the name implies, involves the operations of naval
forces against "enemy ships at sea and in bases and the
battle for sea and ocean communications.""* Fleet-against
shore consists of "attacks by carrier aircraft against
ground targets and grouping of forces and in the destruction
of strategically and economically important land targets by
submarine-launched nuclear-missile attacks."^
Fleet-against-fleet therefore deals with the more
traditional aspects of naval warfare in which the fleet
attempts to engage the enemy fleet or interdict his shipping
on the sea lanes. However, according to Gorshkov, it is in
the area of fleet-against-shore that modern navies have
gained their most important significance. Modern naval
vessels, specifically the SSBN, can crush the military-
economic potential of an adversary by launching ballistic
missiles against the enemy's most important military and
industrial areas. The ability to crush the enemy's
military-industrial potential is of special significance
because this is defined as a strategic goal of a future
conflict, and, as a strategic goal, it is capable of
influencing the course and outcome of a war.^ Thus, in
"^Gorshkov, Sea Power of the State , p. 315.
^Gorshkov, Sea Power of the State , p. 315.
^Gorshkov, Sea Power of the State , pp. 325-329.
Gorshkov's scheme of naval warfare, fleet-against-shore
operations are more important than the traditional fleet-
against-fleet and, most importantly from Gorshkov's
perspective, have given the Soviet Navy an increased
significance because, for the first time, it can directly
influence the course and outcome of a war. This is the main
point of his book.
2. Evidence of Basic Assumptions
a. SSBN as a Withholding Deterrent
Withholding, as discussed in Chapter III, refers
to the inherent survivability of the SSBN as a strategic
platform which allows it to be used as a "strategic reserve"
in case of a future strategic nuclear war. Many Western
analysts have insisted, and continue to insist, that
withholding provides the Soviets with their primary
justification for protecting their SSBNs in bastions. To
continue this logic, the Soviets would have no need to
provide such intensive support for their SSBN fleet if they
intended to use the SSBN strategic missiles at the very
onset of war. Therefore, the fact that they do provide
conventional protection for their SSBNs can only mean one of
two things: the Soviets either intend to withhold some of
the SSBNs from the initial exchange in a nuclear conflict or
they expect the next war to commence with a prolonged
conventional phase that will eventually escalate to a global
nuclear war. The first option could be implemented in order
to provide some bargaining leverage since the remaining
SSBNs provide the ability to retaliate against any further
nuclear escalation. The second option implies that nuclear
weapons have not been used; their protection becomes even
more important because it is essential that both sides have
the ability to inflict unacceptable damage on the other if
the war does manage to escalate to the nuclear stage.
Unfortunately, it is very difficult to support
or refute the withholding assumption. The Soviets provide
very little insight into the specific intentions for their
SSBN fleet in the event of a future war with the West.
Gorshkov, while often referring to the importance of the
SSBN to the Soviet Navy, never says that the SSBN would be
withheld from an initial nuclear exchange. It is of great
interest to note, however, that Gorshkov does give a very
precise explanation of withholding in Sea Power of the
State , but insists that it is the U.S. strategy , and not the
Soviet strategy , for a strategic nuclear war:
...considering the comparatively low vulnerability of
missile-armed submarines and the complexity of detecting
them before the first strike, one can assume that a
considerable part of the nuclear-missile strength of the
enemy (i.e., U.S.) will be wasted to no purpose, while the
main part of the nuclear-missile strength of the U.S.
strategic forces will be preserved.^
It is important to note that Gorshkov 's reason-
ing for the withholding of the U.S. submarine strategic
nuclear forces is almost identical to the reasoning applied
"^Gorshkov, Sea Power of the State , p. 237.
by Western analysts to the Soviet Navy. Gorshkov makes it
clear that the relative invulnerability of the SSBN makes it
safe for one to assume that it would be an ideal platform
for such a task, he never claims that it is U.S. declaratory
policy. Not surprisingly the same can be said for the
Soviet Navy. There is simply an insufficient amount of
evidence to determine if the Soviets really do intend -to
withhold their SSBNs, or a portion of their SSBNs, from an
initial nuclear strike. This was the same conclusion
reached by James Tritten in his book Soviet Naval Forces and
Nuclear Warfare . After conducting a content analysis of
Soviet literature (mostly from Gorshkov, the Minister of
Defense, and the Secretary General of the Communist Party)
,
Tritten concluded that "there is no direct evidence in the
literature alone to support a declaratory policy of
withholding SSBNs from the initial nuclear strike...."^
The lack of evidence to support a withholding
role for the Soviet SSBNs does not take away the
justification for protecting them in bastions close to home
waters. As previously mentioned, another option is that the
Soviet's believe that a future war with the West would
commence with a prolonged conventional phase. Assuming, for
the time being, that this is true, the protection of the
SSBN force could in fact become even more important because
8<Tritten, Soviet Naval Forces and Nuclear Warfare , p.
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it ensures the ability to retaliate if the war does escalate
to a nuclear strike. Simply having the ability to
retaliate, even if the war happens to go poorly for the
Soviets on the central front, can be extremely important,
particularly in the later stages of the war.
b. The SSBN as a Warfighting System
In Sea Power of the State Gorshkov goes into
great detail explaining the evolution of naval power,
especially Soviet naval power, in the twentieth century.
After the Civil War the Soviet Navy was essentially a
coastal patrol navy whose primary function, should another
war occur, was to launch "attacks from different directions
upon the main enemy objective without breaking away from
friendly bases.... "^ This method of waging naval warfare,
which Gorshkov made abundantly clear is not the preferred
method, was thrust upon the Soviet Navy when it had limited
strength and had to face a more powerful enemy. The
implication was clear: a navy that was only powerful enough
to protect its own shores by remaining within its home
waters is a sign of weakness. A more powerful navy,
befitting a true global power, should be carrying the fight
to the shores of the enemy.
Gorshkov also explained that in a war between
two powers that are separated by the ocean expanses, the
navies will play a more important role than they would if
^Gorshkov, Sea Power of the State , p. 186.
the nations are both contiguous land powers. In both World
War I and World War II the primary Soviet enemy was Germany,
another land power. Appropriately, Gorshkov does not deny
that the Soviet victory in World War II was mainly due to
the efforts of the Soviet Army. However, he also points out
that in the war in the Pacific between Japan and the United ..
States both countries were "separated by ocean expanses, and . -.^
that in itself predetermined the special and decisive role
of the navies. "^^ Again Gorshkov seemed to be warning the
Soviet military leadership, especially the Army, that all of
the previous Soviet wars have been against other land
powers. A future war may be against the United States, a
country that is separated from the Soviet Union by the
sea. ^^
With the advent of the nuclear powered submarine
capable of launching ballistic missiles, the Soviet Navy now
had a weapon that could both carry the fight to the shores
of the enemy and play a decisive role, even if the enemy
happened to be across the ocean. The ballistic missile
submarine was a qualitatively new weapon that was capable of
carrying out a qualitatively new mission, "the crushing of
the military-economic potential of the enemy through direct
^•^Gorshkov, Sea Power of the State , p. 156.
^^Of course the Soviets did enter the war against Japan
in August 194 5, but even this war was essentially a land war
since the Soviets attacked the Japanese forces in Manchuria.
There was no real need for the Navy to get involved.
military action from the sea against his vitally important
centers. "^^
Gorshkov felt that the impact of the ballistic
missile submarine on war and armed conflict could not be
emphasized enough. The Soviet Navy was no longer condemned
to a role of total subservience to the whims of the Soviet
Army. Here was a weapon that could not be ignored, a weapon"^-"
that was extremely difficult to locate, able to remain on
station for very long periods of time, and, most importantly
of all, a weapon that could effect the course and outcome of
a war by conducting the strategic mission of crushing the
military-economic potential of the enemy.
Gorshkov actually defined two separate strategic
missions for the Soviet Navy: crushing the military-
economic potential of the enemy and destroying the ballistic
missile submarines of the enemy. -^-^ However, by far the most
emphasis is placed on the former and, as it later became #r
more obvious to the Soviets that they were going to have an
extremely difficult time locating U.S. SSBNs on patrol, the
anti-SSBN mission seems to have been dropped as a strategic
mission—at least for the time being.-'14
^^Gorshkov, Sea Power of the State . p. vi of
introduction.
^^Gorshkov, Sea Power of the State , p. 292.
^^Hildebrandt, The Soviet Trend Towards Conventional
Warfare and the Soviet Navy: Still No Anti-Sloe? , p. 147.
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strategic missions, according to Gorshkov, have
become "the determining factor in the development" of modern
navies.-'-^ This implies that the SSBN, as the weapons system
(at the time) capable of conducting strategic missions, has
virtually become the raison d'etre of modern global navies.
Gorshkov makes it very clear in several passages of Sea
Power of the State that "a navy operating against the shore
possesses the capability. . .of directly affecting the course
and even the outcome of a war."^^ Therefore, there is a
substantial amount of manifest evidence to indicate that the
Soviet Navy under Gorshkov believed it had the ability to
conduct strategic missions, and affect the course and
outcome of a war.
c. SLOG Interdiction
In Red Star Rising at Sea . Admiral Gorshkov
spends a considerable amount of time discussing the role of
SLOG interdiction in both World War I and World War II. In
World War I Gorshkov claims that the German blockade of
Britain had a "considerable effect on the overall course of
the war."-'-^ The wording here is important because Gorshkov
does not say it had a decisive effect, and he does not
mention what its effect on the outcome of the war was. He
^^Gorshkov, Sea Power of the State , p. 242.
^^Gorshkov, Sea Power of the State , p. 325.
•^^Gorshkov, Red Star Rising at Sea . Annapolis: United
States Naval Institute Press, 1974, p. 45.
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draws very similar conclusions from World War II when he
states that the German blockade had a "serious effect on the
military-economic potential of England" and that overall,
the submarine campaigns against enemy shipping during World
War II had a "definite influence on the course of military
operations. "^S Gorshkov is even more straightforward in Sea
Power of the State when he explains that, with respect ' to
World War I, "the battle in sea and ocean theaters had a
profound effect on the course of operations and campaigns in
the ground theaters. Moreover, this influence was strategic
in nature . "^^
In spite of all the attention Gorshkov gives to
the role of the submarine, especially the German U-boats, in
both World Wars, he reserves some especially harsh criticism
for the manner in which the Germans operated their U-boats
throughout the war. Gorshkov repeatedly reprimands the
Germans for waiting too long in the war before they deployed
their submarines on a massive scale and, after they did
deploy a considerable number of submarines in the Atlantic,
for failing to ensure proper support for their submarines.
The remainder of the German Navy, and any part of the German
Air Force that could have been spared, should have been used
to protect and support the German submarines as they went on
^^Gorshkov, Red Star Rising at Sea , pp. 79, 103.
^^Gorshkov, Sea Power of the State , p. 143. (Emphasis
added.
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patrol. Instead, by sending their U-boats into combat
totally unsupported by other branches of the armed forces,
the Germans doomed the U-boats to a slow but inevitable
death.
... in the final period of the war the effectiveness of the
submarine blockade was reduced because the German command,
after charging the U-boats with accomplishing the main
mission, had failed to employ other naval forces to ensure
their successful operation. The German fleets and air
units did not materially even engage the enemy antisubma-
rine forces. The U-boats were left to their own
resources. To the thousands of ships and other means of
waging antisubmarine warfare. Germany merely responded
with a few new submarines. Imperialist Germany, whose
military machine was approaching a catastrophic end,
delayed too long before beginning to employ her submarine
forces on a broad scale, and she did not draw upon her
total naval strength to support their operations . ^^
It is apparent that Gorshkov felt the German
submarine force, if it had been properly supported by the
Navy and Air Force, could have had even a more decisive
effect on the course, and possibly even the outcome, of the
wars. Gorshkov never explicitly says this, but the number
of times he repeats the German mistakes in both books, and
the fact that he calls it "the biggest mistake of the German
fascist leaders" indicates that he felt the submarine's role
could have been much more decisive. ^^ The latter statement
is even more startling when it is considered that it is
coming from a Soviet military leader who actually fought
against the Germans in the Great Patriotic War. Most Soviet
20Qorshkov, Sea Power of the State , p. 140. (Emphasis
added.)
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^Gorshkov, Sea Power of the State , p. 162.
military leaders, and many Western analysts, feel the
biggest mistake of the war made by Germany was in choosing
to attack the Soviet Union in the first place. The fact
that Gorshkov, a veteran of that war, stated otherwise makes
his argument even more poignant.
Gorshkov does not deemphasize the importance of
ocean transport or the role of the submarine in attacking
ocean shipping after World War II. In fact, Gorshkov
explains that the role of the submarine in attacking enemy
shipping is "even more important in today's context. "^^
However, in Sea Power of the State Gorshkov states that
fleet-against-shore operations could be considered a part of
SLOC interdiction. The SSBN has the ability to launch
ballistic missiles against ports, dry docks, shipyards, and
other repair facilities. This, according to Gorshkov, also
constitutes a means of disrupting enemy shipping, and is
even more decisive since it is directed "against the source
of the military strength of the enemy. "^-^ Furthermore, "the
role and position of ocean transport in the economies of
many states in their day also determined the importance of
oceans, an importance which is growing continuously ."^^
Admiral Gorshkov never claimed that the
interdiction of the enemy's sea lines of communication was a
22Gorshkov, Red Star Rising at Sea , p. 102.
^^Gorshkov, Sea Power of the State , p. 326.
^^Gorshkov, Sea Power of the State , p. 14.
strategic mission or that it was capable of affecting or
influencing the course and outcome of a war. He did make it
clear, however, that a properly supported SLOC interdiction
campaign could be a very important part of damaging the
enemy's military-economic potential, especially if the
interdiction took the form of nuclear strikes against enemy
ports. There is no manifest evidence that indicates Admiral
Gorshkov considered SLOC interdiction as one of the primary
missions of the Soviet Navy—at least at the outset of a
future conventional war. However, it is apparent that the
Soviet Navy under Admiral Gorshkov did still believe SLOC
interdiction was a very important mission,
d. Soviet Conventional Navy
The second essential element of the bastion
concept involves the use of the conventional Soviet Navy to
provide protection for the ballistic missile submarines. In
this context, the conventional navy refers to all of the
naval combatants except for the SSBNs, minesweepers,
transport ships, troop carriers, and other naval
auxiliaries; specifically it refers to the torpedo attack
submarines, guided-missile submarines, aircraft carriers,
cruisers, destroyers, and frigates. This aspect of the
bastion concept is important to the Maritime Strategy
because it gives a very important indication of where the
Soviet fleet can be found, and what operational and tactical
methods will have to be used to confront it.
Gorshkov was extremely critical of the German
Navy in both World Wars for not providing sufficient combat
support for their submarines. However, the German U-boats
were mainly involved in the interdiction of the Allied
shipping. Now, according to Gorshkov, there was a
qualitatively new mission that navies were capable of
performing: the destruction of the military-economic
potential of the enemy by the use of ballistic missile
attacks upon his most important centers of industrial and
military strength. This qualitative change would seem to
indicate that there was a fundamentally different mission
for the conventional navy as well.
Gorshkov repeatedly emphasized that the
submarine simply could not " fullv assure its own
invulnerability . "25 The primary role of the submarine may
have changed from attacking enemy shipping on the open seas
to delivering strikes upon enemy shores but the submarine
was still "the main attack force of the Navv ."^^ This
quantum increase in the importance of the submarine meant
that the role of the conventional navy in protecting the
submarine, specifically the ballistic missile submarine, was
equally more important. The conventional navy could not be
wasted unnecessarily on general engagements against the
enemy fleet. Such engagements "not only have lost their
^^Gorshkov, Sea Power of the State , p. 279.
^^Gorshkov, Sea Power of the State , p. 279.
significance, but have also actually become impractical . "^^
Instead, the conventional navy had to be used to ensure the
combat security of the ballistic missile submarines by
preventing enemy naval forces from surprising them. Once
the combat security of the SSBNs was ensured, they could
then carry out their strategic missions.
The primary mission of the conventional navy,
the protection of the ballistic missile submarines, required
that they establish "control of the sea." Control of the
sea was a very important concept for Gorshkov which should
not be confused with the Western or Mahanian concept of
"command of the sea." In fact, Gorshkov criticized the
traditional Western concept of controlling the sea as "the
banner of the militant circles of British and American
imperialism. "28 For Gorshkov, control of the sea was not an
absolute principle but very much dependent upon time and
place. Specifically it was defined as:
...a favorable operational situation gained to conduct an
operation or battle in a certain area of a sea-theater for
the period of time necessary to reliably ensure success
and to guarantee that the enemy will not interrupt the
preparation and conduct of the battle. ^9
The time dependence of control of the sea was
particularly important for Gorshkov. The Western command of
the sea concept, according to the eminent British maritime
27Gorshkov, Sea Power of the State , p. 319.
Gorshkov, Sea Power of the State , p. 336.
Gorshkov, Sea Power of the State , p. 339.
strategist Sir Julian Corbett, meant "nothing but the
control of maritime communications, whether for commercial
or military purposes. "^O In other words, it was not
dependent upon time but was considered to be important for
the duration of the war. Gorshkov, however, insisted that
"the time frame within which one can maintain control of the
sea has been considerably reduced as the speed of ships and
other naval forces have increased and as communications and
intelligence have improved. "^^
The conventional navy, therefore, had to ensure
that the ballistic missile submarines had a sufficient
amount of time to carry out their strategic missions—no
more and no less. This required the establishing of sea
control in a specific place for a specific amount of time.
"The achievement of sea control is the factor ensuring the
success of the operations of forces prosecuting the primary
missions. "^2 Therefore, without sea control the strategic *'>
mission could not be executed and the navy's ability to
influence the course and outcome of the war would be
severely limited. This indicates the importance, from
Gorshkov's perspective, of ensuring that the conventional
^Ojulian Corbett, Some Principles of Maritime Strategy .
Annapolis: United States Naval Institute Press, 1988, p. 94.
^^Gorshkov, Sea Power of the State , p. 340.
^^Gorshkov, Sea Power of the State , p. 341.
navy is capable of properly establishing sea control,
without it everything else becomes impossible.
Gorshkov ' s primary role for the conventional
navy is thus clear. It must be able to ensure "the all-
around support of the operations of forces prosecuting
strategic missions. "-^-^ There is therefore ample evidence to
support the assumption that the conventional navy, under
Gorshkov, had the primary function of protecting the SSBN
force. This leaves little doubt that Gorshkov realized the
importance of SLOC interdiction, but only after the adequate
protection of the SSBNs has been secured.
e. Land War/Conventional War in Europe
When discussing the significance of a possible
future war in Europe one must keep in mind Gorshkov 's
perspective. Gorshkov was trying to argue for the necessity
of a strong Navy if a nation is to have ambitions as a true
global superpower. He would be damaging his argument if he
emphasized the importance of the land war in Central Europe.
The Soviets have long recognized the importance of Central
Europe and have kept a great quantity of motor-rifle
divisions and armor in this area for this very reason. The
land war in Central Europe, and its importance, was already
an accepted fact among the Soviet military and political
hierarchy.
^
-^Gorshkov, Sea Power of the State , p. 34 0.
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However, Gorshkov does not seem to feel that the
next war with the West necessarily would be a prolonged
conventional war. He did discuss the importance of
interdicting the enemy's SLOCs on the one hand (what would
appear to be a thoroughly conventional mission) , but he
further implies that this could best be accomplished by
using f leet-against-shore operations: nuclear strikes
against port facilities. Again, this could be due to the
fact that Gorshkov is trying to argue for the importance of
the Soviet Navy, specifically the SSBN force, and not
because he is confident that the next war would be nuclear.
Gorshkov also emphasized the decreasing amount
of time that was available for the fleet to conduct its
strategic mission. In fact, according to Gorshkov, "the
time needed by the Navy to accomplish strategic missions
after the outbreak to military hostilities is becoming of
the same order as the time which is needed to accomplish
tactical missions. "^^ In addition, the short time available
to conduct strategic missions also dictates a strong
requirement to "maintain naval forces in readiness to
immediately deliver attacks on the enemy and the need for
comprehensive control of these forces. "^^ Since the SSBN is
specifically equipped with the ability to execute strategic
^^Gorshkov, Sea Power of the State , p. 335.
^^Gorshkov, Sea Power of the State , p. 335. (Emphasis
added.)
missions, this strongly suggests that Gorshkov foresees the
possibility of requiring the immediate use of the SSBN force
and the ability to maintain comprehensive control of these
forces. It only requires a slight extrapolation from this
point to conclude that Gorshkov felt it is best to keep the
SSBN force close to home waters, well protected and in a
high state of readiness so that they can immediately carry
out their assigned missions: strategic nuclear strikes on
NATO and the American homeland.
In summary, although Gorshkov does recognize
that "the goals of war have been achieved primarily by
occupying enemy territory," he never specifically mentions
the critical importance of the central front in Europe,
unless he is giving his respects to the efforts of the
Russian and Soviet armies in the two World Wars.
Furthermore, he does not specifically say that the next war
would definitely be a nuclear war but does insist that there
is a need to ensure the precise tactical control of the sea-
based strategic nuclear forces for their immediate use.
This is perhaps the strongest argument Gorshkov could give
for maintaining the Soviet SSBN force in well protected
bastions.
f. Nuclear Escalation/War Termination
War termination is not a subject that is
discussed by Gorshkov. In fact, the very idea of war
termination seems to be more of a Western than a Soviet
concept. Gorshkov discusses the use of nuclear weapons to
destroy important land targets and to crush the military-
economic potential of the enemy so that the Navy can alter
the course and outcome of a war. Such language hardly
sounds like simple war termination, it sounds much more like
a war victory. The point may be obvious but it provides an
important insight into the fundamental approach to war used
by the Soviet Navy under Gorshkov.
It is significant to note that Gorshkov does
mention the destruction of enemy SSBNs as a strategic
mission. Although, as previously mentioned, this is not
emphasized to the extent that fleet-against-shore operations
using the ballistic missile submarine are stressed, the very
fact that Gorshkov would elevate anti-SSBN operations to the
level of a strategic mission indicates that the Soviets
placed great importance on having the capability to destroy
the enemy's sea-based strategic arm. If the Soviets really
felt that the destruction of the SSBN force would itself
lead to nuclear escalation it seems unlikely that Gorshkov
would give it this amount of emphasis.
The problem of understanding the nuclear
correlation of forces is even more difficult because of the
difference in correlating nuclear and conventional forces.
According to the definition used for correlation of forces
in the 1970s, "correlations in general are used as a way of
determining which side will have the upper hand, broadly
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speaking, in the action being studied." However, an
important distinction is made for nuclear weapons. "For
nuclear weapons it is much more important to preempt than to
have a higher value in a static correlation. . .therefore,
nuclear correlations do not tell as much as conventional
correlations ."36
Based on this definition, it is overly
simplistic to assume that the Soviets would escalate a war
to the nuclear level if they lost their positive correlation
of nuclear forces because, since this correlation is not
based on static correlations, it is difficult to understand
precisely what the correlation is and, perhaps even more
importantly, the Soviets place more emphasis on preempting
than counting the nuclear correlation. It must also be
acknowledged that it is perhaps too simplistic to assume
that the Maritime Strategy is pushing for war termination
based solely on what is perceived to be the Soviet's
emphasis on the nuclear correlation of forces. The Maritime
Strategy is also meant to show the Soviets that the United
States Navy is quite serious about carrying the fight to
their home waters and will not hesitate to horizontally
escalate the war if necessary. The Soviet SSBN force is not
the recipient of the entire focus of the Maritime Strategy.
However, it is clear that it remains a very important focus.
^^Jalali, Discussions with Voroshilov and Frunze
Academy Students: Correlation of Forces and Means , p. 2.
Two general conclusions about potential nuclear
escalation and war termination can be drawn from the
evidence. The first conclusion is that there is sufficient
evidence to support the assumption that the Soviets did not
intend to escalate a war to the nuclear level just because
they lost SSBNs in the conventional conflict. However, this
does not mean that, at least in the 1970s, the Soviets would
not have chosen to preempt before the question of escalation
even became a problem. The second conclusion is that there
is no evidence that the Soviets would have terminated the
war if they lost their positive correlation of nuclear
forces.
C. SUMMATION
1. The Naval Aspect of Soviet Military Doctrine
This summation is meant to give a general and
condensed version of the naval aspect of Soviet military
doctrine under Admiral Gorshkov, and to summarize the amount
of evidence that could be found to support the six basic
assumptions of the bastion concept outlined in Chapter III.
The purpose of this review is to determine if there really
was a sufficient amount of evidence to support the
assumption that the Soviet Navy would keep their SSBN force
in home waters and protect it with the greater portion of
their conventional navy in case of a future war with the
West. The next chapter will discuss the changes in Soviet
military doctrine and operations that have occurred under
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General Secretary Gorbachev since his accession to power in
1985 to determine if perhaps there has been a fundamental
change from the Gorshkov line.
Based on what Gorshkov said about sea power in his
two major works, and on the pattern of Soviet naval
exercises, hardware, and operations, throughout the 1970s
and into the first half of the 1980s certain conclusions can
be drawn. It is clear that Gorshkov felt the Soviet SSBN
force was capable of conducting strategic missions. These
missions could be carried out by use of ballistic missile
strikes on the enemy's more important communications,
military, and industrial centers—or what would generally be
considered soft targets. Such a task could lead to the
destruction of the military-economic potential of the enemy
and, therefore, could influence the course and outcome of
the war. It is perhaps important to note that Gorshkov said
the navy is capable of altering the course and outcome of
armed conflict but, in the second edition of Sea Power of
the State , this was changed to altering the course and
influencing its outcome . Thus, it would appear that the
SSBN's primary role and benefit lies outside the realm of
armed conflict per se, but is still very important in the
total context of war.
Since the SSBN is of such great importance to the
Soviet military, ensuring its protection and survival is of
great importance. Interestingly, Gorshkov does not discuss
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the possibility of a future war having a prolonged
conventional phase but instead emphasizes the critical need
of supporting the SSBN so that it can iitunediatelv carry out
its primary mission. It would appear that Gorshkov is not
completely convinced the next war would actually begin with
a prolonged conventional phase and that preemption should
not be ruled out as a possibility. The fact that the
Soviets teach their officers that the ability to preempt is
more important than the nuclear correlation of forces would
seem to reinforce Gorshkov 's point. However, it is
important to note that Soviet naval exercises throughout the
1970s and the first half of the 1980s did not begin with
massive nuclear launches but instead seemed to increasingly
emphasize the ability to conduct conventional warfare at
sea. -^^
The best possible explanation to this apparent
contradiction is that the Soviets still believe a future war
would begin with a conventional phase, but still feel it is
critical to be prepared for all contingencies. Nuclear
preemption remained a possibility, albeit a diminishing
possibility as the Gorbachev era was to indicate.
Gorshkov emphasized the fact that in a war between
two powers separated by ocean expanses, the Navy's role is
more important. Such a claim could very well be aimed at
^"^''Soviet Naval Exercises: 1960-1984," NATO Review .
Reprint compiled by staff at Headquarters of Allied Command
Atlantic, Norfolk, Virginia.
the all-powerful Soviet Army which continued to emphasized
the land war in Central Europe. In any case, Gorshkov is
making the point that the Soviet Navy can be useful for
missions besides nuclear strikes on the enemy's homeland.
SLOC interdiction remained an important priority.
However, it should not take the traditional form of a lone
submarine or wolfpack operating independently in searchvof
commerce. Gorshkov repeatedly criticized the Germans for
using such a tactic and stressed that the submarine must be
supported by other surface and air units.
The remainder of the Soviet Navy would not have
attempted to seek general fleet engagements but instead
would have attempted to establish sea control. Sea control
does not have to be established indefinitely over a body of
water to ensure that the sea lanes are safe for commercial
maritime shipping. Instead, sea control is established in a
certain region of the sea for a sufficient amount of time to
ensure that the SSBN can conduct its primary mission.
Again, Gorshkov stressed that the amount of time necessary
to conduct strategic missions has, due to hardware
developments, become roughly equal to the time needed for
tactical missions. This meant that the SSBNs must be well
protected and ready to launch at a moment's notice.
Unnecessary delays could be fatal.
Based upon this review of Gorshkov there is little
evidence to support a withholding mission for the Soviet
SSBN force. Withholding was certainly understood by
Gorshkov but he never directly attributes it to the Soviet
Navy. Hardware and exercise patterns are not of much use
because it is difficult to verify whether the Soviets will
not launch some of their submarine based ballistic missiles
until the need arises. However, as previously discussed,
Gorshkov did appreciate the value of the SSBN as , a
warfighting system. The Soviet habit of establishing a
defense perimeter around the Soviet Union in their naval
exercises could indicate their appreciation for the SSBN,
however, there are probably other reasons as well, such as
protecting the Army's flank or establishing a buffer zone
between the Soviet shore and NATO naval forces.
2 . Support of the Six Basic Assumptions
Table 4 gives a summary of the amount of evidence,
based on this review, that was found relating to the six
basic assumptions. As indicated by the table, no evidence
could be found to support the withholding concept or the
assumption that the Soviets will terminate the war if they
lose the positive correlation of nuclear forces. There was,
however, strong evidence to support the Soviet's belief in
the capability of the SSBN as a warfighting system and the
use of the conventional navy to protect it. There is a
substantial amount of evidence to support the assumption
that SLOC interdiction is not a primary mission of the
Soviet Navy, but it is not entirely clear just how important
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it really is. To classify it as a secondary mission can be
misleading. Based on Gorshkov's publications and Soviet
naval exercises in the 1970s through the first half of the
1980s, SLOC interdiction became increasingly more important
to the Soviets as long as they could ensure the adequate
protection of the SSBN force and their coastline.
There is only a moderate amount of evidence to
support the assumption that the next war would be a
conventional war fought in Central Europe. Gorshkov did
admit that only troops can occupy territory but he does not
specify that it must be Europe. Furthermore, Gorshkov
continuously emphasized the strategic nuclear strike and
never said the next war would be a conventional war.
However, again it must be stated that it was not Gorshkov's
purpose to discuss the war in Europe and he felt the
importance of the SSBN must be emphasized because it alone
was capable of influencing the course and outcome of a war.
Based on the evidence covered in this review, there
is every reason to support the bastion concept. Although
not all of the assumptions were fully supported, there is
still more than sufficient evidence to indicate that the
Soviet Navy, at least from approximately 1971 to 1985, had-"
every intention of providing protection and support for
their SSBN force in case of a future war with the West.
V. WINDS OF CHANGE; GORBACHEV AND THE NEW
SOVIET MILITARY DOCTRINE
Ensuring security more and more becomes a political task
and can only be solved by political means.
^
A. BREZHNEV ERA
1. A Shift in Emphasis
It is now clear that since Gorbachev's ascent to
power in 1985 important changes have taken place in the
Soviet military. Perhaps the most important of these
changes is the "new" Soviet military doctrine adopted in May
1987. Whether the new doctrine will lead to substantive
changes in the Soviet military's force structure remains to
be seen. However, it is apparent that there were three
important factors that forced the Soviets to reevaluate
their current military doctrine to determine its
applicability for the remainder of this century. These
factors, the faltering Soviet economy, the changing nature
of the Soviet perception of a future war, and the impact of
advanced conventional weaponry on the modern battlefield,
were all potential problems before Gorbachev came to power.
They were to play an important role in Gorbachev's decision
to to halt a troublesome trend in Soviet decision making and
"S. Gorbachev, addressed to 27th Party Congress,
February 198 6, as cited in Raymond Garthoff, "New Thinking
in Soviet Military Doctrine," The Washington Ouarterlv .
Summer 1988, p. 131.
thereby emphasize political instead of military solutions in
the future
.
With respect to the Soviet military, and virtually
all of Soviet society, the year 1985 was to prove to be a
watershed. In March of 1985 Mikhail Gorbachev assumed power
as the General Secretary of the Communist Party of the
Soviet Union. For a General Secretary Gorbachev was- a
relatively young and unknown factor. He had spent a
majority of his career as a provincial party chief in
Stravpol and, once he came to Moscow in 1978, was placed in
charge of agricultural matters. ^ It is fair to say that
Gorbachev had relatively little experience in dealing with
the military, perhaps a factor that would work to his
advantage. However, before reviewing the Gorbachev era and
some of the changes that have occurred in the military under
his aegis, it is first necessary to recall the general
atmosphere that prevailed in the Soviet military at the end
of Leonid Brezhnev's reign as General Secretary.
The first ten years of the Brezhnev era were good
ones for the Soviet military. From 1965 to 1975 the Soviets
increased their defense spending by four to five percent.-^
At the 2 4th party congress Brezhnev stated:
Everything that the people have created must be reliably
protected. It is imperative to strengthen the Soviet
^F. Stephen Larrabee, "Gorbachev and the Soviet
Military," Foreign Affairs , summer 1988, p. 1005.
^Larrabee, "Gorbachev and the Soviet Military," p. 1003.
state—this means strengthening its Armed Forces , and
increasing the defensive capability of our Motherland in
every way. And so long as we live in an unsettled world,
this task will remain one of the most primary tasks.'*
The general attitude towards defense spending that
prevailed under Brezhnev thus appears to be rather clear.
As long as the United States and NATO remained a threat to
the Soviet Union then the military would be provided with
whatever it needed. Since according to Marxist-Leninist
theory the two opposing social systems of communism and
capitalism can never indefinitely coexist on peaceful terms,
then Brezhnev was implying that he believed that until the
historically inevitable victory of socialism over capitalism
this trend of increasing military spending would have to
continue.
However, a definite shift in emphasis was evident
towards the latter half of the Brezhnev era. The change was
apparently instigated by the obvious decline in Soviet
economic growth that became apparent in the later stages of
the 197 0s. Economic growth, which had been as high as four
percent in the 1960s dropped to slightly more than two
percent in the late 1970s. ^ According to Paul Kennedy,
industrial output dropped "from double digit increases to a
"^L.I. Brezhnev, "Summary Report of the CPSU Central
Committee to the 24th Congress of the CPSU," p. 100, as
cited in Gorshkov, Red Star Rising at Sea , pp. 134-135.
^Larrabee, "Gorbachev and the Soviet Military," p. 1003.
lower and lower figure, so that by the late 1970s it was
down to 3-4 percent a year and still falling."^
Although the economic decline of the Soviet Union
that occurred throughout the 1970s was not catastrophic, it
was of a sufficient degree to require the Brezhnev regime to
reallocate resources. Subsequently, military spending
"dropped to two percent from 1977-1983, with investment
devoted to the procurement of new weapons showing no growth
at all during the same period.""^ It is quite possible that
the general decline in Soviet military spending caused
strains in the relationship between the more prominent
civilian members of the CPSU (Communist Party of the Soviet
Union) and the senior Soviet military officers, particularly
with the increase in defense spending in the United States
that occurred when Ronald Reagan became president in 1981.
2 . Marshal Ogarkov and a Call to Arms
The unprecedented peacetime military build-up that
occurred in the United States beginning in 1981, combined
with the much more severe rhetoric of President Ronald
Reagan caused a great deal of concern in the Soviet Union,
particularly among the military. An atmosphere that seemed
^Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of Great Powers . New
York: Random House, 1988, p. 430.
^Robert Gates, Deputy Director for Intelligence, CIA,
"Testimony Before the Subcommittee on International Trade,
Finance, and Security Economics," Allocation of Resources in
the Soviet Union and China; 1984 . U.S. Government Printing
Office, 1984, as cited in Larabee, "Gorbachev and the Soviet
Military," p. 1003.
to border on hysteria seemed to envelop the Soviet military.
Perhaps the most outspoken, and therefore the best example
of the tremendous apprehension among the more senior Soviet
officers, was the chief of the Soviet General Staff, Marshal
Nikolay Ogarkov.
In January 1982, almost exactly one year after
President Reagan assumed office, Ogarkov published Always , in
Readiness to Defend the Homeland . The book probably best
exemplifies the attitude prevalent among the Soviet military
at this time. It is quite clearly a warning to the Soviet
people that the rapid deterioration of Soviet-U.S. relations
may have very significant consequences. In fact, the
general tone and mood of the book is so severe that it is
tantamount to a call to arms. In essence, the essay is a
warning to the Soviet people that a slackness in attitudes
on patriotism cannot be tolerated, it is a call for a
further strengthening of the Soviet military and homeland in
the face of imperialism. Finally, it is a warning that
these changes must occur now—before it is too late.
The very first chapter of the book, "Imperialism:
The Source of Military Danger," is a blistering attack upon
the United States and its policies towards the Soviet Union.
Ogarkov insists that the most important aspect of
imperialism is its aggressive nature while repeatedly
emphasizing the peaceful attitude of the Soviet Union which
"has never threatened anybody and never attacked anybody,"
(an incredible statement considering this was written after
the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan).^ The United States, on
the other hand, had established a "dangerous reactionary
policy" which had the purpose of,
...dull(ing) the vigilance of the peoples of the world, to
teach them to accept the idea that 'limited' nuclear war
is realistic and 'acceptable,' and to suppress in them any
resistance to an unchecked arms race and the military
preparations being conducted by the forces -of
imperialism.
^
Ogarkov then discussed the post-World War II era as
a period in which the Soviet Union was simply reacting to
the military initiatives of the United States (a strictly
revisionist point of view) . He explained how the Cold War
and the arms race following World War II were entirely the
fault of the U.S. The Soviet Union, according to Ogarkov,
"has been forced to take the necessary measures to streng-
then its defense" in response to American aggression. ^^
Ogarkov 's attack upon the U.S. continued relentlessly as he
described aggression after aggression alledgedly committed
by the United States. He accused the United States of
"brazen interference," "outright intervention," provocation,
sabotage, threats, and of inventing "barbaric means of
waging war." He described the present American doctrine of
°N.V. Ogarkov, Always in Readiness to Defend the
Homeland . Voyenizdat, 1982, p. 11.
^Ogarkov, Always in Readiness to Defend the Homeland ,
p. 11.
^^Ogarkov, Always in Readiness to Defend the Homeland ,
p. 13.
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fighting a future war by conventional means as a "verbal
shell" and insisted that the U.S., under the leadership of
Reagan, had essentially come full circle back to the
doctrine of "massive retaliation."-'-^
The third chapter of the book, "Defense of the
Socialist Homeland—the Concern of all the People." is by .
far the most important. The general message of the chapter, -r^'^n-
and indeed the book, is best summarized by the very first
sentence: "Defense of the socialist homeland is an
objective historical necessity and a most important
condition of building communism."
In this final chapter Ogarkov very carefully
criticized the complacency of some of the Soviet people
toward defense of the fatherland. He criticized the
lackadaisical attitudes of the workers, the lack of physical
conditioning of Russia's youth, and the general lack of
concern among Soviet people to stemming the tide of i^
capitalism and seeing to the ultimate victory of socialism.
He emphasized the importance of morale and the necessity of
ensuring that all people, not just the young people, should
be prepared for war.
It is essential to convey to Soviet citizens more
thoroughly and in a well-reasoned manner the truth about
the steadily increasing aggressiveness of imperialism and
the threat of war which imperialism presents. . .the full
1
^Ogarkov, Alwavs in Readiness to Defend the Homeland ,
p. 13.
seriousness of the international situation should
definitely be shown. ^2
Ogarkov's essay should not be criticized as another
batch of meaningless propaganda to be cast aside and
forgotten. Although it is unlikely that Ogarkov's opinions
represented the views of all of the Soviet leadership, there
is good reason to believe that it did reflect the opinions'
of the more conservative right wing of the CPSU as well as
the Soviet military. He made it very clear that he felt a
future war was very possible and that, although the war
would probably start as a conventional war, it would
eventually become a nuclear war. The publication of this
book, in 1982, reflected a very serious concern of the
Soviet political-military leadership with the poor relations
between the U.S. and the Soviet Union and the collapse of
detente. The tone of the book depicts just how concerned
they were, and the book virtually served as a warning to the
Soviet people to prepare for war.
Ogarkov's influence went beyond the publication of a
very conservative book. There were reports that he openly
demanded that the Party leadership increase funding on new
weapons systems and for greater defense spending in
general. ^-^ In 1982 General Secretary Brezhnev had to defend
^^ogarkov. Always in Readiness to Defend the Homeland ,
p. 48.
l^C.N. Donnelly, "The Soviet Military Under Gorbachev,"
December 1986, unpublished paper, p. 2.
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the cutbacks in military spending in an unusual meeting in
the Kremlin with the Minister of Defense and other top
military leaders. "Brezhnev's speech had a strongly
defensive tone. It seems to have been designed to impress
upon the military leaders the need for spending constraints
while at the same time reassuring them that their interests
would not be neglected. "^^ After Brezhnev's death there"-**
were also reports of Ogarkov openly disagreeing with General
Secretary Chernenko in Defense Council meetings. -^^
Ogarkov 's continued outspoken opposition to the
Party's reluctance to drastically increase military spending
apparently was one of the major reasons that he was fired
from his position as chief of the Soviet General Staff in
September 1984. However, unlike many of his predecessors
who dared to speak openly against Party policy, Ogarkov was
not sentenced to a political exile or retired in disgrace
but, according to most reports, was instead placed in charge -s^-
of the Western TVD, and is still a member of the Central
Committee. ^^ The fact that Ogarkov was not exiled but
instead was placed in charge of the most important TVD in
the Soviet military is in itself an indication that Ogarkov
and his opinions were still considered to be extremely
^"^Larabee, "Gorbachev and the Soviet Military," p. 1003.
l^Donnelly, "The Soviet Military Under Gorbachev," p. 2.
^^For more on what apparently became of Ogarkov, see
John Hines and Philip Petersen, "Ogarkov 's Role," Signal .
December 1986, p. 108.
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important to the Soviet political leadership and, perhaps,
it is also an indication of the tremendous influence enjoyed
by the Soviet military in the last years of the Brezhnev
regime.
B. THE NEW SOVIET MILITARY DOCTRINE
It is typical of the strict hierarchical Soviet system,
that any fundamental long term changes that occur will start
from the top. The changes being instituted at the present
were all originally promulgated by Gorbachev, a process that
began almost as soon as he became General Secretary of the
Communist Party and continues today. This is why it is
necessary to examine what Gorbachev and senior Soviet
military officers, mostly Army officers, and various
academicians are saying about the "new" Soviet military
doctrine and its many manifestations—such as arms control.
It is clear that the changes and their exact
implications for the Soviet military are still in the
process of debate and, unfortunately, all that can be done
at present is to look at both sides of the debate in order
to try to understand what these changes may mean for the
Soviet Navy in terms of operations, reductions in the force
structure, or changes in the naval aspects of the Soviet
military strategy. It is quite possible that there is no
one in the Soviet Union today, including the top Soviet
Naval staff, who is certain at this time what the changes
will mean for the Soviet Navy. It cannot be discounted that
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there may not even be any substantial changes, but this
seems unlikely. If changes do indeed occur, they still hold
great significance for the U.S. Maritime Strategy,
particularly if there is a change in the Soviet's
warfighting strategy. That is the primary concern of this
research.
For its part, no member of the Soviet Navy has commentied -'*'
extensively on the new thinking in the Soviet military.
This explains the necessary reliance upon the publications
of mostly politicians. Army officers, and academicians.
Undoubtedly, in a few years there will be more than a
sufficient amount of discussion from everybody, including
the Soviet Navy. But by then matters will probably have
been largely settled and it may be too late for NATO to
react. The point here is to try to understand, to the full
extent possible, a priori what these changes are and, more
important to the context of this research, what the changes •-'-*
may mean for the current U.S. Maritime Strategy.
1. Gorbachev and the Military Crises
There is no doubt that when Mikhail Gorbachev became
General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union
(CPSU) in March 1985 the Soviet Union had more than its
share of problems. Domestically, the long term economic
decline combined with widespread alcoholism and worker
apathy were immediate concerns that required Gorbachev's
attention. Meanwhile, the Reagan administration had
instigated a military build-up in the United States that
clearly worried the Soviet leadership, particularly the
Soviet military. The general atmosphere, as previously
discussed, was one of growing concern that the U.S. would
soon catch up or surpass the Soviet military in its
capabilities, after the Soviets had spent so much time,
effort, and money doing the same to the U.S. throughout «the ^:^*
latter half of the 1960s and into the 1970s. The most
obvious response to the U.S. military build up would be to
commence a build-up of their own in order to prove to the
Reagan administration and NATO that the Soviet Union will
not be surpassed in its military might. This is what
Ogarkov and other senior military leaders were apparently
urging.
In view of the growing economic concerns facing
Gorbachev, a compromise would clearly have to be drawn. An
increase in military spending would only have further -.»
adverse effects upon the economy and would hamper his
program of perestroika. A solution had to be found to break
this vicious cycle without compromising the security of the
Soviet Union.
The track record of the Soviet military immediately
prior to and after Gorbachev's ascension to power did
nothing to make the decision any easier. The deployment of
the SS-20 turned out to be a serious miscalculation since it
led to NATO's counter-deployment of the Pershing 2 and
ground launched cruise missile. *' Instead of enhancing
Soviet security it actually declined, and required a long
and involved arms control negotiation which would not be
completed until 1988. The Korean airliner tragedy of
September 1983 forced some critics within the Soviet Union
to accuse the Soviet military of "frequently not knowing
what it is doing. "^^ The Mathias Rust incident in which a
young West German managed to land his small aircraft in Red
Square was "highly injurious to our prestige" and led to the
dismissal of the Minister of Defense and the head of the
Soviet Air Defense Forces. ^^
Without a doubt, the most serious miscalculation of
the Soviet military was the invasion of Afghanistan in
December 1979. The final decision to invade Afghanistan
might not have been a military decision but, like the U.S.
military in Vietnam, when it appeared that the conflict
would not be over soon and continued to drag on year after -.sm
year, it was inevitable that the military would be blamed.
According to at least one Soviet source, certain "liberal"
sectors of Soviet society (which brings up the interesting
question of exactly how the Soviets define a liberal)
17
1005.
Larrabee, "Gorbachev and the Soviet Military," p.
-'-^Alexander Prokhonov, "Defense Consciousness and New
Thinking," Literaturnava Rossiva . 6 May 1988, p. 4.
^^Prokhononv, "Defense Consciousness and New Thinking,"
p. 4.
"criticize the Army for the very fact that it went into
Afghanistan, considers this an inadmissible, erroneous, and
harmful step, and charges the Army with a host of
transgressions in this regard. "^O The entire situation in
Afghanistan became not only a source of embarrassment for
the Soviet military but also was a blow to Soviet
international prestige, particularly in the Third World.*
The situation was so bad that it prompted one Soviet writer
to admit that the military,
...because of its inflexible, conservative, closed
nature. . . (the Soviet military) is the source of all that
is stagnant and conservative, of everything that rejects
the new thinking, perestroika, and experimental models of
behavior of the nation and the state. That is, the Army
(or military) is coming to be identified with the
opponents of modernization. ^-^
Soviet military doctrine has two distinctly
different areas of emphasis: the military-technical and the
political. The military-technical determines "the strategic
nature of a future war. . .what sort of war and against what
enemy one must be prepared to fight. . .what the methods cold
be for carrying out strategic and operational-tactical
missions in a future war...."^^ In essence, the military
20prokhonov, "Defense Consciousness and New Thinking,"
p. 4.
^^Prokhonov, "Defense Consciousness and New Thinking,"
p. 4.
22Makmhut A. Gerayev, M.V. Frunze; Militarv Theorist .
Voyenizdat, 1985, p. 326.
137
and technical aspect of Soviet military doctrine is clearly
the primary responsibility of the military itself.
The political aspect of Soviet military doctrine
determines the "sociopolitical essence of modern wars, the
nature of the political goals and strategic missions of a
state in a war, the basic requirements on strengthening the
national defense. ... "^-^ Gorbachev immediately established'
the predominance of the political aspects of Soviet military
doctrine over the military-technical. He claimed that
ensuring the security of the Soviet Union is increasingly
becoming a political task that can only be solved by
political means. Gorbachev seemed to be underscoring the
danger that can occur if the military-technical aspect of
military doctrine is allowed to wander too far from the
control of the political aspect. It was a trend that he
intended to reverse.
In order to emphasize the return of the dominance of
the political aspects of Soviet military doctrine over the
military-technical features, Gorbachev immediately began to
replace large numbers of the senior Soviet military
infrastructure. It is difficult to say exactly what method
Gorbachev used to determine who should go and who should
remain but it is obvious that he meant to leave a lasting
impression upon the Soviet military hierarchy. He replaced
Gorshkov in December 1985 along with General Yepishev, the
^^Gerayev, M.V. Frunze: Military Theorist , p. 326.
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head of the Main Political Administration. He later
replaced Vasili Petrov, the Senior First deputy minister of
defense as well as Generals Govorov and Altunin, deputy
defense ministers. After the Rust incident he replaced
Minister of Defense Sokolov and the head of the Soviet Air
Defense Forces, Marshal Koldunov. In effect, Gorbachev
...has carried out a major reshuffling of the top
leadership of the armed forces, including ten out of 16
deputy defense ministers. In addition he has replaced the
chief of the Strategic Rocket Forces, the heads of the
Group of Soviet Forces in Germany, Poland and Hungary, as
well as the commanders of the Moscow and Byelorussian
military districts. ^^^
It is difficult to assess the complete effects of
such large replacements of senior military personnel within
the Soviet system within a relatively short period of time.
The changes become especially significant in a system, such
as the Soviet's, in which it is possible for senior officers
to remain in power for extremely long periods of time. The
Soviet military system has been able to maintain such a
great deal of continuity and "corporate memory" precisely
because a select few of their more elite officers, such as
Gorshkov, were able to remain in power in some cases for
almost 3 years. The fact that Gorbachev replaced so many
in such a short period would seem to indicate that he is
quite serious about carrying his restructuring program over
into the military.
^^Larrabee, "Gorbachev and the Soviet Military," p.
1008.
2. The Essence of the New Soviet Military Doctrine
a. Motivations
It is only to be expected that some Western
analysts will be extremely skeptical of the Soviet
motivations for changing their military doctrine. There are
indeed many possibilities for Gorbachev's emphasis on the -
changes that he claims are taking place within the SoVl-^""^?^
and Warsaw Pact militaries. Some of the possibilities
undoubtedly go beyond what Gorbachev and the more senior
military officers have claimed. It is presumed by some that
the Soviets are after the hearts and minds of the public,
especially in Western Europe and the United States. That
"the only battle that really matters for the Soviet Union is
the battle for public opinion. . .more than ever, Moscow seeks
to advance its anti-Western cause by portraying itself as an
unparalleled champion of peace. "25 There is also a
considerable body of opinion that Gorbachev is trying to
-^.*
break up the NATO alliance or that he is attempting to
reduce the number of options available to the U.S. and NATO
should another war break out in Europe. ^
6
Such accusations should not be dismissed as the
expected reaction of the extreme right-wing conservatives of
2 5Jean Quatras, "New Thinking is Not Good News," The
Washington Quarterly , summer 1988, p. 178.
^^See, for example, Andrew Goldberg, "The Present
Turbulence in Soviet Military Doctrine," The Washington
Quarterly , summer 1988.
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Western Europe and the United States. There is a distinct
possibility that some of these opinions are at least partly
accurate. The Soviets have made it clear that they view
NATO as a threat to their security. They have repeatedly
proven themselves to be shrewd and bold politicians when it
comes to persuading world public opinion to their cause.
According to a recent State Department report: -
The Soviet effort to manipulate the opinions and
perceptions of leaders and publics throughout the world is
highly orchestrated and effective. It has resulted in the
widespread, unjustified belief throughout the world that
the United States is engaged in such nefarious activities
as the creation and purposeful dissemination of the AIDS
virus, use of chemical weapons, and assassination of
leaders. ^^
However, as will be shown, the Soviet shift in
military doctrine is clearly not just a line of meaningless
propaganda, but is a classic example of making a virtue out
of a necessity. Top party leaders, military officers and
academicians have all repeated the same basic concerns, with
varying emphasis, that have motivated the changes. It is
based upon economic, military, and technological issues that
have made change more than just a luxury, but a necessity.
This is not to imply, however, that there will not be a
healthy amount of propaganda mixed in with the truth. It is
highly unlikely that the Soviets would pass up a chance to
propagandize a subject which, although an economic.
^"^Soviet Influence Activities; A Report on Active
Measures and Propaganda: 1986-1987 . Washington, D.C., U.S.
Department of State Publications, 1987, p. 87.
military, and technological necessity to them, will be
highly popular among the world public.
(1) Economic Necessities . The idea that the
primary motivation behind Gorbachev's new policies is the
fact "the USSR faces economic or social stagnation or, at
worst, collapse," has become very popular among Western
analysts—and for good reason.^^ According to Minister-of
Defense Yazov,
A decision was adopted at the 2 7th CPSU Congress to create
an economic potential roughly equal to that accumulated
over 7 years of Soviet power by the year 2 000: that is,
in the space of 15 years. .. .This is why we need restruc-
turing in all spheres of our life. This is why we need
peace, and peace alone. ^'^29
It is very difficult to ignore the fact
that the Soviets, including General Secretary Gorbachev,
have placed very important significance on the restructuring
of the Soviet economy. It is of interest to note that,
within the Soviet Union, the amount of emphasis that is
placed on the necessity of restructuring the economy varies
between the academicians and the military. Not surprising-
ly, the academicians tend to stress the recovery of the
economy as one of the primary reasons for cutting back on
military spending.
According to several Soviet academicians
"the arms race, which absorbs colossal financial, material
^^Donnelly, "The Soviet Military Under Gorbachev," p. 6.
25r.T. Yazov, "USSR Defense Minister's Press Confer-
ence," Krasnava Zvezda . 18 March 1988, p. 1.
and intellectual resources, is already causing enormous
harm... to the economies of individual states. ... "-^^ The
high levels of defense spending have acted as a
"parasitical" part of the economy and diverted vital
resources that "could be used for the implementation of
social programs and an improvement of the well-being of t^he
people. "^^ Military spending adds nothing to the economic
development of an industrial nation and is in fact "one
major reason for the growing economic difficulties. "^2 Many
Soviet writers have even compared the material losses caused
by the arms race to the losses suffered in both World War I
and World War 11.33
When viewed as a whole, many of the
statements made concerning the effects of defense spending
on the Soviet economy are quite remarkable. Although most
writers are very careful not to specifically point the
finger at the Soviet Union (they generally criticize the
defense spending of the United States and NATO) , their
intent cannot be missed. Soviet writers have even admitted
3 0a. D. Nikonov, The Arms Race; Causes. Trends. Ways to
Stop It . Moscow: Mezdunarduyye Otosheniya Publishing House,
February 1986, p. 181.
31r. Formazayon, "Global Problems of the Present Day:
Economics and Disarmament," Ekonomicheskaya Gazeta , January
1988, p. 17.
^^Nikonov, The Arms Race: Causes. Trends. Wavs to Stop
It, p. 195.
3 3see, for example, Foramazayon, "Global Problems of
the Present Day: Economics and Disarmament," p. 16.
that examining military spending as a percentage of gross
national product (GNP) is misleading because it "fails to
provide a true picture of the strong effect of militarist
preparations on the economy (such as) a very high degree of
use of intellectual resources (and) a massive diversion of
scientists and engineers into the military sphere. ... "-^^
The precise levels spent by the Soviets on
their military sector is unclear and has been a subject of
constant debate over the years. The official CIA estimates
place the levels at 14 to 16 percent in 1980, and 15 to 17
percent in 1987.-^^ Other analysts insist the levels are
considerably higher, up to twice the CIA level. The Soviets
have claimed that their military spending consumes roughly
16 percent of their GNP, a figure which seems to fall almost
too neatly within the range of the CIA estimates. The
Soviets generally do not discuss exact spending levels or,
if they do, it is not discussed with respect to its impact
on the economy. However, in one particularly interesting
book. The Arms Race; Causes. Trends. Ways to Stop It , A.D.
Nikonov notes:
Even if we disengage ourselves from qualitative aspects
and take a level of military spending equal to, say, 5
percent to 6 percent of GNP, as was the case for a number
of Western countries during the seventies, this is
ultimately the equivalent every 15 years to 2 years of




Soviet Military Power: An Assessment of the Threat
1988 . 7th ed. , U.S. Government Printing Office, 1988, p. 32.
the destruction of a whole year's volume of goods and
services produced. -^^
It is difficult not to notice that Nikonov
has picked a number roughly equivalent to the levels
expended by the United States. It leaves one wondering what
would be the effects of the Soviet levels which are up to
three times higher with respect to the percentage of GNP. -
Such a point could hardly be lost on the senior Party and
military leadership.
The military approach to economic
restructuring is, not surprisingly, from a different
perspective. Frederich Engels claimed that "nothing depends
so much on economic conditions as the Army and the Navy.
Armament, personnel, organization, tactics and strategy
depend primarily on the level of production achieved at a
given moment. "-^^ However, the days when everything the
military required would be provided were clearly over.
Therefore, instead of emphasizing the importance of economic
restructuring in its social context, the military points to
the increased security which can be gained in the future
through the use of wise fiscal policies today.
An increase in the tempo and scale of social production; a
qualitative increase in economic capability; a decisive
turn towards intensive economic methods; acceleration of
scientific and technical progress. . .create qualitatively
^^Nikonov, The Arms Race: Causes. Trends. Wavs to StoT3
It, p. 195.
^"^K. Marx and F. Engels, Sochineniva . 2nd ed. , Vol. 20,
p. 171, as cited in Gorshkov, Sea Power of the State , p. 259.
145
new capabilities as well for improving the material and
technological base of the defense capability of the
country and its Armed Forces. "^^
The Soviet military tends to view the arms
race as an attempt by the United States and NATO to
"stimulate their economy and undermine the economy of the
Soviet Union -and other socialist countries. "^^ The process
of ensuring the proper security of the Soviet Union in the
future will require a fundamentally new approach, in which
economic restructuring will play an important part. This is
not to imply that the Soviet military has agreed that
economic restructuring should take the form of massive
cutbacks in military spending. On the contrary, the
relative lack of attention paid to economic necessities by
the military as a primary justification for the restructur-
ing of the Soviet military indicates that, for the present,
the military is cautiously going along with these policies
with a wary eye towards the future.
(2) Military Necessities . As discussed in
Chapter I, by 1967 the Soviet leadership had concluded that
a future war with the West would not necessarily commence
with nuclear strikes on the homelands of the United States
and the Soviet Union. The Soviets concluded that a future
•^^P. Skorodenko, "Military Parity and the Principle of
Reasonable Sufficiency," Kommunist Vooruzhennvkh Sil . No.
10, May 1987, p. 21.
-^^M.A. Gareyev, "Defense of the Homeland: Soviet
Military Sciences," Defense of the Homeland . No. 11, 1987,
p. 2.
war may begin with a brief conventional period that would
inevitably, and probably swiftly, escalate to a nuclear war.
The precise amount of time at which a future war would
remain conventional is not specified but it was generally
acknowledged to be brief.
Gorshkov, as well as other influential
officers such as Sokolovskiy in the 1960s, assumed that the
next war would inevitably be nuclear. As discussed in
Chapter Four, Gorshkov repeatedly emphasized the role of the
SSBN in influencing the course and outcome of a war and felt
that the amount of time alloted of the SSBN to conduct its
strategic mission was roughly equivalent to the amount of
time necessary to conduct tactical missions. Such an
opinion seems to indicate that Gorshkov foresaw a future war
reaching the nuclear level very early, if not almost
immediately. Again it must be emphasized that it is not
completely clear whether Gorshkov was arguing for political
purposes or simply repeating accepted doctrine, but the fact
that he was able to publish a book which envisions a battle
for the first salvo indicates that his theories were
acceptable to some.
One of the first indications that
Gorshkov 's assessment of the nature of a future war was no
longer acceptable appeared in a book by the Deputy to the
Chief of the Soviet General Staff Colonel General Makmhut
Gareyev. Gareyev is an extremely prolific writer on
subjects such as military doctrine, strategy, and
operational art. In 1985 he published M.V. Frunze;
Military Theorist in which he claimed:
In the 1960s and 1970s the author's of this (Sokolovskiy •
s
Military Strategy ) and many other books proceeded
primarily from a view that a war, under all circumstances,
would be waged employing nuclear weapons and military
operations employing solely conventional weapons are
viewed as a brief episode at the start of the war.
However, the improvement and stockpiling of nuclear
missile weapons have reached such limits where the massed
employment of these weapons in a war can entail
catastrophic consequences for both sides. At the same
time in the armies of the NATO countries there has been a
rapid process of modernizing conventional types of
weapons. .. .Under these conditions, as is assumed in the
West, there will be a greater opportunity for conducting a
comparatively long war employing conventional weapons and
primarily new types of high precision weapons.'*^
Gareyev did not deny that a future war
could eventually become a nuclear war, and in fact stated
that, as military operations are expanded, a nuclear war
probably will occur. The main point was that a future war
would not likely be a quick blitzkrieg type of war, but
would be protracted. Furthermore, the war would not
initially start off as a nuclear war but, after a
"protracted, stubborn and fierce armed struggle," nuclear
escalation was probably inevitable. ^'- In addition, at a
conference held in England in July 1988 on Naval Strategy
and Arms Control . the Soviets, in an unusually forthright
^^Gareyev, M.V. Frunze; Military Theorist , pp. 183-
184.
^^Gareyev, M.V. Frunze; Military Theorist , p. 184.
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admission, stated that Gorshkov's ideas on the "battle of
the first salvo" were simply wrong. '^^
There were other apparent changes in the
Soviet assessment of the nature of the future war besides
the fact that it would now be protracted and, much later,
nuclear. In the Warsaw Pact military doctrine adopted in
May 1987 it was stated quite clearly that "there can be no
victors in a nuclear war."'*-^ This was a rather extraordin-
ary change in emphasis for the Soviets. They had maintained
that a future nuclear war would definitely have devastating
effects on both sides but, with proper preparation and
training, it was possible for one side to crawl from the
rubble and continue the fight.
Many analysts have pointed out the apparent
discrepancy between the Soviet's claim that a nuclear war
cannot be won and the tremendous amount of time and money
they have expended, and continue to expend, on civil
defense. For approximately 4 years the Soviets have been
working on the construction of deep underground facilities
which are, "in some cases, hundreds of meters deep and can
accommodate thousands of people. "^^ These facilities are
not meant to protect the general public or even all of the
^^Roger W. Barnett, "Memorandum for the Record,"
National Security Research Inc., 2 August 1988, p. 4.
4 3
"On the Military Doctrine of the Warsaw Treaty Member
States," Pravda, 30 May 1987, p. 2.
^^Soviet Militarv Power 1988 . p. 59.
military, but are only designed to ensure the safety of the
senior Soviet leadership in case of a nuclear war. However,
by themselves, these facilities do not necessarily indicate
that the Soviets truly believe that victory is possible in a
future nuclear war. It is entirely possible that the
underground facilities reflect a natural desire on the part
of the Party elite to simply survive a nuclear war—at any
cost. In any case, these shelters must be viewed with
respect to other Soviet activities and not as an isolated
entity.
Traditional Marxism-Leninism has taught
that the two opposing social systems, communism and
capitalism, can not indefinitely coexist on peaceful terms.
Eventually, the capitalist forces would begin to lose the
battle for world domination and, in their dying throes,
would lash out at the forces of socialism in a final war
which would mean the end of capitalist countries. This view
that war between socialism and capitalism was fatally
inevitable changed in the 1970s when it was acknowledged
that there are other means of ensuring the victory of
socialism. However, by the early 1980s when the fear of war
seemed to be recurring due to the arms build up and rhetoric
of the Reagan administration, Ogarkov warned that "the
absence of a fatal inevitability of war, however, by no
means signifies elimination of the possibility of a war
occurring in the contemporary era, the principal conflict of
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which is the conflict between socialism and capitalism. "'^^
However, after Secretary Gorbachev took office the Soviets
again began to stress that war is not fatally inevitable and
can be avoided. Therefore, although the possibility of war
remains as long as imperialism is in existence, it can be
controlled; Ogarkov's warning, the Soviets seem to be
saying, is a bit premature.
In conclusion, the military necessities
that led the Soviets to the adoption of a new military
strategy were essentially a combination of new ideas with
old ones. The belief that a future war would not be a quick
blitzkrieg type of strike but would instead be a protracted,
difficult and fierce struggle appears to be relatively new.
Although a future war was not considered inevitable, if it
did occur, it would certainly eventually reach a nuclear
level which neither side could win.
If a future war would not be quick and
decisive but long and expensive and, much more importantly,
would inevitably escalate to the nuclear level which neither
side could possibly win, then a fundamental reassessment of
the approach to war would have to be made. The bottom line,
following this line of reasoning, is that a future war could
not be won under the present circumstances, no matter how
well trained and well equipped the military was. This made
'^^Ogarkov, Always in Readiness to Defend the Homeland ,
p. 32.
it clear to Gorbachev that a change would have to be made in
the Soviet military doctrine which would be aimed at the
prevention of war—a thoroughly different goal than the
previous doctrines.
(3) Technological Necessities . Since the early
1960s, a new type of weapon has been developed which has
literally revolutionized the tactics to be used on the
battlefield by opposing armies. These highly accurate
weapons are often referred to as precision guided munitions
(PGMs) , and they have reached a level in their development
where they can be devastatingly lethal in their effect.
PGMs are not only highly accurate but also extremely mobile;
they can be carried by the individual infantryman or
serviced by a small crew. This means that the individual
soldier or a small group of soldiers can very effectively
and ruthlessly threaten aircraft, tanks, or other armored
vehicles.
The Soviet Army is an army which has
invested very heavily in a large number of tanks and armor.
The tremendous success of the German Panzer armies in their
blitzkrieg operations against the Soviet Army in the summer
and fall of 1941 left a deep impression on the Soviet Army,
a lesson that they would not soon forget. As a result, the
Soviet Army has since been trained to conduct blitzkrieg
type of operations. However, PGMs may have inexorably
neutralized the blitzkrieg as a valid form of land warfare.
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The Soviets have admitted since at least
1985 that PGMs will be extensively used on future
battlefields. According to the dialectical law of
transition from quantitative to qualitative changes, one of
the most important of the dialectical laws of Soviet
military science, a qualitative transition takes place .whext, - v.
a new weapon is introduced in sufficient numbers. However,
"as long as new weapons and combat equipment are employed in
limited quantity, most frequently they are merely adapted to
existing modes of combat or at best introduce only certain
partial amendments. "'^^
It is clear that the Soviets are convinced
that the PGM has made this transition. The Soviets now
insist that PGMs represent a "qualitative leap forward, in
the development of conventional armed forces and
weapons...."'*^ The primary question then becomes: what are
the implications of large numbers of these weapons on the -"*
central front in Europe? This has undoubtedly been a
crucial question for the Soviets since it became apparent
that PGMs were a force to be reckoned with. At least one
Western analyst has concluded that "the recent developments
in precision guidance have significantly enhanced the
'^^Ogarkov, Always in Readiness to Defend the Homeland .
p. 32.
^"^A. Kokoshin, "The Development of Military Affairs and
Reduction of Armed Forces and Conventional Arms," Mironava
Ekonomika I Mezhdunarodnvve Otnosheniva . No. 1, January
1988, p. 17.
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capability of a defense to thwart an offensive based on the
blitzkrieg. ""^S
It would appear that the Soviets tend to
agree with this assessment of the effectiveness of PGMs.
They are now claiming that PGMs are "comparable in their
effectiveness with weapons of mass destruction."^^ Since
PGMs have reached a level of effectiveness which can be
compared to the nuclear weapon, two conclusions have
apparently been drawn by the Soviets. The first is that the
nuclear weapon has lost a great deal of its usefulness since
it is capable of unpredictable and uncontrollable damage.
It is of no value because its use will inevitably lead to
further escalation (the Soviets absolutely do not accept the
concept of limited nuclear war) in which case neither side
can possibly win. Furthermore, the main mission of the
nuclear weapon is swiftly being replaced by the new and
accurate conventional weapons, or PGMs. The second
conclusion is that PGMs give an advantage to the defender in
a conventional war, and have essentially forced the
blitzkrieg concept to be seriously questioned for the first
time since World War II. While the blitzkrieg has not yet
been completely rejected by the Soviets, it is clear that
^^John J. Mearshimer, Conventional Deterrence . Ithaca:
Cornell University Press, 1983, p. 190.
^^Kokoshin, "The Development of Military Affairs and
Reduction of Armed Forces and Conventional Arms," p. 17.
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they are seriously reassessing its value on the modern
battlefield with precision weapons.
The effect of the Stinger ground-to-air
missile in Afghanistan on the Soviets should not be
understated. It is clear that this weapon, in the hands of
the Afghan rebels, forced the Soviets to drastically alter ^
their tactics. It may be an exaggeration to say that the
Stinger played a major role in the Soviet withdrawal from
Afghanistan. But the Stinger missile, and other PGMs,
deployed on a much greater scale in Central Europe would
theoretically be equally effective. This may be a lesson
that the Soviets learned cheaply.
(4) Summary . There is no doubt that all three
of the problems mentioned, the faltering Soviet economy, the
changing nature of a future war, and the impact of advanced
conventional weaponry on the modern battlefield, have all
played a part in forcing the Soviets to reexamine their - *.
current military doctrine. At this point, it is extremely
difficult to determine which of the three had the greater
effect. The civilian lobby (comprised mainly of academic
experts from the USSR Academy of Sciences) has tended to
emphasize primarily the need to restructure the economy.
This emphasis seems to be a fundamental acknowledgement by
certain sectors of the Soviet Union that if the Soviets are
to maintain their current position as a global superpower
into the 21st century then the economy absolutely must be
strengthened. It is here where all agreement between the
Soviet civilians and military seems to stop. Is the economy
best strengthened by making important reductions in the
military sector or by other possible methods?
The military has tended to stress that the
restructuring of the economy is important because future
weapons development is dependent upon the economy. Even
more important, from the military's perspective, is the fact
that modern conventional weapons have called into question
the traditional wisdom of the blitzkrieg and, to make
matters worse, these weapons seem to be improving and
proliferating all of the time. Their effectiveness is being
compared to nuclear weapons. Even the most poorly trained
soldier in the poorest of Third World countries has proven
that these weapons can be used with extreme effectiveness,
even against a superiorly equipped and trained modern army.
There has been no indication that the Soviet Army does not
still continue to dominate the Soviet military's hierarchi-
cal structure. Therefore, if the Soviet Army is concerned
about the future of a land war in Central Europe then, ipso
facto, it is a problem for the Soviet Navy. If the Soviet
Army decides that the problem has become of such signifi-
cance that Soviet military doctrine must be changed then the
Navy has little choice but to adapt to new realities.
Finally, there is the problem of nuclear
war. Even if the Soviet economy were very strong, even if
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the precision guided munitions had not yet been invented,
there still remains the fundamental fact that the Soviets
have determined that a nuclear war would be catastrophic for
both sides—and that continuing to rely on traditional
deterrence or the threatened use of these weapons is
becoming increasingly imprudent. If a nuclear war cannot be
won, then a nuclear war must be avoided. If a conventional
war will inevitable escalate to a nuclear war, then a
conventional war must also be avoided. Thus, all war must
be avoided. This seems to be the most important change in
the new Soviet military doctrine, the culmination of three
interplaying forces that could not be ignored any longer.
Doctrine must now concentrate on methods to prevent war if
at all possible.
b. Results
The changes that have been occurring in the
Soviet military in the previous three years culminated in
the drafting of the new "Military Doctrine of the Warsaw
Treaty Member States" in May 1987, However, the new
doctrine does not explain everything by itself. It has
become increasingly clear that the debate on the actual
meaning of the new doctrine is still underway. Eventually ,
a decision will be made and the arguments that are now so
evident will be over, publicly at least. Until then, a very
interesting, provocative and, for the Soviets, open debate
seems to be continuing.
Perhaps one of the primary differences between
the current debate and previous ones is the diversity of the
people involved. Gorbachev has apparently asked the social
scientists, primarily from the USSR Academy of Sciences, to
join in—and they have done so enthusiastically.
The fact that the debate is still continuing uv
means that no definite conclusions can be drawn yet abput'
the effects of these changes on the Soviet Navy and the
bastion concept, if any. But, there are some definite
indications, such as the more recent round of naval arms
control proposals, that may provide some insight into where
the current debate is going to lead the Soviet Navy.
(1) Nature of the Doctrine . As previously
discussed, perhaps the most repeated and fundamental changes
in Soviet military doctrine concerns its basic goals. As
recently as 1985, Colonel General Gareyev explained military
doctrine as a
System of scientifically sound guiding views which are
officially adopted in one or another state and concerns
the essence, goals and nature of a war, the preparation of
the nation and the armed forces for it and the methods of
waging it.^^
However, by 1988, not quite two and one-half years later.
Colonel General Gareyev explained that
...the military doctrine of the Warsaw Pact is based on
views directed not toward the preparation and
^Gareyev, M.V. Frunze; Military Theorist , p. 325.
unleashing of a war but rather toward the prevention of
war. . . . ^-'
Thus, prior to the official adoption of the
new military doctrine in 1988, Soviet doctrine emphasized
the goal of waging a war (and presumably winning it) , the
new doctrine, on the other hand, claims to be based on
preventing it. Two goals that, at least at face value, .
would require a completely different force structure.
The primary means of ensuring that war is
prevented, according to the new doctrine, is to guarantee
"that neither side, while assuring its defense, has the
forces or means enabling it to mount offensive
operations. "^2 p^^ first glance this does not seem to be a
change in Soviet military doctrine at all. The Soviets have
emphasized for years that their doctrine is defensive in
nature. However, the new doctrine emphasized that there can
be no possibility of offensive operations-the so-called non-
offensive defense. The Soviets define non-offensive defense
as the forces necessary to ensure that the defensive
capabilities of the Warsaw Pact exceed the offensive
capabilities of NATO and vice versa. ^-^ The blitzkrieg
^^Gareyev, "Defense of the Homeland: Soviet Military
Science," p. 5.
52r.t. Yazov, "The Military Doctrine of the Warsaw
Pact, A Doctrine of the Defense of Peace and Socialism," as
cited in Garthoff, "New Thinking in Soviet Military
Doctrine," p. 146.
^^Yazov, "The Military Doctrine of the Warsaw Pact, A
Doctrine of the Defense of Peace and Socialism," p. 146.
operation is explicitly ruled out as a blatantly offensive
concept. ^"^
The new doctrine also emphasizes that
ensuring the proper security of the Soviet Union has become
more of a political task than it has been in the past, and
"can only be solved by political means. "^^ Gorbachev stated
this from the very first days he was in office, and it is a
theme which is often repeated, mostly by the Soviet civilian
analysts. One civilian analyst explained it as the "abrupt
and profound politicization of traditionally military
questions.
..
(which) has occurred before our very eyes."^^
Gareyev, however, has acknowledged that the recent changes
in the world, such as military, economic, and technological
necessities previously discussed, have forced "a completely
new approach to the problems of war and peace and a
fundamental change in the thinking on these questions."
This means an increased reliance on the "political arsenal"
(an interesting choice of words) to "resolve international
problems without resorting to armed violence. "^^
^^S. Karagonov and A. Kostunov, "Reasonable
Sufficiency—Or How to Break the Vicious Circle," Moscow New
Times . No. 40, 12 October 1987, p. 14.
^^Gorbachev, Speech to 27th Party Congress as cited in
Garthoff, "New Thinking in Soviet Military Doctrine," p. 131.
^^Kokoshin, "The Development of Military Affairs and
Reduction of Armed Forces and Conventional Arms," p. 12.
^"^Gareyev, "Defense of the Homeland: Soviet Military
Science," pp. 1-2.
According to the Soviet military, the
doctrine of non-offensive defensive does not discount the
possibility of countering Western military aggression as
decisively as possible. This is another major area where
there is obvious disagreement with the academicians. The
actual wording of the new Warsaw Pact military doctrine
states that "in the event of an attack they (the Warsaw Pact
forces) will give a devastating rebuff to the aggressor . "^^
It is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to align the
policy of non-offensive defense in which there is no
possibility of offensive operations with devastating
rebuffs— a choice of words that hardly connotes defensive
operations. Furthermore, it is not only one or two Soviet
military officers who emphasize this point, but several. It
is also described as a crushing blow by Colonel General
Gareyev, and Minister of Defense Yazov even goes so far as
to say that the act of repelling the aggression,
. . .must be reliable and firm, stubborn and active,
calculated to stop the aggressor's offensive, bleeding
him, not permitting loss of territory, defeating the
invading hostile forces. Defense alone, however, cannot
defeat the aggressor. Therefore, after repulsing the
attack, troops and fleets must be capable of waging a
decisive offensive .^^
5^
"On the Military Doctrine of the Warsaw Pact Member
Staes," Pravda, 31 May 1987, p. 1.
^^R.T. Yazov, In Defense of Socialism and Peace .
Moscow: Voyenizdat, 1987, pp. 32-33, as cited in Garthoff,
"New Thinking in Soviet Military Doctrine," p. 147.
It is quite clear from the preceding
argument that the Soviet Union has not yet resolved
precisely to what degree the military-technical aspect of
doctrine will be subjugated to the political aspect, or
precisely what is meant by non-offensive defense. It is
clear that the civilian academicians do tend to stress the
importance of political vice military solutions to solve'
world problems, while the military insists that it must
maintain the capability to counter-attack and decisively
defeat NATO forces should a war occur. The precise force
levels needed to carry out these tasks is not yet clear,
however, it is based upon the concept of "reasonable
sufficiency," a concept which is so important in its
relationship to the new Soviet military doctrine that it
must be discussed separately.
(2) Reasonable Sufficiency . The concept of
"reasonable sufficiency" has become the standard phrase used
by most Soviet writers when explaining the basis of the new
Soviet military doctrine. It is a phrase which obviously
has not been officially defined, and therefore has different
meaning for different parts of the Soviet leadership. The
military's apparent definition is conspicuously different
from the academicians'. The argument over the exact meaning
of reasonable sufficiency, and how it is to be implemented
in the Soviet Union, is important because it is a microcosm
of the larger debate that is presently taking place between
the military and the academicians within Soviet society.
The concept of sufficiency is not a new one
for the Soviets. It was used by the United States in the
early 1970s as a justification for making reductions in
strategic nuclear weapons. In Sea Power of the State .
Admiral Gorshkov gave a very nice definition of sufficiency
which he attributed to Western strategists. It is a
definition that is surprisingly similar to the present
definition used by the Soviets:
The concept of sufficiency. . .means the assured possibility
of destruction of the military potential, human resources,
and economic potential of the enemy even in the event of a
retaliatory nuclear attack which is unfavorable to the
United States, and also the ability to maintain her
ability to fight in any situation. ^^
Gorbachev has obviously been at the
forefront of the campaign to limit the levels of weapons to
reasonable sufficiency. At the 27th Congress of the CPSU
Gorbachev stressed the importance of "limiting military
potentials to reasonable sufficiency."^^ According to
Gorbachev's explanation, it is clear that sufficiency is
being closely tied to the hardware reductions which
^"^Gorshkov, Sea Power of the State , p. 235.
^^M.S. Gorbachev, Political Report of the Central
Committee of the CPSU to the 27th Congress of the Communist
Party of the Soviet Union . Moscow: Ploitizdat, 1986, as
cited in Garthoff, "New Thinking in Soviet Military
Doctrine," p. 131.
Gorbachev and the Soviet leadership have called for since
1986.
The Soviets make an important distinction
between the two levels of sufficiency: conventional and
strategic. Strategic sufficiency, it is repeatedly
emphasized, is "determined by the necessity of, not
permitting a nuclear attack without retribution under any, '".^i?
even the most unfavorable circumstances. "^^ Presumably, the
most unfavorable circumstances would be a situation in which
the United States launched a surprise nuclear strike that
caught the Soviets totally unprepared. The ability to
retaliate, according to this definition, is still of the
utmost importance, especially in an era of arms reductions.
The ability to retaliate and inflict
unacceptable damage upon the enemy is a very important part
of the Soviet idea of strategic stability at the nuclear
level. However, at the conventional level "it is impossible
to materially and practically implement a similar threat. "^^
This means that conventional sufficiency cannot be tied to
the concept of retaliation as easily as strategic
sufficiency. At the conventional level, strategic stability
can only be guaranteed by ensuring that the defensive
capabilities of one side exceed the offensive capabilities
^2Yazov,"The Military Doctrine of the Warsaw Pact, A
Doctrine of the Defense of Peace and Socialism," p. 140.
^^Kokoshin, "The Development of Military Affairs and
Reduction of Armed Forces and Conventional Arms," p. 18.
164
of the other, and vice versa. This is why the concept of
non-offensive defense is so important, it ensures strategic
stability at the conventional level.
The practical problems of ensuring that
each side has stronger defensive capabilities than the
offensive capabilities of the other are numerous. It is
difficult to discern the precise constitution of a strictly
defensive weapon and, even if such an agreement could be
reached, it would obviously require a massive change in the
force structure of both NATO and the Warsaw Pact. In any
case, this would require that reductions of some type be
initiated before reasonable sufficiency could become a
reality. Perhaps this is why the Soviets also repeatedly
emphasize that the levels of conventional sufficiency are
dependent upon the actions of the United States and NATO.
Securing the ability to retaliate with nuclear weapons is
not a bilateral problem (as long as the Strategic Defense
Initiative is not deployed) , but developing proportionally
stronger defensive forces most certainly is. Until the U.S.
and NATO agree to also make some force reductions
conventional sufficiency will not be realized. Of course
this is the primary argument of the Soviet military which is
understandably hesitant to make unilateral reductions.
The Soviet military draws very close
parallels between the concept of reasonable sufficiency and
strategic military parity. This becomes an important
distinction because having the ability to retaliate and
inflict unacceptable damage upon the enemy does not
necessarily require strategic nuclear parity, and yet the
Soviet military continues to insist that "the bounds of
reasonable sufficiency of military capabilities are closely
associated with. . .maintaining strategic military parity-
between the USSR and the U.S."^^ , '
The academicians, in sharp contrast to the
military, do not emphasize the need to equate reasonable
sufficiency with strategic parity. In fact, one academic
from the Institute of U.S.A. and Canadian Studies even
suggested that, on an absolute scale, true reasonable
sufficiency can mean armed forces at levels that are even
less than the enemy 's.^^ There has also been the suggestion
from the civilian sector that the Soviet military reevaluate
its basic premise for its force levels. For years the
Soviets have stressed that their armed strength must be
capable of dealing with all potential enemies—a requirement
that would help to partly explain the large size of the
Soviet military. However, now such a policy is being
criticized as "totally unrealistic."^^ Instead, reasonable
^'^Skorodenko, "Military Parity and the Principle of
Reasonable Sufficiency," p. 20.
^^L. Semeiko, "Academic Roundtable on Meaning of
Reasonable Sufficiency," XX Century and Peace . December
1987, p. 17.
^^Karagonov, "Reasonable Sufficiency—Or How to Break
the Vicious Circle," p. 14.
166
sufficiency should only be at a level sufficient to ensure
that the enemy "not be able to count on either a 'local
blitzkrieg' or on escalating such a conflict with
impunity. "^^
Not surprisingly, the civilian Soviet
analysts also tend to emphasize that the concept of
reasonable sufficiency is primarily a political idea: "The
basic premise of this concept is that security is primarily
a political problem. .. .The dominant role in this complex is
played by political factors. "^^ As a political concept it
implies that the problems of security must be solved by
means other that armed conflict, because armed conflict
leads to war which will inevitably become nuclear, a
situation in which no one wins and the fundamental security
of the Soviet Union has not been maintained.
Thus, there is no clear definition of
reasonable sufficiency at this time. It is obvious that it
is meant to reduce both the qualitative and the quantitative
levels of weapons while ensuring that both sides reduce
their offensive capabilities to such a level that offensive
blitzkrieg operations become impossible. It is a concept
which is meant to promote the Soviet idea of strategic
stability which to the military means rough nuclear parity.
^^Karagonov, "Reasonable Sufficiency—Or How to Break
the Vicious Circle," p. 14.
^^Karagonov, "Reasonable Sufficiency—Or How to Break
the Vicious Circle," p. 13.
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In fact, from the military's perspective if the word
"parity" was substituted for "sufficiency" in most of their
publications no essential meaning would be lost. It is
apparent that the concept of parity, which the Soviet
military feels it had to fight so hard to gain, a policy
which, in the attitude of many Soviet leaders, forced the
United States to the negotiating table for the fif'st
Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, will only be relinquished
grudgingly, and probably not without a fight. This is an
attitude that is probably shared by the more conservative
members of the CPSU, and may be an indication of just how
much difficulty Gorbachev is going to have actually
implementing his new policies—especially in the beloved
Soviet military.
(3) Arms Control Proposals . What does the
Soviet Navy have to do with the new Soviet military
doctrine? This is an extremely relevant question since the
doctrine tends to be full of very general, philosophical,
and rather vague concepts which say nothing specifically
about the Soviet Navy or its future role as an important
part of the Soviet military structure. Reasonable
sufficiency, non-offensive defense, or strategic stability
are only ideas, not force structuring guides or war planning
documents. It is possible that these ideas could reflect a
change in the building rate or pattern of the Soviet Navy,
but this may not become apparent until the next Five-Year
Plan is implemented in 1991.
It is for these reasons that it is
imperative to take a very close look at the Soviet arms
control proposals, especially in the naval arms arena. The
Soviets have repeatedly stated that their arms control
proposals are a reflection of the "new thinking" on military 'v--
doctrine. Therefore, at best these proposals are a specific
and concrete example of what the Soviets are attempting to
convey by their new military doctrine. At worst, and
probably more likely, these proposals are a reflection of
real Soviet concerns combined with a proper amount of
propaganda to confuse the Western negotiators and keep the
Western analysts guessing about the true Soviet intentions.
The Soviets have made several different
proposals with respect to navies, such as verifying the
presence of nuclear weapons on board ships or establishing
nuclear-free zones, which will not be discussed here. Only
the more relevant proposals that deal with the operational
nature of navies will be reviewed. ^^
Since Gorbachev came into power, the
Soviets have increasingly criticized the idea that the
primary risk of war is on land. With the build-up of naval
forces in certain oceanic regions, especially the Greenland,
^^See, for example, C.A.H. Trost, "The Soviet Naval
Arms Control Offensive," Vital Speeches . Vol. LIV, No. 14, 1
May 1988.
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Norway, Northern, and Baltic Seas, it has become more and
more probable that a future war would begin on the sea.^^
Accordingly, Gorbachev made one of his first concrete
proposals for reducing this "tension" in his speech
delivered in Vladivostok in July 1986. In this speech
Gorbachev made three important proposals for naval arms
control. First, Gorbachev suggested that the activity -,of'
ships equipped with nuclear arms be limited; secondly, that
a limitation should be established on the competition and
sphere of ASW weapons; thirdly, that ASW activity should be
banned from "certain zones" of the Pacific as a confidence
building measure. ^-^ None of these proposals was very
specific, but they did indicate that Gorbachev was quite
ready to bring naval forces into the arms control arena.
The Vladivostok speech was followed by
several other speeches over the next year in which naval
arms control proposals were again repeated. Gorbachev
emphasized that naval arms control was a regional issue, and
subsequently provided one important speech in each of the
major regions of concern such as Murmansk and Belgrade. In
other speeches Gorbachev also mentioned the need to limit
ASW activity within certain unnamed and unspecified zones.
From these speeches it is apparent that Gorbachev is
^^see, for example, Nikolay Chervov, Moscow Television
Service, 1800 GMT, 22 January 1988, FBIS-SOV-88-015, p. 9.
^^S. Gorbachev, 28 July 1986 speech in Valdivostok,
Moscow Television Service, 1986, FBIS-SOV-86-145, p. 1.
primarily concerned with two operational aspects of NATO's
navies: ASW warfare and the sea launched cruise missile.
The attempts by Gorbachev to create ASW-
free zones does not reflect a new and unique idea. As early
as 1973 a book was published in the United States that
specifically addressed the issue of SSBN sanctuaries and
ASW-free zones. ^^ j^i 1981, Leonid Brezhnev, addressing the
2 6th Congress of the CPSU, recommended "limiting the
deployment of new (SSBN) submarines" within certain
sanctuaries. ^2 The thrust of Brezhnev's proposals continued
to be carried by Adm.iral Gorshkov who more specifically
claimed that the goal was the "withdrawal of the two sides'
missile-carrying submarines from vast regions of their
present patrolling and on the reduction of their movement to
mutually agreed limits. "^^ The proposals to limit SSBN
operating areas to predesignated sanctuaries continued and
seemed to reach their peak in 1983. The U.S. negotiators
refused to discuss any limitations on SSBN operations and
the proposals eventually died.
Gorbachev's proposals have specifically
been for the limitation of ASW activity, and not the
"^^K. Tsipis, A. Cahn, and B. Feld, The Future of the
Sea-Based Deterrent . Cambridge: MIT Press, 1973. See
especially chapters six and seven.
"^^L.I. Brezhnev, Speech at 26th Congress of the CPSU,
Moscow: Novosti Press Agency Publishing House, 1981, p. 39.
"^^S. Gorshkov, "Great Victory: Its Importance, Its
Lessons," APN Daily Review , 29 April 1982, p. 5.
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establishment of SSBN sanctuaries. However, Gorshkov's
successor, Admiral Chernavin, did mention on at least one
occasion the failure of the U.S. to agree to the withdrawal
of SSBNs from the ocean expanses into agreed sanctuaries.^^
In addition, the Soviet Institute of U.S. and Canadian
Studies published an article in which it recommended the
establishment of SSBN sanctuaries away from areas where pre- *
emptive strikes could be made against certain early warning,
command, control and communications systems. ^^ In any
event, ASW-free zones and SSBN sanctuaries would both
achieve the same goal for the Soviets: helping to ensure
the protection of the SSBN and therefore enabling it to
successfully complete its assigned missions. Therefore,
these current proposals of Gorbachev's are by no means new
but are simply using a different means to achieve the same
end.
Gorbachev has made no specific proposal to
limit the operating areas of the SSBN. The only proposal
made by Gorbachev in which he mentioned placing limitations
on the operating areas of ships carrying nuclear weapons was
in an interview with the Indonesian newspaper Merdeka . In
this interview Gorbachev said.
^^N. Chernavin, "Oceangoing, Missile Carrying. Today
is USSR Navy Day," Moskovskava Pravda . 26 July 1987, p. 3.
^^A.G. Arbatov, A. A. Vasileyev, and A. A. Kokoshin,
"Nuclear Weapons and Strategic Stability," SSHA: Ekonomika.
Politika. Ideologiva . No. 9, September 1987, p. 5.
It would be possible to agree to limit the area of
navigation by ships carrying nuclear weapons in such a way
that they could not approach the coast of any side to
within the range of operations of their on-board nuclear
systems. ''
It is clear from the above explanation that Gorbachev is
making a reference to sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs)
and not SLBMs.
The SLCM is obviously of great concern for
the Soviets and in fact was called "an integral part of the
historic program for eliminating nuclear weapons by the year
2 000."^^ The SLCM represents a PGM which is capable of
carrying a nuclear warhead. The Soviets fear that any
progress made in reducing strategic nuclear weapons or
restricting naval activity would be meaningless if the SLCM
cannot also be eliminated.
The Soviets have not made it clear if the
proposal for establishing an ASW-free zone is meant to be
only a peacetime proposal or if it is intended to also be
valid during war. There is no precedent for an agreement
restricting the operations of a weapons platform in wartime
that was not violated. The agreement banning chemical
warfare was followed by most (but not all) countries during
World War II but that was clearly in the best interest of
^"^B.M. Diah, "Answers by M.S. Gorbachev to Questions
from the Indonesian Newspaper Merdeka . " Pravda . 23 July
1987, p. 1.
"^^V. Kalugin, "On the Sea and Oceans: The Naval Aspect
of International Security," Pravda, 28 April 1988, p. 1.
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both the Axis and Allied powers. It is not so apparent that
an agreement limiting ASW activity from certain zones during
a war would be so mutually advantageous. However, the very
fact that the Soviets have again started to mention
establishing ASW-free zones or SSBN sanctuaries is
significant. An ASW-free zone or SSBN sanctuary literally
amounts to a legalized bastion. It indicates that, at least
for the present time, the Soviets are still concerned about
the protection of their SSBN force. The reason for this
increased concern will be made clear later.
(4) Hardware . From a hardware analysis
perspective, which would naturally include the Soviet ship
construction program, there is little that can currently be
used to indicate that the Soviets are truly following their
reasonable sufficiency policy: reducing force structures to
increasingly lower levels. As pointed out in Chapter I,
there can be as much as a 20 year lag between the adoption
of an idea and its full assimilation. Therefore,
signigicant hardware changes may not become evident until
after the turn of the century.
At present, the Soviets are still building
the Typhoon, Delta IV, Akula, Sierra, Victor III, several
classes of surface warships, and of course, their new
aircraft carrier. As previously mentioned, it is hardly
surprising that the Soviets have not reduced their building
rate because they would naturally be hesitant to do so
unless the West, particularly the United States, agreed to
do so as well. Furthermore, even if the Soviets do adopt
the policy of reducing their naval construction rate it is
possible that this would not become evident until the next
five year plan is implemented in 1991.
Meanwhile, despite the rhetoric, the Soviet
Navy's shipbuilding program has been moving along at-, a'
healthy pace in the current five year program (1986-1990)
.
The growth in defense spending assured by the current five
year plan has been used to develop fewer ships in absolute
numbers. However, the ships that are being built are of a
higher quality, and in some cases a very significant
increase in quality, over previous classes. ^^
Among the construction programs for surface
warships the new Soviet aircraft carrier has attracted by
far the most attention among Western analysts. There are
currently two of these carriers under construction with the
first, now called Tblisi instead of Brezhnev "for political
reasons," expected to commence sea trials late in 1989. ^'-^
At a recent conference, the Soviets claimed that the new
carrier is only slightly larger than the Kiev class and, in
fact, was nothing more than a continuation of this class (an
incredible assertion considering that the Kiev displaces
about 40,000 tons and Western estimates of the new carrier
'^^Soviet Military Power 1988 . pp. 35-38.
^^Barnett, "Memorandum for the Record," p. 4.
have put it at 60,000-70,000 tons). It is not yet clear if
the Soviets intend to operate conventional take off and
landing (CTOL) aircraft from the new carrier but there have
been reports of testing of the associated systems . ® *-
It is difficult to understand the signifi-
cance of the new aircraft carrier at this time. Only two
are currently being built and the first is still not
operational. At such a rate it could be well into the next
century before the new aircraft carriers are built in
sufficient numbers to have any appreciable effect on the
naval balance.
The Kirov class, the largest non-aircraft
carrier warships built in the world since World War Two,
currently has three operationalunits with a fourth under
construction. Incredibly, the Soviets recently complained
that the Kirov was a wasted effort because it has no use
except for Third World operations which are of less interest
than before. ^2 j^i addition to the Kirov the Soviets are
also currently constructing at least one Slava class
cruiser, as well as one Sovremmeny and three Udaloy class
destroyers.
^^William 0. Studeman, Director of Naval Intelligence,
Statement before the Sea Power and Strategic and Critical
Materials Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee
on Intelligence Issues, 1 March 1988, pp. 34-35.
82Barnett, "Memorandum for the Record," p. 4.
The Soviets have also continued to make
significant improvements in their nuclear powered attack
submarine force. The Victor III and follow-on submarines
have made considerable advances in sound quieting. The
Akula is a particularly quiet platform which has caused some
concern among Western Naval officers, especially in light of
the illegal transfer of milling machines and sophisticated'
software to the Soviets by Kongsberg Vaapenfabrikk and
Toshiba Machine Ltd. With the traditional three to one
disadvantage in submarines, the United States Navy had been
able to assume that its advantage in submarine acoustic
performance would make up for this numerical superiority on
the part of the Soviets. However, the advances in sound
quieting that the Soviets have accomplished in their latest
generation of submarines, combined with their "ongoing/
dynamic noise control and reduction programs," will
inevitably require a change in submarine warfare tactics. ^^
Tactically, submarine warfare may be reduced to an old West
gunfighter story—he who shoots first wins. In either case,
"a simple reality of acoustic parity is this: US subs are
going to get jumped by Soviet subs, and probably more often
than the force cares to admit. "^^
S^Studeman, Statement before House Armed Services
Committee on Intelligence Issues, p. 30.
^^Kevin, Peppe, "Acoustic Showdown for the SSBNs," U.S.
Naval Institute Proceedings . July 1987, p. 35.
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However, the Soviet SSN force is not
without its problems and, depending on one's perspective,
these problems could prove to be quite serious in the near
future. There are currently 27 first line SSNs in the
Soviet inventory of the Akula, Sierra, and Victor III type.
Moreover, "in 1985, about 2 percent of the entire 'active'
Soviet submarine fleet was at least 30 years old; over one-
half was more than 20 years of age."®^ With such a massive
block obsolescence facing its submarine fleet (including
ballistic missile submarines) there will eventually be a
significant impact upon the Soviet submarine force
structure
.
In fact, the submarine fleet, which
numbered 458 total units in 1985, "by 1995 can plausibly be
expected to count altogether about 250 units," or almost a
fifty percent reduction in ten years. ®^ Of course, this
number assumes about 60 SSBNs by 1995, a number that may
become considerably smaller, in fact, if current arms
control proposals become a reality.
The backbone of the modern Soviet SSBN
fleet are the five Typhoons and five Delta IVs currently
(1988) stationed in the Northern Fleet. At least part of
the Delta IV fleet is rumored to be transferring to the
^^Jan Breemer, "The Future of the Soviet Submarine
Fleet," Armed Forces . January 1988, p. 38.
^
^Breemer, "The Future of the Soviet Submarine Fleet,"
p. 38.
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Pacific fleet within the next few years, but the Typhoons
will probably remain in the Northern fleet because of their
capability to operate under ice.^^
The current START proposal of limiting
warheads on ICBMs to 4,900 could severely limit SSBN
production. A 4,900 warhead limit has been accepted by both
sides, but the difference in positions is presently focused'
on the proper split of the 4,900 warheads between ICBMs and
SLBMs. The United States is asking for a limit of 3,300
warheads on ICBMs with a preferred limit of 3,000. The
Soviets, on the other hand, have countered with a
recommendation of a limit of 3,300 SLBM warheads. ^^
Assuming the U.S. position is eventually agreed upon, this
would leave a total of 1900 SLBM warheads. As Table 5
indicates, with the current inventory of Typhoon and Delta
IVs alone, the Soviets already have 1320 SLBM warheads. If
a future Soviet SSBN force was eventually to be comprised of
only Delta IVs and the Typhoon, then Table 6 shows that if
the U.S. proposal of 1900 SLBM warheads is accepted then
this could mean a SSBN force of seven Typhoons and seven
Delta IVs. If the higher Soviet level of 3300 SLBM warheads
is accepted, this could mean a force of 12 Typhoons and 14
^"^Studeman, Statement before the House Armed Services
Committee on Intelligence Issues, p. 32.
S^Steven Hildreth, Al Tinajero, and Amy Woolf, START;
A Current Assessment of U.S. and Soviet Positions . CRS
Report for Congress, 3 June 1988, p. 2.
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TABLE 5





of of of Total
Tubes Warheads Boats Warheads
20 10 5 1000
16 4 5 320
Note: The numbers of warheads per missile have been
previously agreed upon in the START talks. The Arms
Control Reporter . December 1987, p. 6. 11. d. 71.
POTENTIAL STRUCTURE OF FUTURE SOVIET SSBN
FLEET UNDER CURRENT START PROPOSALS
U.S. Limit Soviet Limit
(1900 SLBM Warheads) (3300 SLBM Warh«
Typhoon 7 12







Delta IVs. The Soviets obviously could build more boats if
they decided to put all of their future warheads on Delta
IVs (or they could theoretically place all warheads on
ICBMs)
, but the point to be made here is that their SSBN
force would still be considerably smaller than the 60 SSBNs
permitted under the existing SALT agreements. In fact, it
is possible that the Soviet SSBN force could be up to 77
percent smaller if the U.S. goal of 1,900 SLBM warheads is
accepted.
A smaller number of SSBNs to protect could
have a serious effect upon the naval aspects of Soviet
military strategy in the event of a future conventional war.
However, the Director of Naval Intelligence, Admiral
Studeman, has stated quite clearly that at present the'
Soviets would use 75 percent of their attack submarine force
to conduct sea control or sea denial operations to protect
their SSBN force. ^^ Furthermore, he explained that only 2 5
percent (or the full remainder of the attack submarine
force) would be used for out of area operations in the
Northern and Pacific fleets. Of the remaining 2 5 percent
"the Soviets will probably dedicate a number of their most
modern SSNs (Victor III, Sierra, Akula, and follow ons) to
strategic ASW missions. "^^
The Soviet Navy's Northern Fleet currently
has 13 6 submarines of all types excluding the SSBNs. This
total would include all of the older diesel submarines as
well as the older Type I nuclear submarines such as the
Echo—not exactly modern ships of the line. If only 25
percent of these boats are used for out of area operations
then this would leave only 3 4 boats. Assuming that all of
^^Studeman, Statement before the House Armed Services
Committee on Intelligence Issues, p. 4.
^^Studeman, Statement before the House Armed Services
Committee on Intelligence Issues, p. 10.
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their submarines were operational and one-third were on
station while one-third were in port and the remaining one-
third was en route, this would leave at most only 11
submarines to conduct other than pro-SSBN tasks, including
SLOC interdiction. The 11 boats would have to be further
divided so that some of them could conduct strategic ASW
operations against Western SSBNs. It is difficultr^etb^
determine precisely how many submarines the Soviets would
dedicate to strategic ASW, but assuming that it would be at
least one and not more than half of the available total,
this would leave only six to ten boats to conduct SLOC
interdiction in the Atlantic with even fewer in the Pacific.
(5) Exercises/Operations . Since 1984, which
appeared to be a peak year, there has been a very slow but
steady decline in the Soviet tempo of operations, and a
reduction in the scope of their exercises. Since 1986, all
major Soviet naval exercises have been conducted "in waters
close to the Soviet mainland." This is a definite change in
the pattern evident prior to 1985 when the Soviet Navy's
exercises were generally on a much more geographically
expansive scale and "demonstrated the (Soviet) Navy's
growing capabilities to expand its combat operating areas in
the Atlantic and Pacific. "^^
^^Studeman, Statement before the House Armed Services
Committee on Intelligence Issues, pp. 39-40.
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Operationally, the average number of
submarines deployed per day decreased from 4 6 to 2 5 between
1984 and 1987, while the average number of surface warships
deployed per day decreased from 31 to 24 during the same
period. ^2 ^he number of days that Soviet ships operated out
of area was reduced by six percent between 1986 and 1987
and, for the first time in this decade, no Soviet ship >made
a Caribbean cruise during 1987. However, the Yankee SSBNs
which discontinued their typical deployments off of the U.S.
East coast, recently returned to their normal deployment
pattern after almost a one year hiatus. ^-^
In both 1985 and 1987 there was a major
deployment of Soviet Victor Ills into the Atlantic off of
the U.S. East coast. It is interesting to note that the
number of Victor Ills reportedly deployed was six, a number
which correlates to the expected number of Soviet SSNs that
will conduct SLOC interdiction in the event of a future
war.^"^ Such a small number does not seem significant unless
it is recalled that the Germans sank 1,150,675 gross
registered tons of shipping in American waters between
^^Michael Gordon, "Soviets Scale Back Naval Deployments
and Large Exercises," New York Times . 17 July 1988, p. 1.
^2
"Soviet Yankees Resume U.S. Patrol," Jane's Defense
Weekly . 30 July 1988, p. 154.
^^"SLCMs in Range of USA in Soviet Exercises," Jane '
s
Defense Weekly . 18 April 1987, p. 699.
January and April 1942, with an average of only six to eight
U-boats. 95
C. SUMMATION
There is no doubt that at least the political aspects of
Soviet military doctrine have changed. However, the
critical question is if and how this change in the political,
aspects of military doctrine will affect Soviet military
strategy, specifically the naval aspects of Soviet military
strategy.
It is clear that the Soviets are serious when they
discuss the reduction of nuclear force levels and the
elimination of all offensive weapons. Gorbachev has
envisioned a world in which the levels of weapons will be
increasingly reduced until they are only reasonably
sufficient for defensive purposes. Nuclear weapons are
especially significant because, in a world in which a
nuclear interchange would be catastrophic, they have lost
their significance as a viable weapon of war.
The arms control issues which seem to be gaining
momentum are also a reflection of Gorbachev's increased
emphasis on political solutions. The Soviet proposals for
the establishment of ASW-free zones is an indication that
they will continue to concern themselves with the protection
of their strategic nuclear forces at sea until nuclear
^^Breemer, "The Future of the Soviet Submarine Fleet,"
p. 40.
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weapons are eliminated. This is especially true as the
numbers of SSBNs are reduced due to the START proposals.
The START proposals are still not a signed treaty—but
there is no reason to believe at this point that they will
not soon be a signed and ratified reality that both the
Soviet and the U.S. Navy will have to learn to live with.
Despite the disagreements on the number of warheads that'
each side will be permitted to deploy on land and at sea, it
is apparent that the resulting Soviet SSBN force will be
significantly smaller; and as the Soviet SSBN fleet becomes
smaller its protection will become even more critical.
After the START agreements each Soviet SSBN that is lost
could represent as much as 5 percent of their total SSBN
force (instead of about 1.5 percent) and, if the target were
a fully loaded Typhoon, a little over 10 percent of the
Soviet Union's total number of sea based nuclear warheads.
At this rate, the losses could build up very quickly.
Considering the Soviet penchant for the mathematical
correlation of forces, this is a fact that they cannot, and
no doubt will not, ignore.
The hardware evidence does not correlate well with the
Soviet rhetoric on their new military doctrine. The fact
remains that the Soviet Navy has not made any significant
reductions in the construction rate of warships. However,
there is no reason to expect any reductions in their force
structure at this point. Gorbachev is still apparently in
the process of convincing the military of the soundness of
his new ideas, and he would probably rather convince than
coerce.
Even if the entire military and senior CPSU leadership
completely agreed with Gorbachev's initiatives tomorrow, it
would be several years before there would be a corresponding
change in Soviet naval hardware that properly reflected 'tfeis-^*?
agreement. This is the basic problem of dealing with
changes in force structure. It literally takes years to
build a modern naval warship and the ships that are being
built today were based upon decisions that could have been
made 15 to 2 years ago. There is a tremendous amount of
bureaucratic inertia in a system as large as the Soviet's,
and even once the decision to make changes is made, it will
probably take a few years before the Soviet shipyards can
respond and begin making actual changes.
There has been a very noticeable decrease in the Soviet
Navy's operational tempo and a reduction in the scale of
their exercises. However, the primary problem of analyzing
operations and exercises is determing the cause and effect.
It is very tempting to say that the recent reduction in the
operational rate and exercises was caused by the economic
restraints that Gorbachev has been emphasizing. Operating a
modern navy is undeniably an expensive undertaking. But
there are other possibilities to explain this reduction. It
seems just as possible that the Soviet Navy is trying to
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keep a low profile while Gorbachev pursues his political
solutions. The Soviet Navy operating at an increased rate
or flexing their muscles by exercising on a global scale
would seem oddly incongruous with Gorbachev's cry for a
reduction of military tensions.
In any case, this chapter has primarily focused on
patterns. In spite of the flaws that are possible in any ^^«
type of analysis, these Soviet actions do seem to fit a
pattern. It is a pattern of "clues" that hint at a search
for political solutions, prevention of war, elimination of
nuclear weapons, and reduction in force levels. A pattern
motivated by economic, military, and technological problems
that the Soviets felt they could no longer afford to ignore.
Finally, it is a pattern which has resulted in a definite
shift in emphasis that could have long term effects on the
future of the naval aspects of Soviet military strategy-
especially the bastions.
VI. FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS
I know from experience that the leaders of the armed
forces can be very persistent in "claiming their share when
it comes time to allocate funds. Every commander has all
sorts of very convincing arguments why he should get more
than anyone else. Unfortunately there's a tendency for
people who run the armed forces to be greedy and self-
,
seeking. They're always ready to throw in your face lihe
slogan 'If you try to economize on the country's defenses
today, you'll pay in blood when war breaks out tomorrow.'
I'm not denying that these men have a huge responsibility,
and I'm not impugning their moral qualities. But the fact
remains that the living standard of the country suffers
when the budget is overloaded with allocations to
unproductive branches of consumption. And today, as
yesterday, the most unproductive expenditures of all are
those made on the armed forces.^
A. FINDINGS
Table 7 indicates the evidentiary support uncovered in
this research for the basic assumptions under Gorbachev and
compares it to the evidence for the 1971 to 1985 Brezhnev
period. There is still no evidence for using the SSBN as a
unique withholding platform. However, even if the
possibility did exist before, there have been a few changes
since 1985 that could resolve this question once and for
all. The Soviet have developed two new mobile ICBM systems,
the rail-mobile SS-24 and the road-mobile SS-25. Mobile
ICBMs present a very difficult targeting problem and can not
only potentially survive a first strike, but could also be
^N. Khrushchev, Khrushchev Remembers . Boston: Little,
Brown, and Co., 1970, p. 519.
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withheld from a preemptive strike for political leverage.
Withholding implies survivability, and the new mobile ICBM
systems are certainly more survivable.
Furthermore, at the START talks the Soviets have
proposed that no more than 3300 of the 4900 ballistic
missile warheads be placed on submarines. Although the
Soviet position is probably meant to limit the number of
U.S. sea-based warheads, if taken at one extreme to mean
literally 3300 sea-based warheads such a proposal could mean
that 67 percent of the Soviet ballistic missile warheads
would be on SLBMs. If this proposal was eventually accepted
it seems very unlikely that the Soviets would withhold 67
percent of their ballistic missile force from a first
strike, whether preemptive or retaliatory. On the other
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hand, under the Soviet proposal all 4900 of their warheads
could be based on ICBMs although this seems to be very
unlikely. Realistically, the Soviets would probably prefer
to maintain a balance between their SLBMs and ICBMs which is
proportionally similar to the present balance. Obviously,
these issues cannot be decided until there is an agreement
between the two sides on the START proposals. .- . :
There is still strong evidence that the Soviets believe
the SSBN to be a very important part of their navy. Admiral
Chernavin still refers to the SSBN as "the main arm of the
Navy," a statement that could have come straight from
Gorshkov.2 However . no Soviet military officer or
academician under Gorbachev has stated that the SSBN can
influence or effect the course and outcome of a war. This
may be due to the fundamental change in Soviet rhetoric
about a future war. Conventional war will eventually become
a nuclear war, and "nuclear war cannot be won." If nuclear
war cannot be won, then the SSBNs role is no longer one of
helping to ensure victory but strictly to deter war by
guaranteeing a retaliatory strike. This would be a slightly
different mission for the SSBN than existed under Gorshkov.
Now, its role appears to be cast primarily as a deterrent—
a
definite downgrade from a warfighting perspective.
^N. Chernavin, "The Ocean Watch for the Motherland,"
Kazakhstanskaya Pravda . 28 July 1985, p. 3.
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There simply has not been a sufficient amount of
evidence since 1985 to indicate that the relative importance
of the SLOC interdiction mission of the Soviet Navy has
changed. It still appears to be an important mission but
not a primary mission. The appearance of the Victor Ills
off of the U.S. East coast the previous two years could be
an indication that this role is being upgraded, however, by
themselves these exercises are insufficient evidence.
There is still strong evidence that the Soviet conven-
tional navy would primarily be used to protect the SSBNs
within their bastions. There are too few carriers in the
current Soviet inventory to assume that they represent a new
power projection role for the Soviet Navy. The fact that it
is conventionally powered would seem to indicate that the
new carrier is meant to expand Soviet air cover further out
to sea instead of conducting power projection missions—but
it is still too early to tell. The rest of the conventional
navy, including the SSNs, are being built at a slower rate
but at a higher quality.
There is no change in the Soviet perception of the
importance of the Central European front. However, the
Soviets seem to be even more convinced that a future war
would at least start as a prolonged conventional war. The
conventional war would inevitably become nuclear, but the
Soviets are not fatalists. Despite the fact that the
Soviets have repeatedly emphasized the inevitable escalation
of a war to the nuclear level, and despite the fact that
they insist nuclear war cannot be won, the conventional
phase has become more important. The fact that conventional
weapons are becoming more accurate and lethal in their
effects portends a future world in which conventional
weapons are going to be a greater concern than nuclear
weapons. By eliminating nuclear weapons this logic would
demand that war could now be won, therefore, conventional
warfare should not be ignored.
There is still no evidence that the Soviets would agree
to war termination if their SSBNs are attrited. Further-
more, no Soviet author ever stated that the destruction of
SSBNs in time of war might be considered an escalatory act
that will necessarily lead to a nuclear exchange. This
seems to be a concern mainly among certain groups of non-
Soviet writers.
Thus, the evidence indicates that, under Gorbachev, the
significance of the SSBN has decreased, and that more
emphasis has been placed on fighting a conventional war.
If the next war is more likely to be a prolonged
conventional war, then it seems logical that the role of the
SSBN will be deemphasized. It is also possible that the
U.S. Navy's publicly declared Maritime Strategy which has
specifically mentioned the SSBN as one of its primary
targets has also led to this deemphasis on its role. There
is, however, still strong evidence that the protection of
the SSBN in bastions is as important as it was up to 1985.
In fact, as the numbers of SSBNs are reduced by future arms
control proposals, their protection will become even more
important.
B. CONCLUSIONS
The Maritime Strategy has been often criticized for
having too many different meanings for too many different
people. It is a strategy that gathered its principal
intellectual roots at the turn of this century. It has been
occasionally reduced to an argument between the maritime and
continental schools of strategy; it has been criticized for
being too expensive or too inherently escalatory. These
arguments, however, overlook a most critical point: the
Maritime Strategy is a warfighting strategy, and it gives
the people who will be thinking about the war and actually
fighting the war a common ground that they can use to anchor
their ideas. It provides a critical structural framework
that can be used to find answers to what is an extremely
complex and important problem: the use of the U.S. Navy in
a future war.
No one has ever claimed that the Maritime Strategy was
meant to be the complete solution to the U.S. Navy's future
problems. The many disagreements that have occurred are
healthy and ultimately to the Navy's benefit. The U.S. Navy
does not claim to have all of the answers; it was a bold
step to present the strategy to the public for all to see
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and criticize. The numerous opinions that have been written
on the Maritime Strategy (and they are almost too numerous
to count) indicate that the strategic planners in the U.S.
and Europe are still thinking very seriously about the Navy'
role in a future war. Up to a point the Navy can make use
of their insight.
Finally, the Maritime Strategy must be considered an
expression of the confidence of the U.S. Navy that it is
more than capable of handling the Soviet Navy. It is a
fundamental acknowledgement by the U.S. Navy that it is good
enough to operate in what are generally perceived to be
Soviet home waters whether the Soviets like it or not.
Although this fact is seldom if ever mentioned by the more
outspoken critics of the Maritime Strategy, after years of
negativism about the abysmal military situation in Central
Europe, such an outspoken expression of confidence is a
relief, it is a sign of hope for both the United States and
our Allies. It is also a message that the Soviets could not
have missed and, although this cannot be proven, the openly
aggressive nature of the Maritime Strategy may have played
an important part in forcing the Soviets to reassess their
military doctrine.
These are the main benefits of the Maritime Strategy as
it has been developed in the 1980s. Other benefits are
important, but secondary.
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However, for better of for worse, the coining to power of
Mikhail Gorbachev in the Soviet Union has had deep
implications for the world, and the Maritime Strategy is no
exception. If nothing else, Gorbachev has forced the U.S.
Navy to reassess its strategy, not necessarily change it.
It is quite possible that ten years from now it will become
clear that despite all of the rhetoric, Gorbachev has not
really changed anything, and all of the worry was about
nothing. But, in the author's opinion, this seems to be
extremely unlikely.
Gorbachev has made it abundantly clear that changes will
be made, even if unprecedented measures must be taken to see
them through. These changes unquestionably will affect the
Soviet military; to a certain extent they already have. The
Soviets have signed the INF treaty, and continue to show a
very high interest in arms control, and they are currently
pulling out of Afghanistan. But the critical question, the
question this thesis has researched, is to what extent has
Gorbachev really introduced changes into the Soviet military
and what are the possible implications of these changes for
the Maritime Strategy? Specifically, do these changes also
affect the primary mission of the Soviet Navy: protecting
its SSBNs in well guarded bastions?
The question is relevant because the bastion concept is
one of the central assumptions of the Maritime Strategy. If
the bastion concept is no longer the critical linkage
between the Maritime Strategy and the naval aspects of
Soviet military strategy (which is directly influenced by
the new Soviet military doctrine) , then changes must be
made. It is the primary conclusion of this research that
the bastion concept will remain an important linkage to the
Maritime Strategy, although it is becoming clearer that, if
Gorbachev is successful, important changes will be made. It
is simply too early to determine if these changes will alter
the Soviet priority for protecting their SSBN force.
There is another option that must be discussed. Even if
the Soviets do not decide to protect their SSBNs as
thoroughly as the West expects, this does not have to
fundamentally alter the basic strategical concepts
promulgated in the Maritime Strategy. It may still be
necessary to conduct a forward offensive because it remains
the best strategical option. In either case, such a change
would inevitably alter the operational and tactical aspects
of the strategy if the Soviet Navy decided to be more
aggressive.
The most difficult problem is discerning whether the new
Soviet military doctrine is really new. There does indeed
appear to have been a change in the political aspects of the
doctrine. However, there still does not appear to be a
significant change in the military-technical aspect of the
doctrine. Colonel General Gareyev, repeating a theme that
is appearing with great frequency, insists that "no state
can guarantee its security by military-technical means
alone. The political moves of many countries are acquiring
more and more importance. "^ However, it is easy to say that
the new political goal is the prevention of war and is
therefore based upon the principle of reasonable
sufficiency—but what does this say about the actual force
structure? The war that the Soviets want to prevent is war
with the West; they have never said that they will not
continue to support wars of national liberation or other
wars which may help them to achieve their goals.
The military still considers the military-technical
aspect of Soviet military doctrine to be their area of
responsibility, and as long as it remains this way they will
be reluctant to sacrifice an offensively capable force
structure. They will continue to argue that such a
structure is necessary if an aggressor is to be firmly
repelled. Furthermore, why should the Soviet military give
up some of their valuable hardware now if many in the West
are willing to believe that the "new thinking" on defensive
doctrine signifies a lessening of the Soviet threat-even if
no vital changes in force structure are made? Threat levels
are a matter of perception, and the enemy's perception of
one's true capabilities can be controlled to a certain
•^M. Gareyev, "Five Goals of Current Military Doctrine,"
Soviet Military Review . No. 12, December 1987, p. 1.
extent. The Soviets have proven themselves to be masters of
this game.
This is the beauty of having two aspects of Soviet
military doctrine. One side can theoretically be changed
without affecting the other
—
as long as it can be dialec-
ticallv justified . Furthermore, the Soviet military
continues to insist that the military-technical aspect of
military doctrine must be a proper reflection of "the world
situation" which remains "complex and strained." As Admiral
Chernavin himself put it, "dreams are dreams and reality
dictates it own laws.""* In other words, no changes can
actually be made until the NATO countries agree. In effect
then, from the Soviet military's perspective, the new Soviet
doctrine is tantamount to saying nothing—at least nothing
that is new.
However, the argument is clearly not over. Gorbachev
and the Soviet military have each indicated that there are
certain fundamental issues which continue to be of great
concern, such as the stagnation of the Soviet economy, the
changing nature of a future war, nuclear weapons, and
finally the impact of modern technology on the future
battlefield. The military's fundamental interests are not
always going to correlate to Gorbachev's fundamental
^N. Chernavin, "70th Anniversary of the Soviet Army and
Navy: Clear Channel," Komsomolskava Pravda . 21 February
1988, p. 1.
interests. The debate continues, and it is possible that
the military will come out on the losing end.
Gorbachev and the Soviet military are concerned about
the basic nature of a future war. For years, most analysts
and politicians in the West have insisted that a nuclear war
would mean the complete devastation of the world as we know
it today. It now appears, after almost 4 years of the
threat of nuclear war hanging over the world, that the
Soviets have actually accepted this idea. The Maritime
Strategy has emphasized the Soviet reliance on maintaining a
positive correlation of nuclear forces; in fact, it could
easily be argued that the entire Soviet Navy is primarily
serving the function of protecting this nuclear correlation,
in both war and peace. And yet, now the Soviets are
seriously discussing the complete elimination of nuclear
weapons by the year 2000. There seems to be a
contradiction
.
It would be foolish at this point not to take all of
Gorbachev's arms control proposals seriously. Like most
politicians Gorbachev will undoubtedly ask for more than he
thinks he can realistically obtain, but it appears that
Gorbachev is quite serious about the elimination of all
nuclear weapons. If this is true then there must have been
a serious reassessment of the importance of the correlation
of nuclear forces.
This means that the apparent contradiction in the Soviet
attitude towards nuclear weapons can be explained. The
changing Soviet outlook about the importance of the
correlation of nuclear forces seems to have been primarily
motivated by the increased concern for the effects of a
nuclear war, as well as the significant impact that the
technologically new precision guided munitions will have on
the future battlefield. If weapons development has
proceeded to the point so that, by the year 2 000, tremendous
improvements in accuracy and destructive capabilities make
PGMs as useful as nuclear weapons, then present concern will
be justified. The nuclear weapon would become unnecessary
and antiquated, its use would simply become too dangerous.
However, until the nuclear forces are completely
eliminated, their correlation will remain critical. In
fact, the correlation of nuclear weapons would become more
critical until they are sufficiently reduced so that they
prove to be no threat to the Soviets. It is impossible to
predict where such a level may be. It may be until the very
last weapon is destroyed or at some intermediate level.
This would depend upon the Soviet definition of unacceptable
damage—a definition that they may not fully understand
until the need truly arises.
The Soviets still realize that the goal of eliminating
all nuclear weapons could be at least a decade away. This
means that reasonable sufficiency and non-offensive defense
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must adapt to the present military and political realities.
Until nuclear weapons are completely eliminated these
concepts must still consider the possibility of retaliation.
Retaliation seems to be a very important Soviet concern, and
the ultimate goal is to remove the need to retaliate by
eliminating all offensive weapons.
If the goal of eliminating all offensive weapons is
achieved then a tremendous economic burden will have been
lifted from the shoulders of the Soviet Union. But such a
goal can only be achieved if the United States and other
NATO countries agree. This is why the Soviets continue to
insist that the levels of reasonable sufficiency depend upon
the United States and NATO.
The evidence indicates that the Soviets will continue to
view the protection of the SSBN force as a primary role for
the navy. Until nuclear weapons are eliminated they must be
protected at all costs. The Soviets recently complained
that a reduction of the numbers of SLBMs by the START treaty
would result in as few as 15 to 20 SSBNs which would make
trailing them more "cost effective".^ Thus, it is clear
that as the START proposals inch their way closer to an
actual treaty the Soviets have become increasingly concerned
about the protection of their SSBN force. This concern is
reinforced by the recent proposals for establishing ASW-free
zones. Thus, the protection of the SSBN in well guarded
^Barnett, "Memorandum for the Record," p. 3.
bastions is likely to become an increasingly more important
mission for the Soviet Navy until all nuclear weapons are
eliminated.
Unfortunately, there is a flip side to the START
reductions that could have a significant impact on the
Maritime Strategy. If fewer funds are spent on the
construction of SSBNs, then more money could be spent on
building more of the newer generation SSNs such as the
Akula, Sierra, and Victor III. Furthermore, fewer SSBNs to
protect could mean that more assets can be released for
other missions, such as SLOC interdiction.
It is apparent that the Soviets, especially Gorbachev,
are very concerned about the decrease in industrial
production and the general downward trend in economic
growth. The military is certainly one area where savings
can be made both in the short term and the long term, and
some of the Soviet academicians have implied that this is
one area where cuts should be made. One academician praised
the period of 1956 to 1960, when Khrushchev (who is not
mentioned by name) made cutbacks in the Soviet military, as
a good example of what needs to be done. The Soviet writer
insists that Khrushchev's decision,
. . .was prompted not so much by military and strategic as
by technological and economic considerations. Nonethe-
less, in the political context of the time, this decision
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worked towards assertion of the principles of reasonable
sufficiency.
^
Khrushchev, as indicated by the opening quote, wrestled
with the very same problem that confronts Gorbachev today.
The very fact that a Soviet writer would allude to
Khrushchev's efforts in this area demonstrates the Soviet
awareness of the importance as well as the precariousness of
the situation.
However, the changes that are currently witnessed in the
Soviet Union, including the changes in their military
doctrine, reflect much, much more than a concern by the
Soviet leadership for the Soviet economy. The Soviets are
faced with a fundamental problem that is by no means unique
to the Soviet Union: what changes will have to be made in
order to ensure that the Soviet Union will remain a global
superpower, or possibly the predominant superpower, in the
21st century? Perhaps it is only natural that as the end of
one century approaches and the beginning of a new one looms
just around the corner, all nations naturally undergo a
reassessment of their current standing in the world, where
they would like to be by the next century, and what will
have to be done in order to guarantee that these goals are
reached.
^Vladimir, Zubok, "The Principes of Reasonable
Sufficiency in the Fifties Through the Seventies," APN
Military Bulletin , No. 6, March 1988, p. 6.
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The United States has not had a shortage of strategic
thought prompted by this end-of-the-century-itch. Books
like The Rise and Fall of Great Powers and 1999 and
documents like Discriminate Deterrence indicate that it also
realizes that the world has reached a watershed. Important
changes are taking place, and the world may be a very
different place in the 21st century. The successful country
will be the one that has thought this through sufficiently
in advance and is willing to make the inevitable sacrifices
necessary to ensure it is able to lead the world.
The changes that are occurring in the Soviet Union are a
fundamental acknowledgement that the world is also changing,
and changing very rapidly. New thinking will be necessary
if the Soviet Union is not to be left behind—and her
current efforts indicate that the Soviet Union has no such
intention. On the contrary, the Soviet Union is probably
intent on forging ahead of the rest of the world. Only by
setting the example for the other Socialist countries can
the Soviets ever hope to reach the goal of global communism.
It is a fundamental goal they have not lost sight of.
What is dangerous is a reliance on the idea that the
Soviets are willing to sacrifice some of their long term
global ambitions to effect a change in their economy today.
They might be willing to make some sacrifices in the short
term, by reducing military spending for example, in order to
make long term gains into the next century. However, they
have shown no indications of actually cutting back and most
likely will not cut back until the West agrees to cutbacks
as well.
The critical questions then become: has there really
been a fundamental change in the Soviet long-term ambitions,
and what will be the implications for the Maritime Strategy
in the 21st century if we make cutbacks now? This is why we
must be cautious, and these questions must remain the
central focus upon which we base our decisions.
C. SUMMARY
The principles of the Maritime Strategy were devised
long before Mikhail Gorbachev came to power in the Soviet
Union. The strategy, based upon many ideas that gathered
momentum in the 1970s, assumed that the Soviets would use
their conventional navy to protect their SSBN force in well
guarded bastions.
The primary effect of Gorbachev's new policies so far
has been the official adoption of a new military doctrine.
The new doctrine was motivated by a combination of Soviet
concerns about the state of the economy, the future of the
nuclear weapon as a viable weapon of war, and the impact of
technologically new weapons such as precision guided
munitions on the future battlefield.
The Soviets have decided that the best course of action
is to reduce their military spending without compromising
their security. Such a task can only be accomplished by
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inducing the West, particulary NATO, to also agree to
cutbacks. This can be best accomplished by the use of arms
control proposals.
One of the primary goals of Secretary Gorbachev is the
complete elimination of nuclear weapons by the year 2000.
Until nuclear weapons are eliminated the Soviets remain very
concerned about having the ability to retaliate in the event
of a nuclear war. Therefore, as these weapons are reduced
the protection of the remaining SSBNs will become even more
important.
Thus, the bastion concept will remain a critical linkage
between the Maritime Strategy and the naval aspects of
Soviet military strategy for the foreseeable future.
However, the complete elimination of nuclear weapons will
obviously give the Soviet Navy a fundamentally new and
different primary mission. Whatever mission is chosen, it
will undoubtedly have important implications for the
Maritime Strategy. It is not too early to look ahead.
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